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ABSTRACT 
State Policy and Urban Housing in Kenya examines the gap between the formal stated 
Kenya Government housing policy objective for housing the low income groups and its 
evident outcome, manifested in the proliferation of informal low income housing. This 
is done by searching into the policy and the institutional framework through which 
housing programmes are implemented using Umcja Tenant Purchase (UTP) scheme as 
a case study. The institutional framework of such housing programmes in Kenya 
normally include several actors from both public and private sectors. 
However, the implementation of this particular UTP Scheme is evaluated by examining 
the role of the key implementing agency, the Nairobi City Council' (NCC). Other 
public and private institutions, namely United States Agency for International Assistance 
(USAID), Ministry of Local Government (MLG), Ministry of Lands & Housing (MLH) 
and the National Housing Corporation (NHC), are only examined in so far as they 
pertain to the issues being assessed. , Subsequently, an assessment of both the socio- 
economic profile, level of satisfaction with services and the tenure status of UTP 
residents is undertaken., 
The findings show that the State policy objectives of housing the low income groups has 
failed and a policy redirection is needed. UTP neither fulfilled its initial objective of 
housing the low income groups nor satisfied the real beneficiaries who hardly fall within 
the target group. The main reasons being the lack of a local conceptualisation of the 
housing problem and how best to solve it and the inappropriate policy instrument of 
housing the low income groups through a single umbrella of home ownership; without 
clear outlined targets at policy level and how to identify them. Subsequently. the lack 
of consensus among the political and the administrative officials, mostly at the output 
stage of policy also limit achievement. As reflected on individual and collective demand 
making, representation of interests and difficulty to resolve conflict which dominated the 
implementation of UTP. 
'Between March 1983 and December 1992, the City Council was called Nairobi City Commission, 
the council having been dissolved due to mismanagement, especially relating to allocation of resources 
within the city. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Developing countries are urbanising at a historically unprecedented rates exerting 
pressure on already inadequate services (Todaro, 1985; Habitat, 1986; Rodwin, 
1987 and Stren & White, 1989). Among the most pressing service needs is 
housing. Provision of housing has been inadequate due to socio- economic and 
political factors. Where housing policies exist, they are frequently unclear and 
poorly implemented. Developing countries, therefore, experience a widening gap 
between the stated policy and policy outcomes. Policies that exist on paper often 
omit important -issues relevant to implementation, such as distribution and 
management. In some cases, policies conflict, making them unimplementable and 
where implementation happens, a number of distortions occur. 
Housing as both an economic good and a basic need is one of the most 
challenging aspects of rapid urbanisation taking place in the developing countries. 
The need for urban housing is generally a consequence of a number of factors, 
which include high urban population growth rate due to rural-urban migration, 
natural increase, a lag in development of infrastructure that supports housing 
development, low purchasing power of the majority of urban households, poor 
management and the lack of appropriate policies, especially those relating to 
building by-laws and standards for low income housing. 
The above factors have contributed to the demand for urban housing often 
out-pacing the supply and hence a predominant shortfall of required units. 
Although shortfalls mostly hit the low income groups, it is experienced by the 
majority of urban residents. This trend is reflected in the predominance of middle 
income groups occupying housing units planned for the low income groups, as the 
low income groups resort to unplanned informal areas. On the other hand, the 
comparatively better off choose between owning their own houses or renting in 
areas of their choice. Additionally, they can also choose to own several units, 
some of which may remain unused or rented out to tenants. In this case, they act 
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as landlords, who view housing as a good form of investment. It is in this respect 
that this study undertakes an analysis of urban housing policy geared for low 
income groups in Kenya, using the representative case of the UTP scheme in 
Nairobi. 
In Kenya, the gap between demand and supply has been wide. For example, it 
was estimated that by the end of 1990, all urban areas in Kenya would need a 
total of 117,652 housing units and that out of, these units, 50,454 were to be 
needed by the city of Nairobi alone (Kiamba & SYagga, 1988). These official 
estimates do not take into account the units produced by the informal sector, 
which often develops more housing units than the formal sector. This 
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of policies aimed at arresting the housing 
problem. 
It has become clear to those interested in urban, development that the mere 
development of additional housing units in the name of the poor or low income 
groups does not necessarily lead to the units being made accessible to them. In 
Kenya, the goals and objectives of the housing policies and plans geared for low 
income groups are rarely attained. This is reflected in the mismatch of the housing 
forms and lack of housing management available. As a consequence. often the 
very poor live in 'unplanned' areas and the middle income groups occupy the 
housing units planned for the poor, in the 'planned' areas. A substantial percentage 
of urban residents occupy units that, in terms of policy and planning, are intended 
for other groups. Of particular concern are the very poor, who, often live in 
appalling conditions. 
Since, the early Seventies, the Kenya government has mostly relied on 
international funds for the development of urban housing. Whereas this approach 
is considered appropriate due to lack of adequate local resources, it has not solved 
the problem of urban housing (Temple & Temple, 1980; Stamp, 1981; Mitullah, 
1984; Kiamba et. al. 1988). Instead it has negatively influenced the ability of LAS 
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to mobilise local resources for the development of housing, as they had done 
before its intervention. International finance, especially that of the World Bank, 
has often been criticised for its inability to reach the urban poor (Payer, 1982; 
Ayres, 1983; NfltuRah, 1985; Van De Laar, 1976). Their approach is based 
primarily on economic determinism and relies on affordability - cost recovery and 
replicability. The core of the approach is to achieve full or nearly fun cost 
recovery with minimal subsidies. Whereas this is an appropriate approach in the 
absence of adequate local resources, it has to be supported by other programmes, 
especially if the interests of the lower income groups are to be met but this has 
not been the case. 
Organisational Structure 
This study is organised into eight chapters, with an introductory note. The 
introductory note states the housing problem summarising the unmanageable 
situation in the developing countries and Kenya, specifically. It also outlines the 
organisational structure of the study by giving a brief review of each of the eight 
chapters. Chapter One is a presentation of the theoretical framework. It begins by 
defining key concepts used in the study and outlining the development ideology 
in Kenya. This is followed by a brief discussion of some prevalent approaches 
(economic determinism, basic needs, socio-cultural, ecological/environmental and 
political economy) used in studying housing provision. Subsequently, adopting the 
political economy approach, due to its ability to integrate the strengths of the 
other approaches. Applying the latter, an analysis, of the unresolved debates on 
housing provision and the role of the State is undertaken. Whereas Chapter Two 
states the objectives, significance and scope of the study. The main objective of 
the study which is to assess the institutional framework, uses the UTP scheme in 
NCC to examine this in detail. Subsequently the chapter justifies the study, 
delineates the methodology and gives an outline of the study area. 
Chapter Three discusses issues in urban housing pointing out the multiple actors 
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and the different interests involved in its production and consumption. This 
contribute to the power interplay among competing interests, consequently 
determining which interests policy favours. The African context is presented 
highlighting the failures of policies applied by most Governments in an attempt 
to curb population movements to the urban areas. A discussion of the Kenyan 
housing policy context follows, pointing out policy evolution, specifying the 
colonial and post Independence housing policies. Subsequently, housing 
programmes and projects; institutional framework for housing policy; housing 
policy mechanisms and the impacts of housing policies are discussed. 
Chapter Four reviews the global nature of urbanisation, exposing the problems 
of service provision and management. It also brings out the unique features of 
urbanisation in the developing countries as opposed to the developed countries. 
The case of Kenya is given an emphasis by discussing both colonial and post 
Independence urbanisation. Subsequently, a discussion of the shortcomings of the 
rural based policies applied by the Kenya Government, in an attempt to curb 
population movements to the urban areas is undertaken. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of management of urban growth in Nairobi, addressing the state of 
services and implication for low income housing. 
Chapter Five introduces the empirical case study of UTP by first undertaking a 
brief discussion on the concept of planning. Following is a background and 
objectives of UTP; establishment of PMU and the implementation and political 
alliances, bringing out inherent issues of contracts, tendering and the allocation. 
Overall, the chapter outlines the initial policy process which went on before UTP 
was implemented, the limited planning on the part of NCC, leaving the funding 
agency to come up with an appropriate plan, and the political interplay which 
halted progress. 
Chapter Six presents the empirical situation of the case study between November 
1992 and April 1993, outlining the socio-economic profile of the residents, which 
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highly contrasts to that of the initial plan. Issues relating to the types of tenure are 
presented. Intrinsic is a discussion of services and their management, types of 
tenure, relationship between tenants and their landlords and the case of resident 
home owners and issues relating to the process of home ownership. 
Chapter Seven merges the key issues in the above two chapters and that of the 
theoretical framework. It analyses the politics of implementation within the 
context of the case study and the Kenyan State policy focus of housing the low 
income groups; bringing out the innate problems in the areas of policy focus and 
institutional framework. Subsequently, important issues within the institutional 
framework such as the management structure, lack of adoptive regulations, the 
requirements of access- to housing and the role of international finance, are 
discussed. Chapter Eight Summarises the findings of the study and draws 
conclusions and reconunendations. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
1.0.0 Introduction 
Provision of housing is one area of urban services that has drawn interest from 
several scholars with diverse backgrounds. In this respect, it has been 
conceptualised and understood differently, depending on the context, analyst and 
the theory adopted. Therefore, in order to be able to understand housing provision 
in Kenya, especially that for the low income group; an understanding of various 
key concepts, the development ideology and some theories, which have been 
advanced in relation to housing provision and the role of the State, is necessary. 
1.1.0 Key Concepts 
1.1.1 Urban housing 
Urban housing or a family shelter has many meanings depending on the individual 
and the context within which it is perceived. Pugh (1990) in his study of Madras, 
indicates that in the popular imagination, a home is a building with a kitchen, a 
bathroom, bedrooms and a lounge. It is built sturdily enough to withstand the 
natural elements, and it has an address on the post office register. This idea may 
be popular in the western concept of housing, but very few aspects of it may be 
applicable within an African context, more so, to an insignificant percentage of 
the population. In appreciation of this position, Pugh notes further that many 
people in India live in shelter which do not fit his definition and hence he adopts 
a definition whereby; 
a house can be many things in both appearance and in its meaning and 
significance to those who live there. It can be a pavement, it can be a 
small hutment standing illegally on public or private land, built in 
ramshackle ways without services (emphasis added), it can be crowded 
tenement where rents or instalments are paid to owners; or it can be an 
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expression of affluence in leafy suburbs', (Pugh, 1990 p. 18). 
The above is a broad definition of a house and can be applied within different 
contexts, including Kenya. Urban housing in this study, constitutes all structures 
(formal & informal) within any urban setting of Kenya, which are used as home 
by urban households. This excludes all housing used purely as business premises, 
offices and for other functions. Urban housing is essentially the residential domain 
of the urban workers, who are employed in the formal and informal sectors. In 
a number of cases some residential areas play double or triple functions, but their 
basic function is first and foremost residential. 
As might be expected, among the residential structures, the unplanned informal 
structures seem to be of worse quality when compared to the planned ones. The 
former, placed on a rough timber framework, are often of two basic types. First, 
the structures are made of recycled metal, cardboard and/or polythene or sundried 
mud walls with floors of either cemented or with hardened mud. Secondly, there 
are structures built entirely of mud brick walls, galvanised iron sheet (GIS) roofs, 
with the floors either cemented or with hardened mud. This latter type of structure 
is an apparent improvement on the former. 
These two types of structure are often located on land which has not been set 
aside for residential use by the planning authorities. Most of these areas rarely 
have water borne sanitation. Kabagambe & Moughtin (1983), argue that in the 
majority of cases the occupants are squatters owning the meagre structure they 
occupy or more often renting it from 'slun-dords, who themselves have no title 
to the land but nevertheless build accommodation for renting. On the other hand, 
the planned structures have concrete block walls, screeded cement floors, as well 
as appropriate roofing materials, all to the standards approved by the city 
authorities. 
For nearly two decades after Independence, informal housing was considered 
illegal. This is because such buildings were not approved by existing legislation 
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contained in the Town Planning Ordinance of 1931, the Land Planning Act of 
1968, the Public Health Act of 1972 and the Building Code of 1968 (where 
adopted). In many instances the buildings are referred to as 'unplanned' by both 
Central and Local Government Authorities but it has been noted that this is a 
misrepresentation, because though some are not up to the standards required by 
the regulations, they are nevertheless planned. A study on Informal Sector 
Housing Finance in Kenya (Mbugua, 1989) found that some informal settlements 
show considerable evidence of being planned but do not meet the rigid standards 
of the Planning By-laws and Building Regulations, which prevents them receiving 
official approval. 
Urban housing should not be viewed in isolation from its various types of 
infrastructure. The above three categories of housing exist in different locations 
with varying degrees of infrastructure. Often the availability of infrastructure is 
linked to the ability to pay for it, either by the consumer or through some kind 
of subsidy., In this case, almost all 'unplanned' structures lack relevant 
infrastructure, such as all weather roads, health and educational facilities. 
Residents of such areas normally rely on services located in neighbouring planned 
areas. In turn, services in these areas are often inefficient due to over-use and 
congestion. 
Although provision of urban housing had been seen at Independence to be the 
domain of the government, the situation has since changed. Currently the 
provision of urban housing in Kenya is undertaken by a number of institutions 
and/or private developers who act as individuals or companies. The informal units 
Cunplanned sector) are in many cases developed by individuals, who are 
desperate for shelter, in relation to their opportunity, to earn an income, albeit 
irregular, but have no resources for renting 'acceptable' units. In most cases they 
live in the units they have built. Some individuals and/or groups participate in this 
task purely on a commercial basis. In such cases, the developers may not 
necessarily live in the units, instead they rent them out. On the other hand, formal 
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housing units (planned sector) are often developed by both public and formal 
private institutions, cooperatives, private developers as well as individuals. The 
public institutions mainly include local authorities, government ministries and 
parastatals. On the other hand, the private institutions include mostly private 
employers and registered individual and/or group developers. 
1.1.2 Forms of housing provision 
There are a number of forms of housing provision. They include both public and 
private. The private can further be divided into private formal and informal. The 
public sector provision has concentrated on, what they refer to as; 'low income 
housing' but has in most cases been occupied by the so called middle income 
group. Thus demonstrating the existence of a housing market even in the public 
sector, the sector that was originally intended to provide an alternative to the 
private sector. The issues surrounding access to housing being determined by 
income alone, when a commodity is in general short supply are difficult to 
resolve. The mechanisms for ensuring that market forces do not apply in public 
sector housing have to be effectively managed. The more so where income is a 
yardstick for access. It is very difficult to quantify, and so far the methods used 
have been unable to present a representative situation. 
In Kenya, housing provision categorises urban households into low, middle and 
high income groups. Indeed, this is an oversimplification, which may have applied 
immediately after Independence but is currently totally inadequate. Although the 
government uses different income categorisation for different purposes, in the area 
of housing, low, middle and high income groups include Ksh. ' '0 - 1,999; 2000 - 
7999 and 8,000 (GOK, 1992) respectively. The government, through Local 
Authorities (LAs) and the National Housing Corporation has been the main 
'At the completion of field work for this study (May 1992), Sixty Kenya shillings was equivalent to 
one sterling pound. At the time of writing (March 1993), fifty Kenya Shillings was equivalent to one 
Sterling pound. One Kenyan pound is equivalent to twenty Kenya shillings. In this study reference is made 
to both Kenyan shillings and Kenyan pounds. 
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agency providing or supporting the provision of formal low income housing en C 
masse. Prior to 1972, provision of what then was called "low cost housing' was 
done mostly through rental schemes in the classic socialist manner by the 
aforementioned institutions. I'hey were inadequately funded and never fully served 
the interests of the low income groups, who turned to the informal private sector. 
A sector which has been providing the shortfall of government efforts. On the 
other hand, middle and high income housing has been the domain of the private 
formal sector. In this study the focus is for low income housing and therefore it 
is relevant to review some of the predominant forms. 
Since the World Bank's en-mass intervention in the area of low income housing 
in 1972, more units have been built but they too have continuously become 
inaccessible to the low income groups. In an effort to keep costs down the World 
Bank's schemes have been based on Abram's and (1964) Turner's (1967) self help 
approach. The thrust of the approach being that 'where dwellers are in control, 
their homes are better and cheaper than those built through government 
programmes or large corporations. The idea of the State as an enabler, assisting 
in mobilising people's savings and initiative in providing themselves with shelter 
has been adopted in many developing countries. The argument behind this 
approach is that the State is too bureaucratic to be efficient at providing peoples 
housing. Instead, the State should stimulate private investment in shelter by 
intervening in the supply of urban land, provision of public services and the 
removal of stringent taxes on housing and land and reform their registration (Linn, 
1983). 
1.1.3 Self Help Approach to Home Ownership 
The self help approach to home ownership has been opted for in view of the 
pressing economic situation in countries such as Kenya and the global nature of 
political economy. 'Ibis is despite its problematic nature in catering for those who 
are most needy and are at the same time at the bottom of the market. In Kenya, 
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they mainly include; I 
(a) sites and services (SS) Which are basically a joint venture between the public 
and the private sector, the former provide public services and land and the 
individuals develop their own housing units. These schemes can entail open 
allocation, overspill relocation and group application (Rodell, 1983 & MacoOloo, 
1989). Two allocation packages exist; first, allocation of a serviced plot with no 
development and the other with a core unit (one habitable contractor built room 
or one with a toilet, kitchen and bathroom room). The allottees are expected to 
develop their houses over time, using partial financial and technical help from the 
LAs. 
(b) Upgrading (UG) is the progressive improvement of informal settlements in situ 
(MacoOloo, 1989). This is done after land tenure has been secured. The theory 
is that it should never displace more than 10% of the population but it often does. 
The government gives loans for durable building materials and provides technical 
advice. Services such as water, street lighting, health, and schools are also 
provided. 
(c) Tenant Purchase (TP) is the same as the above two in relation to servicing 
land but in it there can be units developed to completion, half way through or 
merely core units. Additionally, the allottees are never given title deeds of their 
property until the repayment period is over. 
The above, schemes were not very popular when they were first initiated. For 
example in Kenya, they were seen as creating conditions similar to those in the 
slums, which the State was meant to be improving or moving away from. The late 
president Kenyatta originally did not support their development and maintained 
the above mentioned position (Werlin 1974; Weisner 1976; Amis 1983 and 
Macoloo 1989). An argument has also been raised that some countries accepted 
them'not due to commitment but as a means of securing loans from the World 
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Bank and other international funding agencies (MacoOloo, 1989). 71be developing 
countries have limited options and have to rely on external funding, especially if 
the rhetoric of housing the poor is to be perpetuated. 
1.2.0 Development Ideology and Housing I 
In order to be able to discuss the intricate issues entailed in the provision of urban 
housing, one has to understand the overall socio-economic and political context 
within which it occurs. In this respect, a clear perception of the development 
ideology on which the econon-dc system is embedded is relevant. Kenya's 
economy, like many other developing countries is based on peripheral capitalism, 
which has not evolved to achieve a full capitalist State. In this respect, one finds 
aspects which are typical of capitalist development and some which are not. This 
has implications for housing provision, where a compromise between market 
forces and the welfare needs of those unable to compete in the market, have to 
be considered. 
To some extent, peripheral capitalist countries, such as Kenya, have very minimal 
bargaining power when it comes to the type of development policies pursued. 
This is due to the nature of World Political Economy which surbodinates 
peripheral capitalist States. For example, most countries pursuing self help 
housing policies did not conceptualise them, but rather the well established 
capitalist system, led by the World Bank. Like every developing country prior to 
1989 their systems were a product of the Cold War. The World Bank was doing 
no less than buying allegiance and propagating the Western Block capitalist 
interests. It was asking too much, of new governments who had other priorities, 
like establishing their roles and consolidating their positions. They were pushed 
into the 'welfare approach' to housing by the welfare statism of the developed 
nations, such as Britain. 
The Kenya State has failed to solve the housing problem of the low income 
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groups, in spite of its insistence that all its major programmes are geared for such 
groups. It is the position of this study, that the State has not been focusing on the 
poor but using them, through rhetoric, for accessing international financial 
assistance. In this case, the State should focus on increasing the housing stock and 
forget about maintaining a policy towards the poor, when they are actually not 
benefiting. An understanding of development and its inherent contradictions may 
assist in clarifying some of these intricate and essentially political issues. 
1.2.1 Evolution of Thinking on Development and Relevance of Housing 
The concept of 'development' has been noted to be subjective and extensively 
depends on the values the analyst holds and the subsequent yardstick he/she 
imposes at a given moment of time. The concept has been defined differently by 
respective scholars. Development as economic growth is the dominant school of 
thought, where development is perceived as the growth of the economy, measured 
mainly in terms of changes in GNP. 'Mis study does not wholly object to this 
mode of thought, but concurs with the opposite school of thought which perceives 
development as a multidimensional process. Scholars such as Seers (1972), 
Barkan (1984), and Todaro (1985) among others, fall into this school. The 
multidimensional approach which is a by product 
. 
of' Neo-Marxist political 
economists, is emphatic on viewing development from various perspectives and 
disciplines: it underscores the importance of basic needs (food, shelter, clothing, 
health, education, ) and individual development, economic growth, and political 
realisation. 
Until the politics of multi-partyism, the African version of Neo-Marxist aid 
partially includes the development of the individual, but only the few individuals 
at the top of the society - ministers (and often there are more of them than needed 
or can be afforded) and their two support groups i. e. the top civil servants and the 
military. They had no view of every individual sharing or benefiting, there was 
no en masse notion of looking after 'our' people as was the case in the USSR. 
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Thus there has been no peoples housing, education or health services in reality, 
on the ground; just the hierarchy of government jobs. 
Barkan (1984), for instance, notes that 'development is an inherently ethical 
phenomenon, a set of value judgements about what constitutes a good society and 
about the institutions and processes through which the good society can be 
achieved'. In reflecting on the same issue, Nyasani (1988), in his discussion of "'a 
philosophical justification for planning a city', argues that 'disorder is a mere state 
of mind unreconciled with the object of apparent disorder. This position is 
reflected in the Kenya government's contradictory views of development, as 
opposed to views of those whom the State purports to advocate support for. It is 
therefore important to adopt a multidimensional approach on account of its values. 
Todaro presents the multidimensional aspect of development and is of the view 
that although economic progress is 'an essential component, it is not the only 
component of development which determines development but; 
'development should therefore be perceived as a multidimensional process 
involving the reorganisation and reorientation of the entire economic and 
social systems. In addition to improvements in income and output, it 
typically involves radical changes in institutional, social, and 
administrative structures as well as in popular attitudes and, in many cases, 
even customs and beliefs' (Todaro, 1985. p. 61). 
This contention is relevant in analyzing development in the developing countries. 
Most of these countries had economic growth during the 1950s, 1960s and a part 
of 1970s but there was no tangible improvement of life for citizens. This 
demonstrates the problematic nature of analysis by experts. The country may 
have improved its economy, but 90% of the people living in it did not; whereas 
the hierarchy improved its living standards greatly. Most aspects of development 
are relative and in Africa, as 80% of the population (up until recently) lived 
subsistence lives in the rural areas - they were not unemployed (as defined by 
economists from the West) and they were not unaccepting of the social structure 
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of their traditional village life. At best, they lived in a 'poor' but stable situation 
with some recourse to education, health care and justice. At worst they were 
exploited, lived near the bread line and were in effe6t slaves to a local rural 
hierarchy. It was what happened over the last 25 years since Independence - 
'development'; that has broken up the traditional societies - caused migration to 
the urban areas - made people dependant on the State and therefore 'unemployed', 
without 'Justice', and without subsistence food. This has led to them becoming, 
in a real sense poor relative to the previous rural subsistence. 
Seers (1972), argues that according to the relevant aspects of development, one 
should examine the 'levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality and where 
these aspects have improved, one can argue that development has taken place but 
where they have deteriorated, even if the per capita income has improved, it 
would be strange to call the result 'development'. Such a perspective has had 
economic development in the developing countries being redefined in terms of the 
reduction or elimination of poverty, inequality, and unemployment within the 
context of a growing economy; tasks which to date pose a major problem to these 
countries. 
In most of the developing countries, including Kenya, development was defined 
by colonialists. Often the rhetoric was economic growth determined by Gross 
National Product with expectation that the macro-approach would have an effect 
and 'trickle-down' to raise the general standards of living. Indeed a demonstration 
of the little understanding the colonialists had of the real political situation in the 
developing countries. In real terms the colonialists did not want economic growth 
so much as they wanted to trade/exploit particular resources. To some extent this 
approach is still prevailing under "new' forms of capital development such as 
multi national corporations and bilateral/multilateral State agreements. Whereas 
the economic growth concept of development is relevant to development 
economists, it has not resulted in benefits of economic growth penetrating all the 
required societal structures. More so, to the disadvantaged rural and urban poor. 
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To such groups, the definition of development is often different. To them, it is 
that process which involves promotion of their well-being through active 
participation; a dynamic process geared towards maximum utilisation of resources 
within their reach. Such type of development are expected to strengthen peoples' 
ability to move from one quality of existence to another higher level of life. It is 
this definition, that those who develop and/or stay in the informal settlements, 
conceptualize as they struggle to house themselves. Whether such a process brings 
quantifiable national gain (which is statistically quantifiable by economists), seems 
not to be the concern of those that say they represent the vulnerable groups. 
Kenya's official perception in the area of housing development has often 
contradicted the peoples' view. The official trend is a requirement of planned 
development, based on standards coupled with building regulations, and is a 
hangover from the partisan colonial approach. Any development contrary to this 
is viewed as against required regulations and hence given marginal recognition. 
This was originally understandable but not now. The stand has largely been 
influenced by the ideology and development conception of the government, which 
is based on peripheral capitalism. Stren (1984) in his discussion of "urban policy 
in Kenya and Tanzania" indicates that the capital city of Kenya, Nairobi, had an 
emphasis on 'prestige development'. Presumably as a consolidating symbol to the 
new elite. This contention is supported by the type of urban policies pursued by 
the Kenya Government before 1974. A period which witnessed what Mabogunje 
refers to, as restrictive government policies (Mabogunje et al, 1978). In Kenya, 
the period did not recognise the role of the informal sector. Like other developing 
countries, under restrictive policies the Kenya Government attempted to solve the 
housing problem by eliminating low-income communities. This meant exclusion 
from urban services such as water, electricity, sewerage systems, education and 
health care. The lack of services was viewed as a method of discouraging 
residents from residing in urban areas but this failed and Government resorted to 
complete demolition of the so called 'illegal areas'. 
27 
These restrictive policies demonstrate how governments do fail to integrate the 
peoples perception of development into their own plans. But may be it was naive 
to suggest that they ever could. Governments in most countries in Africa have 
been noted not to come with a sense of responsibility but only with a sense of 
what they can personally gain. The former has to be taught them constantly by 
the people. Choices for development are not self-evident, nor do they seem to 
involve peaceful and effective processes (Fantu, 1989). Webster in the same 
context, -notes that, planned social change should include the peoples' perception 
of development (Webster, 1990). Further, it is in view of the problematic nature 
of development that Barkan comparing the meaning of development in Kenya and 
Tanzania, observes that what Tanzania viewed as development was viewed as 
underdevelopment in Kenya (Barkan, 1984). To compromise the contradiction, he 
adds that the relevant questions of development should be 'of how and under what 
conditions, one may devise policies which are more effective for realising the 
particular concept of development'. 
The above observations infers a clear misunderstanding by policy makers, 
planners and administrators of what the people who need housing view as 
development in this sector. Without such considerations, development can be 
negative and even dangerous as Seers (1972) maintains in his discussion on the 
meaning of development. There is need, therefore, to understand the concept of 
development, as it relates to housing, and as far as different interest groups 
(Central and Local government officials; the private - formal and informal sector, 
landlords and tenants) are concerned. The lack of understanding and integration 
of the peoples' development perception has, in a number of cases, led to an 
interference in their efforts to house themselves. What is required of the planners, 
administrators and policy makers is the integration of concepts of such individuals 
in the planning endeavour, a task which, until the era of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), 
was difficult for conservative officials, with development models that often did 
not link to the local context in any way, to grasp, never n-dnd implement. 
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1.3.0 Theoretical Approaches 
r1bere have been several approaches applied globally in analyzing housing. 71bese 
can assist the choice of an appropriate theory which may help to explain the case 
of Kenya. Among the various approaches, economic determinism has been 
predominant. Other approaches include; socio-cultural, ecological/environmental, 
basic needs (welfare) and political economy. 71bis study applies a political 
economy approach, which takes into consideration the socio-economic and 
political interplay that goes on, in the policy and the inherent institutional 
framework of the urban housing process. It is however, necessary to discuss all 
the above mentioned approaches, in order to bring out their strengths and 
weaknesses and finally to adopt their strengths within the political economy 
approach. 
Economic Determinism This approach has perhaps been the most applied because 
economics has often been used in determining most issues relating to national 
development. It addresses housing provision in terms of market forces of supply 
and demand. Subsequently, there is a strong belief that the market is able to 
generate the kinds of housing people need. Whereas this is broadly true, it tends 
to cater for those able to compete in the market. Most low income groups are 
unable to participate in the market and therefore get sidelined. 
The economic benefits related to housing are numerous, and economic 
determinism cannot be taken lightly. Housing as an economic good greatly 
contributes to the general economy. Its importance is reflected in the construction 
industry with a potential multiplier effect on other areas such as manufacturing 
and transportation; with the possibility of creating better and more employment 
opportunities. McCallum and Benjamin (1985), have summarized economic 
benefits into two categories (main stream economic and broader economic 
perspective). The first category includes housing as; consumption, improver of 
health and well being, macro economic sector, stimulater to: savings and 
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investment and indirect contributor to income and production. The second 
category, on the other hand, includes housing as a shop, factory, rental income, 
financial asset and as an entry point to the urban economy. 
Tipple (1990), in assessing the above benefits of housing argues that the main 
housing problem in the developing countries is that people cannot afford enough 
housing both at State and individual levels. To him, it is a poverty problem and 
ways and means of generating income should be sought. This position is closely 
linked to the availability of finance, be it from formal or informal sources. 'Me 
implication is that, without the availability of adequate incomes, even the power 
of market forces may be rendered useless. Besides, the income should not only 
be adequate but regular over a period, that can be as long as twenty five years. 
The problem of finance for housing exists in most economies and it is not rare to 
have situations where housing units may exist in the market but are not 
necessarily affordable. At times cases are realised whereby the rising inflation 
rates push interest rates to unaffordable levels, and both rents and mortgages are 
raised due to economic considerations. This is because private developers and 
financiers often use economic determinism as a measure for setting their priorities. 
There has to be proof that the funds plus inherent profits will be realised, before 
any housing development and/or financing can be undertaken. In the developing 
countries the situation is worse, because profits are supposed to be realised over 
a very short period of time due to political instability. This has helped to make 
interest rates high and unaffordable leading to rapid development of informal 
strategies of housing. A development which ironically most governments have 
fought without success. This failure being largely due to the adoption of economic 
determinism and aesthetic values as an approach to housing, without taking a keen 
interest in those who cannot be catered for by the open market, or who are grossly 
exploited by it. 
Nevertheless, econon-dsts have no consensus on the issue of whether housing 
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should totally be left to market forces (Aaron, 1972, Harris & Seldon, 1977), or 
whether there should be government intervention (Harms, 1972, Stretton, 1974). 
Both the World Bank and UNCHS have agreed on an 'enabling strategy', without 
clearly bringing out the details of enablement. Free market proponents argue that 
housing is no different from other goods that require government intervention and 
the best approach is to leave it to market forces. This in turn allows a 'filtering' 
process, whereby houses vacated by households moving to better, newly built 
accommodation are released to lower income groups. However, this assumption 
does not operate very well, since it works slowly and at times the vacancy chains 
are broken before the poor can benefit (Stewart, 1979, Malombe, 1990). 
Additionally, it reduces the poor to doubling up with others, moving to worse off 
units and sometimes paying more than 20 - 25% of their income (Harms, 1972). 
Economic determinism approach requires a growing economy sustained over 
several generations, which is not the case in most developing countries. At the 
same time it does not take account of one fundamental difference concerning 
housing; that it is locational and cultural. 
The lack of consensus on whether housing should be left to market forces or not 
is a critical concern in the developing countries, where the general performance 
of respective national economies is mostly poor. In such economies, economic 
determinism can lead to serious housing problems as, has been seen in some 
countries. This approach tends to be more applicable to the developed economies 
such as the U. S. A. and Britain. In such economies, housing provision is mainly 
determined by the forces of the market which determines the price of houses, type 
of tenure as well as land use (Stewart, 1979; Ball, 1983 and Kemp, 1989 ). In 
retrospect, although the economic depression of the late 1980s into the 1990s may 
be changing, the trend is that most owners lose their homes through repossession; 
these countries have realised the development of private housing occupied mostly 
by owners. Governments of such developed economies may be justified in 
concentrating on enabling the market forces to provide the majority of housing. 
Contrary to this situation, the direct involvement of the public sector in housing 
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development is very crucial in the developing countries. More so, where there are 
substantial economies of scale, externalities, market imperfections, lack of 
information and where individual households are unable to find solutions to 
housing by themselves (Ondiege, 1988) 
Most governments of the developing countries pursue mixed policies which 
combine both the promotion of public and private sector. However, with the 
continuous realisation of poor economic conditions and the push by international 
finance to take an enabling role; many governments are turning to the private 
sector and the informal sector for housing provision. They are adopting what Pugh 
(1999) refers to as the World Bank approach, based on a Neo-liberalist political 
economy, with an emphasis upon individualism, the free market and the user pays 
principle. The Bank believes that investment in housing is not an efficient way 
of using public resources, especially when compared to such activities as the 
provision of services, and measures to provide security of tenure (World Bank, 
1979). Pugh points out that the theory was formulated at the time of McNamara's 
poverty programme without much knowledge of the urban set-up of the 
developing countries. At the same time, the approach is aimed at the Banks' 
economic interests and not those of the lower income groups as has been 
advocated. It is based on economic determinism, using the principles of 
affordability, cost recovery and replicability. It has assisted in increasing the 
national urban housing stock but has failed to meet its objective of housing the 
urban poor as MacNamara anticipated. 
The emphasis on market economy on which the principle of econon-dc 
determinism is based may be more appropriate where markets have developed and 
are recognised as the dominant modes of provision. This is despite the fact that 
a country's level of development imposes limits on what governments can do in 
providing public goods and services such as housing to citizens. A good example 
is Libya where the availability of resources based on oil has made it possible to 
provide most citizens with a near adequate services, housing included (Awotona, 
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1990). In most of the sub-Saharan Africa, where resources are so scarce, public 
services are far from being met as most nations struggle to achieve basic socio- 
economic development. 71bus implying that these countries have to adopt 
approaches which go beyond mere economic determinism. 
Socio-CulturaL Despite the predominance of economic determinism in housing 
issues, it should be noted that a number of factors, which are not necessarily 
economic also play a key role. They influence the housing process and have to 
be taken into consideration. One of these variables is the socio-cultural 
underpinnings. It refers to values and attitudes of people with respect to the 
housing process. In particular, values and attitudes relating to the housing unit 
occupied or that which a household would prefer to occupy. This includes house 
size, number of rooms, arrangement, use of space and location. Koth et al (1965), 
noted that housing reflects social attitudes and traditions of people. Adedokun 
notes that in a number of political systems the failure of housing policy is related 
to the'problem of wrong determinants. Particular cultural housing values of a 
nation or people are quite often disregarded. In conclusion, he maintains that since 
the perception and definition of housing problems confronting specific 
communities is often wrong, appropriate policy formulation, legitimisation and 
implementation cannot be realised (Adedokun, 1989) 
Adedokun argues further that the trend in the developing countries has been to 
perceive housing policies in terms of laws and regulations without an appropriate 
conception of what the legal requirements fully imply. This has been accelerated 
by the inability of most governments to completely dismantle some laws and 
regulations that were colonially oriented and do not suit either the prevailing 
conditions or the socio-cultural orientation of given nation States. The majority 
of such regulations are heavily loaded with concepts which owe their origin to 
Western culture. 
In Kenya, for example, the building standards and by-laws have continued to be 
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a bottleneck to housing provision. After thirty years of Independence, the country 
still retains colonial building standards and by-laws. Ibis probably suits those in 
government who have benefitted from these , standards. The majority of the 
concepts in the by-laws and regulations are foreign and more conducive to 
Western cultures than the local situation. Meanwhile, the enterprising urban 
residents continue to construct what for them is socio-culturally acceptable and 
affordable. In turn, the government refers to their adoptive housing measures as 
illegal, unplanned and sub-standard. If what Adedokun refers to as 'particular 
cultural housing values of a nation or people' would be identified, appropriate 
policy formulation and implementation may be realised. However, capturing 
cultural values, may be as political and difficult as capturing the national interest 
within any given context. 
Considering the above, the adoption of a socio-cultural approach to housing has 
to be done with caution, especially in urban areas where ethnic plurality 
predominates. It may be more applicable to rural areas where communities are 
still closely knit. However, with the kind of changes taking place in rural areas 
(for example, land scarcity leading to migration to foreign areas), the approach 
seems to face a threat. In the developing countries there are a variety of cultures 
which influence the housing process. More so, the urban areas of the developing 
countries are composed of very complex networks which the approach in isolation 
can not easily capture. 
EcologicallEnvironmental protection has become a development agenda as the 
globe approaches the year 2000. In housing, the approach contends that one does 
not only have to look at the housing unit and its inhabitants, but has to go beyond 
the housing unit. It maintains that ecological/environmental factors have a 
tremendous effect on the setting of housing sites and estates, construction, 
technical requirements and the variety of materials used, as well as on spatial 
arrangement, among other things. In the past the approach has mostly been used 
in rural settings where the ecological conditions often determine the type of 
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housing and development which take place, in relation to site, location and 
building materials used. However, with the new trend of environmental protection 
it is becoming an element of consideration even in the urban areas. 
Bugnicourt (1979) appreciates this approach by indicating that environmental 
variety and the contrasting life-styles of those who thrive on it are undoubtedly 
important factors in determining the varying types of dispersed dwellings. Despite 
this perception, the approach may only work if control measures are applied. Gans 
(1976) indicates that ecological explanations of social life are most applicable if 
the subjects of study lack the ability to make choices. In this case, the approach 
assumes a static situation, which is never operational in development. Even within 
the continent of Africa, where the population is predominantly rural, the 
ecological/environmental conditions have been disturbed to the extent that one 
cannot capture their effect, using the approach on its own. 
In his critique of the approach Wanjohi (1988) points out that given the changes 
that have taken place in several societies in terms of new patterns of econon-dc 
production and social orientation, and given the intrusion of ý many external 
cultural influences and improvements in technology, the importance of the 
approach is likely to be challenged in the developing countries. He views it as a 
transitory approach which will give way to other approaches as society develops. 
To this study some aspects of the approach are relevant. This includes the use of 
appropriate building materials, although the materials are almost depleted and 
probably cost more and at the same time their sources are often outside the urban 
areas. These shortcomings are due to the disturbance and subjection of the 
environmental conditions to human control. A case which only weakens its usage 
but does not totally dismiss it. 
In recent years! environmental issues have became central to development and 7 
hopes of conserving and resuscitating some of the depleted natural resources is 
dominant. In this case, a continent such as Africa, which still has substantial 
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natural resources can exploit the situation by using a number of natural building 
material where applicable. Such an approach ought to have been taken 
immediately after Independence but the Western influence with its distorted 
perception of development made such options be viewed as backward or 
% underdeveloped'. Currently, Africa is being pushed by its economic situation into 
looking for internal solutions to most of its problems. Whether this will result in 
an appropriate perception of development, which prides itself in usage of available 
local resources, is not known. 
Basic Needs This approach has been popular even among welfare economists. Its 
premise is that an efficient urban system should play a major role in delivering 
basic needs of life (Sandbrook, 1982). It is closely linked to the welfare 
perception of economists and does not subscribe to the trickle down development 
approach, which some of the developing countries have been relying on. In poor 
economies such as many of those in Africa, one finds GNP increasing as the 
incomes of low income groups stagnate or deteriorate. In this respect, Alderman 
& Morris (1973) argue that on the basis of cross section data, development is 
accompanied by an absolute as well as relative decline in the average income of 
the poor. Inferring that growth alone is not capable of eliminating poverty or 
reducing the numbers and hence the need for a development approach, which 
views access to basic goods and services as the objective. Overall, the basic needs 
approach raises the issue of satisfying basic needs of those who are not able to 
satisfy their needs through the market. It views access to housing as a necessity 
of life which must be enabled by the State and/or other development agencies 
including NGOs. Indeed an attempt to give capitalism a human face (UNICEF, 
1987). 
The basic needs approach views housing to be for people and not for profit. 
Within it, housing production organised on profit maximisation is not seen as the 
way forward but one organised on social needs, which the approach acknowledges 
as leading to social justice and greater productivity. This approach does not 
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operate on need being qualified by ability to pay as in the case of the economic 
determinism approach. However, the current economic trend and the exit of the 
socialist block seem to be making the total use of this approach difficult. In some 
of the developed capitalist States such as Britain and USA, the welfare State has 
been cutting off expenditure on basic needs-oriented programmes. 
Despite its problematic nature, when applied, it invariably assists in understanding 
some of the issues, for example, 'standards' or 'felt needs'. However, the approach 
has often had problems of locating the right target group. This is because it is 
based on an assumption that a certain group is unable to access services. An 
assumption which is not easy to quantify in the developing countries where data 
is never readily available. The classical application of the approach mainly refers 
to food, shelter and clothing. However, in recent years, the concept has been 
broadened to include a full interpretation of life which includes; social, material, 
culture and political aspects of life (Stewart, 1985). 
The Political Economy approach is applied in this study in an attempt to 
understand urban housing policy in Kenya. There are mainly four strands of 
political economy; Liberal, Nationalism, Marxism and Neo-Marxism. This study 
adopts a Neo-Marxist political economy framework. It integrates the relationship 
between politics and economics (Barrat, 1984; Todaro, 1985) and takes into 
consideration other aspects, such as social structure and the inherent social 
relations. Todaro argues that it is concerned with the relationship between politics 
and economics, with a special emphasis on the role of power in economic 
decision making. It looks at the social and institutional processes through which 
certain groups of economic and political elites influence the allocation of scarce 
productive resources, either exclusively for their own benefit or for their own 
benefit plus that of the larger population. 
This study contends that the political economy approach is able to provide a 
compromise of the other approaches by utilising the strengths in each, in order to 
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have a comprehensive look at the urban housing policy process in Kenya. It is 
capable of explaining a number of issues relating to the housing process which 
are full of competing interests. Wanjohi (1988), in his adoption of the approach 
in examining rural housing in Kenya, notes that a single approach analysis is 
bound to land in greater difficulties in the developing countries, because most of 
them still harbour several of their traditional orientations and socio-econon-dc 
activities, along side the externally effected changes in several spheres of life. 
Therefore, the approach is adopted because it takes into consideration not only 
economic, ecological (environmental), socio-cultural, basic needs but also the 
political and institutional factors. In applying this approach, the nature of housing 
production and the role of the State are discussed. 
1.3.1 Nature Of Housing Production 
As already mentioned, urban housing in Kenya integrates both formal and 
informal settlements. The dual nature of urban housing in the developing countries 
has been analyzed by a number of political economists. The centre of the debate 
being whether the two have any links and if so of what nature? The informal 
settlements house over half the urban population of the developing countries and 
therefore fall within the informal sector of the economy. This sector should not 
be seen in isolation from the formal sector. A Neo-Marxist political economy 
perception that views the informal sector purely as a petty commodity production 
mode, may seem appropriate. Veechibala (1984), points out that, like the 
dominant mode of production the petty commodity mode is a form of market 
exchange, in which surplus value of production, regardless of economic 
significance, is created and appropriated by private enterprises. He further notes 
that petty commodity production responds to gaps in the demand and supply of 
goods from the dominant mode, and thus the situation is created due to: difficult 
access to the goods of the dominant mode of production, which may be as a result 
of long distance, high level costs, and other inconveniences; high or unaffordable 
costs of goods from the don-dnant mode of production and scarcity of goods. 
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The above factors clearly demonstrate what leads a high percentage of the urban 
dwellers to resort to the informal sector for accessing housing as well as other 
basic needs. In 1991 the sector created 60,000 new jobs, accounting for 60% of 
all new jobs created outside small scale and 25% of all people engaged. 71is 
underscores the sectors potential in absorbing the growing labour force (GOK, 
1992). In Kenya, most of the low income urban dwellers cannot afford what is 
produced by 'big capital', even when subsidised by the State. 7bus they have to 
rely on the informal sector. Between 1979 and 1989, the sector accounted for 
housing construction of between 60 - 80% (Hoek-Smit, 1989). It is, therefore, not 
ironical but creditable that besides the failure of the Kenya government, like other 
African governments, to formulate and implement appropriate urban policies, the 
urban dwellers, especially the poor, still survive. This survival is based purely on 
their disillusionment with the official peripheral capitalist and entrenched political 
system, resulting in an ability to create their own system (Informal Sector), able 
to cater for their needs. It was not recognised as important by the capitalist mode 
of production until it became a significant reservoir of labour, transmitter of 
technology, competitor and a consumer of capitalist consumer products. 
Capitalist States have been known to be only interested in the aspects of housing 
which enhance the survival and development of capital. To most Neo-Marxist 
political economists (Basset & Short, 1980; Rakodi 1986), housing in relation to 
capitalist development is viewed as; 
a commodity and a source of surplus value for certain forms of 
capital; 
part of the necessary consumption of workers and as such an aspect 
of the reproduction of labour power; 
linked with reproduction of social relations of capitalism; 
likely to be an area for social class conflicts and a focus for State 
intervention. 
Burgess (1978) pioneered defining modes and forms of housing markets in the 
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developing countries. He classified housing by mode and form of production into 
the dominant capitalist mode of production, which produces the industrialised 
form of production, and the dependent petty commodity form of production, 
which produces manufactured and self built forms of housing. In the industrialised 
form, capital is invested according to laws of capital accumulation, giving rise to 
particular organisational channels of the production process and a product 
consumed entirely through the mechanism of the market. 
In applying the classical laws of capital accumulation, Burgess' contention may 
apply. However, housing production and consumption has become more 
complicated and classical laws of capital accumulation have to be applied with 
caution. Public housing is not allocated in accordance with the market criteria. 
While its production is industrialised, consumption is affected by forces other than 
those of the market (Drakakis-Smith, 1979). 
In spite of the relevance of Burgess' classification of housing modes they have not 
escaped criticism. Johnson (1984) maintains that housing types and their 
production, should be viewed as % continua' and the focus should be on-the 
relationship between the capitalist and other sectors and particularly the way in 
which the future development of petty and quasi-capitalist forms is dependent on 
and determined by their relationships with the capitalist mode. Economic 
activities should be seen in the complexity of linkages between production and 
with the capitalist production sector dominating the petty commodity production 
mode (Moser, 1982). In practise, as with any attempt to divide production into 
a limited number of categories, they are neither fixed nor totally distinct; instead 
their characteristics and the relationships among them change over time. One 
reason for such changes may be the extent to which government policies influence 
the interconnections between the various modes and forms (Rakodi, 1992). 
ne close link and interaction which take place between the two modes of 
production has become an acceptable view. In Kenya, the informal mode depends 
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on the formal sector for a number of resources and the two cannot be isolated as 
such. Arnis (1986), discussing the case of East Africa, argues that the limits of 
capitalist proletarization are important in explanifing survival strategies and 
ultimately political responses. Subsequently, this study contends that a reasonable 
number of cities in Africa, especially those which fall within countries classified 
by the World Bank as low income economies, are being maintained by the 
informal sector. In the area of housing production, about half the population are 
gaining from the sector. It is a logical and necessary development of peripheral 
capitalism, whereby the national bourgeoisie, is not formed but struggling to 
develop. At the same time, both the government and the national bourgeoisie are 
unable to sustain their international economic networks; which are essentially 
unfavourable to them and to their national economies, especially the informal 
sector. As this goes on, cities are rapidly deteriorating, as larger numbers of 
people resort to the informal sector for accessing services. 
The survival syndrome of the urban masses in the developing countries has been 
exhaustively discussed by Harnando de Soto (1989), using the case of Peru in 
Latin America. He points out that the sector is the spontaneous and creative 
response to the States' incapacity to provide the basic needs of the impoverished 
masses. 'Me situation is no different in Africa, where the personal 
aggrandizement and perpetuation of the international economic networks 
overshadows the need to formulate appropriate urban policies. Most African 
governments, formulate policies which ostracise the urban masses. In cases where 
appropriate policies are formulated they hardly go beyond the paper they are 
written on. Overall, policies which favour international economic networks and 
the local elites are often preferred. This is because of the nature of the coalition 
of the two groups. Basically, the politics of vested interest prevails in such a 
situation and it hardly favours the majority of citizens. This is clearly 
demonstrated in, the , World - Bank-funded SAPs , policies, most of, them 
implemented since the mid Eighties. 
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Besides the above, there is too much government control without the exercise of 
their responsibilities in form of the provision of all kinds of services, investment 
to create employment opportunities and a defined participatory policy to promote 
general development and civic protection required of modem governments. All 
this has continuously kept the great majority out of the main stream of 
participation and access to resources. The few who are able to participate and 
influence the allocation of resources, such as housing, have to depend on other 
loyalties such as party membership, kinship and other informal methods which by- 
pass procedures. Somehow the poor do not seem to penetrate this network, 
leaving them trapped at the bottom of the housing ladder (Inamenti, 1987). 
Public policies having failed to deal with the poor; the poor have created an 
alternative mode of provision, referred to in official circles as 'informal'. In some 
countries it has realised more growth than the formal sector. The potential of the 
informal sector in Africa was acknowledged as early as the beginning of the 
1970s (ILO, 1972; Hart, 1973; Mcgee, 197 1). Despite this, most governments did 
not exploit it, on the basis that it was illegal. 'Ibis position has been rapidly 
changing due to the econon-dc constraints which many African governments have 
had to face and the subsequent push by both the World Bank & IMF for the 
adoption of SAPs. This move has witnessed the preference of working through the 
private sector as well as the Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the 
community groups they support. A trend which seem to be a threat to the role of 
the State. It is therefore worth examining the role the State is going to take in 
výew of the prevailing circumstances. 
1.3.2 The Role of the State 
The role of the State is key to the understanding of the urban housing policy 
process (or non policy process), more so in the light of pressing economic 
circumstances. The reasons for State intervention in specific activities going on 
within its sovereignty has never been compron-dsed. However, in most societies, 
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State intervention becomes necessary in order to take charge of sectors and 
services which are less profitable (from the point of view of capital) but necessary 
for the functioning of economic activity and/or appeasement of social conflicts 
(Castells, 1979). In the urban areas intervention has been mostly in the fields of 
infrastructure and services, which Castells views as collective consumption, a 
point disputed by some scholars; for example, Lojkine (1976), and Gilbert and 
Ward (1985). 
Gilbert and Ward argue that State intervention in the areas of services and 
infrastructure can be aimed both for social (consumption) and economic growth, 
with increasing intervention being linked directly to production. In their research 
covering three Latin American cities (Bogota, Mexico City and Valencia), they 
conclude that social policy has been largely an afterthought. They also point out 
that it is not possible to have a consensus on what leads to State intervention 
across countries. Rather, the political and econon-dc environment in each country 
determines the nature of intervention, and generalisations similar to that of 
Castells may not be representative. In the area of housing, State intervention has 
hardly changed the housing conditions of the most needy. Acknowledging this 
perception, Hamdi (1991) points out that housing policy has been more an 
instrument of political and social reform than a way to increase the supply of 
houses. 
Globally the State has been analyzed using various approaches which include; 
representational, instrumentalist, managerialist and structuralist. In these 
approaches a number of assumptions exist about the State; there is the liberal 
State, governing in the public interest, but pursuing misguided policies which need 
to be corrected. In some cases a neutral State is assumed, allocating resources in 
accordance with technical and rational criteria, such as efficiency and equity. 
Rakodi notes that often managerialist explanations are advanced for housing 
problems and the outcomes for housing policy (Rakodi, 1992). She argues that 
this applies where political or economic elites control the shaping of policies, 
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local bureaucratic structures are powerful, there is a high level of public 
intervention in local housing markets, and well developed professionalised housing 
management. Whereas all these may not be operational, some aspects of 
managerialist explanation can be applied in understanding institutions and policy 
outcome. However, this can only be done after understanding why the State 
normally intervenes in housing provision. 
The role of the State has been noted to be key in understanding differential access 
to housing and other services. As much as the State is expected to be neutral and 
serve the national interest, as some scholars (Kafandaris, 1980; Turner, 1977) have 
pointed out, this has not been realised. The State, be it in a capitalist society or 
a peripheral capitalist society, represents different interests drawn from the society 
at large. Each of these interests has its own motives which it tries to influence the 
State to pursue through policy interventions at any given time. 'Ibus, the focus of 
policy and the subsequent changes if any, mainly reflect the dynamics of different 
interests within it and the influence of the external environment; as dictated by the 
global political economy. As the State tries to satisfy conflicting interests, its 
statements, actions and policies adopted may be contradictory. A case, so far 
recorded in a number of the developing countries (Gilbert & Ward, 1985; Gilbert, 
1986; Gilbert & Van Linden, 1987). 
Since the State aims at maintaining the social relations of production in any 
society, it has to find a way to manoeuvre around the poor because they are 
essential for reproduction of capital. In this attempt, piece meal unclarified 
approaches, geared to ensure that the capitalist social relations of production are 
not negatively affected by the housing conditions of the workers, are undertaken. 
Explanations linked to the growth and development of capital have been given as 
reasons for State intervention in the housing sector. Burgess and Peattie give three 
factors which lead to State intervention in housing, namely; reproduction of labour 
power, valorisation of land and capital, and legitimisation and the maintenance of 
social order (Burgess, 1978; Peattie, 1975). In his later work, Burgess notes that 
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in order to understand production and supply of housing, it is necessary to 
appreciate the 'social processes of its production, exchange and consumption and 
... the many class based interests tied to commodity cycle' (Burgess, 1985). 
Succinctly, the role of the State is figured to be continually to reproduce the 
conditions within which capitalist accumulation can take place, by both direct 
intervention in production and ensuring the reproduction of the labour force and 
of the relations of production (Rakodi, 1986). 
In a typically classical Marxist political economy stance, Burgess points out that 
the State's aided self-help policy is merely a means of exploiting the poor and 
serving the interest of the capitalist. In the light of the development of the 
informal sector, one would not view the relationship between the State and the 
poor to be purely exploitative. They do not wholly benefit nor lose but the 
rhetorical nature of the State in its relationship to them is clearly displayed. Their 
condition is used to support programmes which only benefit them marginally but 
benefit other groups almost fully. In any case, capital development is more 
interested in a minimal percentage of the poor whom, at any given time, facilitate 
capital accumulation. In the case of the developing countries, and to some extent 
the developed countries, in the wake of economic crisis, a huge pool of labour 
composed of comparatively poor individuals exists. Indeed, a healthy environment 
for promotion of capital development. 
The case of surplus labour which the State may not need at one point in its 
reproduction of capital is key. As the economic situation deteriorates the State 
seeks to integrate the 'highlights' of the urban poor, by absorbing the most 
dynamic elements of the informal sector. This integration of the petty commodity 
sector into capitalist production, does not improve the housing conditions of those 
in the sector but exposes them to be used as justification for misplaced policy 
focus. In spite of this, the State is answerable to evelyffiffigrffiat goes on within 
its sovereignty and subsequently to the citizens. It has an obligation to intervene 
in housing, which falls among the basic human rights. However, the competing 
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interests operating within the State do contribute to contradictory policies and 
statements, leading to inability to pursue stated policy objectives. 
Until the late Seventies, the development agenda in Africa was the prerogative of 
the government and to some extent the formal international private sector. 
However, in the face of the growing African economic crisis generated by 
wastage and military interventions, natural and man made calamities, famine and 
the deteriorating environment, what has acquired the name 'big government', has 
found it increasingly difficult to meet the development needs of the people. Hence 
the recognition and incorporation of closer to the ground development agencies, 
deliberately labelled NGOs, working in every sector of the economy. 
At Independence, most governments in Africa attempted to be the sole providers 
of services to their citizens. Through this approach, they were able to provide a 
variety of resources mostly imported and jobs mostly in the civil service, low 
prices for basic goods, preferential access to government projects which favoured 
particular constituencies (Herbst, 1990). The result was the growth and over 
extension of the State (Abernethy, 1988). It undertook commitments and 
responsibilities that it could not fulfil and increasingly could not afford to fund., 
In the area of policy, it was reflected in the State's inability to effectively 
implement stated policy objectives. With the implementation of the World Bank 
SAPs, most governments have been pushed into changing their development 
approaches. This has involved elinlinating, or at least significantly curtailing 
govenunents' ability to offer services and advantages to their limited 
constituencies, as they had been doing. In this new development, most African 
States have adopted the SAPs, without understanding or making an effective 
strategy for the economic role of the State. Subsequently, it is becoming 
impossible to set the parameters of its political functioning and in particular how 
it will relate to important constituencies. 
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If the inherent political changes taking place in Africa are to be understood, the 
urban economy premised within that context, then it must be given consideration 
within the corporate nature of the new State. The State is ceasing to be the 
domineering agent of classical capitalism and taking advantage of the pwt-1989 
changing and expanding phase of capitalism. It is doing this by incorporating 
other agencies into the development process, as the Economic Commission for 
Africa (ECA) notes; 
% what is required of African governments is to make it possible for the 
population to interrelate positively with all the development variables: 
natural and financial resources, development institutions, local and foreign 
technologies, (ECA, 1983. p. 97)'. 
71be corporate nature of the State does not mean working against capital 
accumulation. Rather, it is an attempt to ensure that capital accumulation is not 
threatened by the prevailing poor economic conditions. Capitalism is thus in 
search of any elements of production which may enhance its survival, even if it 
means limiting the role of the State, as is happening in Africa. It is therefore 
important to review the past situation taking into consideration the new 
developments, in order to be able to design appropriate strategies for development, 
especially that relating to provision and management of urban services. In this 
respect, this study has developed two hypotheses as instruments of application in 
the search for an explanation of State's inability to pursue stated policy objectives 
of housing the low income groups. 
1.4.0 Hypothesis 
This study argues that, between policy formation and implementation a number 
of factors come into play which may affect policy implementation, and may 
explain the failure or achievement of stated objectives. Thus the working 
hypothesis is that; 
The gap between stated policy and its outcome is a product of the socio- 
economic and political factors which determine policy outcome at any 
given period. 
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Subsequently two hypotheses are generated for the purpose of analysis, these are, 
that: - 
HI Housing policies that are not clearly formulated result in inadequate 
housing for low income groups. 
H2 The success of achieving policy goals of housing depends on the 
effectiveness of the institutions charged with that task. 
Inherent in hypothesis two is that, limited access to housing is related to the strict 
administrative and financial requirements, as well as a real short fall over demand 
and that the involvement of international finance in housing reduces the local 
capacity of housing development, instead of the opposite. 
1.5.0 Conclusion 
This theoretical and conceptual framework views the commonly used economic 
determinism approach which leaves housing provision basically to market forces 
to be limited, especially in the developing countries. Additionally, other 
approaches such as basic needs, socio-cultural and ecological/environmental also 
have limitations when used in isolation. This leaves the Political Economy 
approach as a tool with a near adequate capacity for explaining some intricate 
issues on housing provision. The approach integrates the strengths of the other 
three approaches, merging both politics and economics; thereby, bringing out their 
interplay in the provision of housing. 
The nature of housing provision in relation to the role of the State, requires the 
State to adapt a corporate approach to development. This is contrary to the role 
most States in Africa had played in the past, merely providing services which 
were never adequate nor efficient. The pressing poor economic conditions has 
pushed most African States to integrate the urban poor, by absorbing the most 
dynamic elements of the informal sector. The State is also integrating different 
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interests and actors in the provision and management of services. This infers a 
changing phase of capital development, with ability to search for elements of 
production which may enhance the survival of capital; even if it means limiting 
the role of the State. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
2.0.0 Introduction 
Ibis chapter presents the objectives, scope, significance, and methodology of this 
study. An exposition of the study area is also undertaken. The main goal being 
an examination of the policy, the structure and the role played by the authorities 
which implemented the Umcja Tenant Purchase (UTP) Scheme. A number of 
factors contribute to policy failure or success, but this study contends that the 
institutional framework, through which policies are implemented, plays a key role 
in determining policy outcome. In addition, it acknowledges the fact that the 
policy focus in itself (in this case, the focus on low income groups) is also 
important in determining the outcome of the objectives. 
Ibus the intention is to examine the policy, the structure and the role of the 
implementing authorities and their standards, with the intention of assessing 
whether the housing needs for low income groups can be met through them, or 
whether there is need for restructuring and/or extending the existing systems. The 
investigation covers the key agency, which implemented the UTP scheme and 
other institutions, which played a role in establishing, developing and applying the 
policy. 
2.1.0 Objectives of the Study 
This study aims at answering a number of questions regarding urban housing 
policy and its implementation in Kenya. It also raises a number of questions, 
which are subsequently translated into objectives. The first one being 'what is 
housing policy and how is it establishedT In Kenya, there is no current housing 
policy document. The 1965 Sessional Paper is the only existing document. Policy 
issues have been handled in bits and pieces within the Development Plans and 
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government commissioned studies among others. There are cases where Official 
Decrees are treated as policy. To this study, all these are forms of policy and are 
worth studying. The second question is, 'what are the institutional obstacles 
towards achieving stated policy goals? ' Institutions have a number of problems 
which deter realisation of planned objectives. These are mainly bureaucratic 
procedures, inadequate resources, and in a number of cases, mismanagement. 
Thirdly 'what is the role of international finance in housing developmentT There 
has been heavy reliance on international finance but its benefits have been 
marginal to the low income groups, neither has it improved the local capacity. 
Fourthly, 'what are the socio-economic and political characteristics of the actual 
beneficiaries of low income housing projects, as opposed to the stated 
beneficiaries? ' Thus, in summary this study aims at identifying and assessing; 
What is referred to as housing policy, 
the institutional obstacles towards achieving stated housing policy 
objectives, 
the socio-economic characteristics of the actual beneficiaries of 
planned low income housing, 
provision and management of services in planned low income 
housing and 
inherent problems of types of tenure in planned low income 
housing. 
2.2.0 Scope and Significance. 
This study examines the gap between the Kenya government's stated policy 
objective of housing low income groups and its outcome. This is done by 
examining the UTP scheme, a USAID funded project within the capital city of 
Kenya, Nairobi. It involves assessing the UTP scheme as planned in 1975 vis a 
vis its situation in 1992; the role played by NCC, Ministries of Local 
Government, Lands & Housing, National Housing Corporation and USAID. The 
task is to assess whether policy was appropriate and well conceived, as well as 
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whether the stated objectives were achieved. 
'Mere are several factors, which contribute to the failure or success of any policy. 
This study contends that the failure to achieve stated objectives of housing the 
urban poor is determined by four major factors. 'Mese include the shortcomings 
of housing policy at both the central and local government levels; the 
ineffectiveness of the institutions charged with the implementation of the policies; 
the limited role of the private sector and the subsequent administrative and 
financial lin-dtations. However, the study limits itself to the nature of policy itself 
and the relevant institutional framework through which UTP housing scheme was 
implemented. This project had been planned and budgeted for and the only aspect 
left was implementation. Relevant resource allocation aspects, such as land value 
and acquisition, construction resources and provision of services and 
infrastructure, had been sorted out. The only remaining input was to ensure that 
implementation took place as had been planned. Hence the need to examine the 
policy and the institutional framework of implementation. 
A number of studies have been done in the area of housing for low income 
groups. However, there is still limited materials and knowledge on the nature of 
policy and institutional framework through which implementation of such 
programmes takes place. In Kenya, like many other developing countries, the 
discrepancy between policy objectives for housing the low income groups and 
eventual outcome is reflected in the mushrooming of unplanned settlements. 
Studies conducted in the area of urban housing have concentrated either on policy 
(an assumption being that policy is appropriate) or implementation, and have not 
made deliberate attempts to merge the two as a continuous process, as this study 
intends to do. Furthermore, urban areas are constantly changing and hence the 
constant need for fresh data for policy making, review, and planning. Above all, 
my desire to try to explain some of the persistent housing problems of the urban 
low income groups, greatly contributed to the conceptualisation of this study. 
Kenya's continued housing crisis, despite numerous housing programmes aimed 
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at low income groups, demands evaluation. 
2.3.0 Methodology 
Investigation for this study relied both on secondary and primary data. Primary 
data was gathered mainly from UTP, and the NCC which implemented the 
project. Additional primary data was collected from MLG, MLH and NHC. 
Secondary data included recorded data, comprising a comprehensive review of 
project documents, reports and minutes of the Nairobi City Commission, 
government official documents, NHC and USAID reports and acaden-dc 
dissertations. 
Both structured and unstructured questionnaires formed the main instruments of 
the survey (see appendix 2.1,2.2 and 2.3). Structured questionnaires with a few 
open-ended questions were used for interviewing residents of the case study. 
Questions included, the extent of the residents of UTP satisfaction with the project 
in relation to services, rent, relationship with the City Authorities and their 
landlords (in the case of tenants), as well as the residents' views on provision of 
low income housing. 
The survey of the officials of the Nairobi City Council and the above mentioned 
institutions relied on unstructured interviews. Discussions were also held with 
individuals who were conversant with the issues of concern to this study, but did 
not necessarily belong to the case study or the institutions covered. They included 
those who had worked in the institutions being covered in the survey but have 
since retired or left, and others who did not belong to any of the institutions nor 
the case study. 
Samples (for analysis) were drawn from the case study and the key implementing 
agency, the Nairobi City Commission. Other back-up samples came from 
Government Ministries,, parastatals and USAID. In the case study, , 
the, survey 
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aimed at getting basic socio-economic data on the status of the residents, 
tenant/landlord relationships, level of satisfaction with the project and their general 
views on low income housing provision. Information on home ownership was 
gathered from the resident landlords. 
The first stage random sampling of households to be interviewed within the case 
study was based on plots. A systematic random sampling based on a sequence of 
ten was undertaken using the lay-out map of the project (see appendix 2.4). 
Subsequently, households interviewed within each sampled plot were based on the 
duration of residence within the plot. Where a plot had more than one household, 
only the household with the highest score of years was sampled for interview. On 
the other hand, sampling of the Nairobi City Commission officials and that of 
government ministries and parastatals was selective. The relevant questions were 
directed to bureaucrats, who directly play roles in decisions relating to the issues 
being covered. 
A sample size of 11.2% was taken from the 3,084 plots within UTP. 'Ibus, in 
total the survey administered a total of 316 questionnaires but only 315 was used 
for analysis. Among the 315 questionnaires administered, 245 covered the UT? 
tenants, whereas, 70 covered the resident landlords. The sample was spread 
throughout the project which is divided in alphabetical order and subsequently 
numbered for identification of particular units as shown on table 2.1. In each of 
the fourteen stratus 1/10 was sampled for investigation. 
As for the NCC, government ministries and the parastatals, selective interviews 
and discussions were undertaken. The bureaucrats actually interviewed were 
identified after a pilot survey of the institutional framework, through which the 
UTP was implemented. This survey revealed that a number of officials who had 
'The project had three lay-out maps (Zone 1,2 and 3) but two were in bad condition and could not 
be reproduced and do not appear in the appendices. However, the three were similar in their planning and 
lay-out, the best has been given as an illustration. 
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implemented the project had since left the NCC. The option then taken was to 
trace them and organise interviews, a goal which succeeded but with difficulty. 
Identification Letter Total Units Sample Interviewed 
A 170 17 
C 265 27 
D 140 14 
E 196 20 
F 159 16 
G 154 15 
H 229 30 
1 301 30 
K 240 24 
L 244 24 
M 240 24 
N 343 34 
P 275 28 
Q 128 14 
OTAL 3,084 316 
Table 2.1: UTP Scheme Units Surveyed 
The data from the case study was analyzed using SPSS computer package. This 
gave the basic statistics on which most analysis in this study is based. The 
frequency tables were adopted on a draw perfect computer package, subsequently 
producing the graphics used in chapter six. Responses from the policy 
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questionnaires and discussion with a number of key people interviewed were 
manuaRy done. 
2.3.1 Problems of Research 
There were a number of difficulties experienced during the field survey. Most of 
it related to the case study, where interviews had to be undertaken during the 
evenings and night, except for those who gave appointments, contrary to the 
above. Problems ranged from insecurity to the content of the questionnaires. Since 
interviews had to be undertaken during odd hours, the only option of getting the 
right respondents, both the research assistants and the households covered felt 
insecure. 
Whereas the research had one of the UT? units as an operational base, the 
interviews had to be conducted by physically locating and going into the units 
sampled. Transport was available for taking the research assistants into their 
respective zones, within which they could walk into the sampled units. Being 
night, some of the unexperienced research assistants felt it was a risky task, 
knocking on doors whose owners are unknown. At the same time, the sampled 
households were also not very willing to welcome strangers in the night, 
especially the male research assistants. As the field survey progressed, two of the 
three male research assistants had to be replaced by females, leaving only one 
male, who lived within thp area. 
It was observed that female research assistants were more accepted by 
respondents, especially during the night. In many cases, in spite of being night, 
the respondents thought they had problems and needed help and were very willing 
to let them into their houses. Whereas, the male research assistants were treated 
with suspicion and, in many cases, respondents would talk to them with doors 
and/or gates locked. This frustrated them and the two replaced found it a relief, 
whereas, the one retained had this comment to make at the end of his assignment; 
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'Some problems I met I will live to remember. It offered me an 
opportunity to gather a good volume of experience, especially in relation 
to the researcher and the researched. I saw them not as problems but 
challenges - therefore I am seriously taking on the challenges'2 . 
Some of the respondents, especially resident landlords treated the research 
assistants with suspicion, as they thought they were ostensibly working for the 
Government or NCC. Such respondents were often those who had extended their 
units beyond the original plan, without authority and/or those who had been 
allocated the units in a dubious manner. In this case, they were not straight 
forward, especially in answering questions relating to extensions and/or the 
acquisition of the houses. 
Another problem was the content of the questionnaires. Despite having undertaken 
a pilot survey, there were still some questions which were not clear to the 
respondents, depending on their level of understanding. For example, the question 
asking 'who manages this estateT, could not be easily understood and time had 
to be spent explaining the concept. Ibis was also thought to have been influenced 
by lack of management of the estate, reflected in the poor worn out roads full of 
pot holes, street lights not in order, clogged drains and uncollected garbage among 
other things. 
2.3.2 Study Area 
This study concentrated on Nairobi (see appendix 2.5) due to three factors; first 
the capital city is the only urban centre which has benefited from all the three 
major urban development programmes which have been aimed at improving 
housing and related services; secondly, the city has serious housing problems with 
about 52% of the population living in unplanned areas; finally, for operational 
convenience concerning the research. All the ministries and the parastatals, as well 
as other relevant actors, such as private institutions and NGOs have their 
2William Otieno, a B. A. graduate of the University of Nairobi; employment as a research assistant was 
his first assignment after graduating. 
57 
headquarters within the capital city. An alternative choice would have led to 
administrative and financial difficulties. 
Nairobi, being the capital city, has the highest concentration of urban population. 
Currently, it is estimated to be about 1.5 million, of whom about 52% are said to 
be accommodated within the informal settlements (see figure 2.1). NCC has had 
many problems related to the management of the city. In many cases it cannot 
cope with the provision of services, even within the formal areas. Basically, the 
dismissal of the elected Councillors and their replacement with central government 
nominated Commissioners in 1983, was intended to improve the management 
situation but this was not realised even by the time multi-party elections were held 
in December 1992. With the return of councillors under multi-party politics, some 
change may be expected due to inherent accountability, ensured through 
competitive multi-party politics. 
The UTP scheme is one of the housing projects which benefited from a bilateral 
loan agreement aimed at housing low income households during the Seventies and 
was implemented by the NCC. Originally it had 3,084 planned units, but since 
its occupation in 1976, it has experienced continuous transformation. This includes 
both the completion of the 3,084 units provided in the initial plan, as well as the 
construction of additional units (popularly referred to as 'extensions') by plot 
owners. The urban authority (NCQ refers to the extensions as 'unplanned' but 
they in fact provide housing to a signiflcant percentage. 
There were a number of reasons for selecting UTP. The main one being that it is 
a planned settlement where the government had a clear objective of housing low 
income households. Secondly, the project was over ten years old and evaluation 
of policy implementation could be done comprehensively, as opposed to a project 
which is on-going or just completed. Thirdly, the scheme was funded by USAID 
and not the World Bank, as has been common with most schemes. Most other 
studies have focused on the World Bank funded schemes, and have ended up , 
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contending that the Banks' approach was not appropriate for housing those within 
low incomes. It is thus appropriate to find out whether there are major deviations 
in a case not funded by the World Bank. Besides the above points, the UTP 
scheme is currently occupied by comparatively well off urban residents, who pay 
rents that are unaffordable to the large, low income majority, who are instead 
likely to be found within the unplanned settlements. 
2.4.0 Conclusion 
This study does not aim at comprehensively covering the area of State Policy and 
Urban Housing. It is an area influenced by several variables that a study of this 
nature can only limit itself to an assesement of selected variables which fall 
among the many variables contributing to policy outcome. In this respect, it is 
concerned with the policy focus itself, and the institutional framework through 
which housing policies aimed at the low income groups get implemented. Since 
policy cannot be assessed in a vacuum, a case study approach using UTP scheme 
is applied. Subsequently, the chapter has outlined how the key implementing 
agency, the NCC and other institutions which played any role in the 
implementation of the UTP scheme, will be assessed in order to understand policy 
outcome. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
URBAN HOUSING POLICIES: OVERVIEW. 
3.0.0 Introduction 
This chapter begins with an introduction of issues in housing development, 
indicating the diverse interests involved in housing production and consumption 
and the inherent problems. The African context is presented by highlighting the 
policies of Accelerated Rural Development and Development of Alternative 
Growth Centres (AGCs), as a means of curbing movement into the urban areas. 
A review of policy evolution in Kenya during both the colonial and post-colonial 
period follows. Ensuing is a presentation and evaluation of housing projects and 
programmes, implementing institutions, housing provision mechanisms and 
impacts of housing policies. 
3.1.0 Issues in Housing Development 
Formulating appropriate housing policies and ensuring that they are implemented 
remains a global development problem. Ibis is mainly due to the multiple actors 
involved and their different interests as noted by Mayo; 
% consumers seek adequate housing that does not take up an undue portion 
of household income. They seek good locations and amenities, secure 
tenure, access to housing finance and a degree of mobility and choice. 
Housing producers require an adequate supply of residential land, 
infrastructure networks, building materials and equipment. They seek easy 
entry into the sector, plentiful skilled labour, adequate financing, and 
reasonable regulations. Housing finance institutions wish to compete for 
deposits on equal terms with other financial institutions to avoid subsidies 
through the financial system, to lend at positive interest rates, and to be 
protected by adequate foreclosure laws. Local governments wants to ensure 
that housing and associated infrastructure are of adequate quality to ensure 
that public health, safety standards and environmental quality are 
maintained. Central governments wants to ensure that adequate, affordable 
housing is available to all, that targeted subsidies are available to assist 
households who cannot afford minimum housing, and that housing sector 
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policy is integrated into national social and economic planning' (Mayo, 
1991. p. 5). 
The above diverse interests integrate a combined process of production, 
consumption and exchange and reflect an expression in residential space, of 
political and economic bargaining power of various classes (Sheriff, 1987). 
Variables with unique features and priorities which are not necessarily the same 
and it is the state which stands out as the mediator. Subsequently, housing for the 
low income groups cannot be analyzed in isolation from the way the housing 
needs of the rest of the society are expressed and fulfilled. They can only be made 
a priority within the overall housing context, because they cannot compete in the 
market and require enormous state support. 
Contrary to Mayo's contention, the very poor mainly seek housing which they can 
pay for. Concepts such as adequate housing in good location and amenities, secure 
tenure, access to housing finance and a degree of mobility and choice as Mayo 
contend are secondary. On the other hand, most governments, despite their 
inability to come up with practical approaches aimed at reaching the low income 
groups, still claim to act in their interest. Whereas this study appreciates the fact 
that without effective implementation, the decisions of policy makers cannot be 
carried out successfully (Edwards, 1980); it notes that the policy focus and its 
main instruments has to be right before effective implementation can take place. 
There are cases where failure has been as a result of wrong policy focus and/or 
lack of clarity. 
The diverse interests in housing as a process are difficult to compromise and 
require very articulate policies which have been rare in most developing countries. 
In coming up with such policies the power interplay which takes place among the 
competing interests often determine which interest group policy will favour. In 
many cases the outcome is not in the interest of the low income groups who 
normally seek basic affordable shelter. In discussing the case of housing low 
income groups in Tanzania, Sheriff (1987) notes that the policies and strategies 
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have emerged in favour of the medium and low income wage workers at the 
expense of the none waged poor. 
The proliferation of unserviced informal settlements demonstrates the difficulties 
of service provision and management. A reasonable percentage of programmes 
aimed at arresting the problem of urban housing, especially that of low income 
groups housed within informal settlements have failed in most of the developing 
countries (Grimes, 1976; Laquian, 1983; Habitat, 1986; Dhanpaul, 1988; Shidlo, 
1990; and Shefer, 1990). Dhanpaul in his work covering Asia and Africa indicates 
that in most of the countries, housing policies have failed. He gives reasons as 
bureaucratization, adoption of irrelevant standards, a naive understanding of the 
nature and extent of urban poverty and an architectural and engineering bias in 
the planning process. 
The case of Nigeria indicates that among the major factors responsible for the 
ineffectiveness of housing public policy and programmes, two are key; lack of 
incentives for the private sector to participate actively in housing sector and the 
inadequacy of mortgage institutions in Nigeria (Awotona 1990; Inameti, 1988). 
Inamenti argues that the policies have not made an impact on the problems they 
were intended to solve due to inadequate resources, unsatisfactory analysis and 
ineffective arrangements for implementation. Pugh (1990) in his discussion of 
housing policy in India points out that lack of housing for low income groups can 
be attributed to mass poverty, weak flows of new (formal sector) housing supply 
and the absence of any really effective policies for low income housing. 
Despite the various policy approaches adapted by the developing countries, during 
the last two decades the housing problem has escalated, leading to the notion of 
housing rights. Within the context of housing rights, a number of UN institutions 
and NGOs have called on governments to ensure housing rights, especially of the 
disadvantaged citizens. UNCHS initiated the move in their resolution 42/146 of 
1987 where they stated that all nations have obligation to provide housing and 
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citizens have a right to expect their Governments to be concerned about their 
shelter needs (UNCHS, 1991). UN Economic and Social Council Resolutions 43 
of 27th May 1988 also called upon 'all states and international organisations 
concerned to pay special attention to the realisation of the rights to adequate 
housing in carrying out adequate measures to develop national strategies and 
settlement improvement programmes within the framework of global strategy for 
shelter to the year 2000'. Habitat has made several such calls and the International 
Year of Shelter for the Homeless in 1987 marked a climax to the call and a 
turning point to most governments, at least as far as including housing policy 
goals relevant to the low income groups in official documents. The task of 
adopting and applying such policies is still far from being achieved. 
The concept of housing rights is difficult to ensure, especially within free market 
economies where the market determines the nature and types of access to housing. 
In any case, housing right can not be achieved by taking governments to courts 
of law. This is despite the fact that most governments have institutionalised the 
housing problem without coming up with appropriate measures for solving it. In 
contrast to human rights, which mostly operates within civil and political rights, 
housing falls among alternative categories of rights. Right to housing is further 
hampered by notions that the right is linked with state provision as largely a 
socialist concept of state sponsored benefit, not something that one could go to 
court over and claim as an individual right (EAFORD, 1990). 
The developing countries have been pressurised by International Agencies to 
review their housing policies and set up strategies for the year 2000. Whereas this 
move may be appropriate, it is bound to have a number of limitations in realising 
the goals it has set out to achieve. This is because the policies are not coming up 
with commitments as to how to achieve their set goals, an approach not different 
from past approaches of most governments during the last two decades. Agencies 
such as the World Bank and USAID believe that urban housing can only be 
approached through the private sector with an emphasis on home ownership as the 
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Government takes a marginal role of enablement. 
Since the shift from emphasis on project approach to housing the low income 
groups, to 'creating self supporting housing sector that serves the needs of 
consumers, producers, financiers and, Local and Central Governments; and that 
enhances economic development, alleviates poverty, and supports a sustainable 
environment' (World Bank, 1993, p. 52), UN agencies and International Financial 
Institutions have argued that housing conditions are not simply a reflection of 
poverty but housing policies. When housing policies are appropriate, the process 
of economic development and the increasing incomes associated with it create a 
productive and responsive housing sector which benefits all participants (Mayo, 
1991). To argue that housing policies can set a system able to benefit an 
participants is to escape from the realities of politics, especially that of the 
housing market. Policies are products of contending forces within a given state 
and as much as the winning force may not be favourable to the others; it often 
becomes politically necessary to mention the vulnerable groups. Although Mayo 
argues that the poor normally bear the failure of the housing market, this study 
notes that the poor bear both the failures and successes of both the housing and 
the general market within the economy, depending on what the winning force 
displays as an option. Therefore, policy cannot be viewed as a static process with 
constant gains and loses. 
It is due to the fluidity of the policy process that the financiers of housing in the 
developing countries seem to have been disillusioned with the very policy 
approaches they played a key role in designing. For example, Mayo (1991) notes 
that, 'the principal objectives for a new and better urban policy are also those for 
a new and better housing policy, as are the principal features of the strategy 
designed to achieve them ... focusing on policies and institutions rather than on 
isolated projects, and attempting to leverage public resources in a way that enables 
and facilitates the productive activities of many and diverse actors in the urban 
economy'. This connotes the acceptance that policies pursued in the past have not 
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been appropriate. We thus have anew'reformed position which seeks to integrate 
all those participating in the housing sector, including informal providers and 
consumers; who for a long period most governments and international financiers 
thought would be solved by simply funding and promoting SS, UG and T? s. The 
%new' trend is for governments to take an enabling role within the SAPs and let 
the market play its role, housing the poor among others. In this approach, the 
conditions of the low income groups are bound to remain the same or deteriorate. 
In market-oriented economies, people compete for scarce resources. In the housing 
sector, providers decide who qualifies for a place to live. This works against the 
notion that anyone is 'entitled' to housing and gives way to the argument that the 
competitive system itself determines who will qualify and hence the need for the 
state to arbitrate, especially for those unable to effectively participate in the 
market. The rationale of having a government, and thus policy, as far as economic 
considerations are concerned, is to provide a helping hand when market 
mechanism (price system) breaks down or fails out-right (Fadlalla, 1979). If 
markets were to function appropriately by assuring optimal and equitable 
allocation of resources in the housing market, governments would not intervene. 
Subsequently, this study does not subscribe to the total market approach as 
insinuated by agencies such as the World Bank and USAID. 
The housing Market in many developing countries has failed to provide for the 
low income groups, a role which has been unsuccessfully taken by respective 
governments. Classical marxists in their instrumentalist perception of the state 
dismissed the state as a mere manager of the capitalist interests. This view of the 
state is not appropriate for understanding state activities in the developing 
countries such as Kenya. The mere existence of the modem welfare states within 
capitalist economies contradicts classical marxism. The relative autonomy of the 
modem state allows it to force through welfare measures which are in the long 
term to the interest of capital. This is aimed at both ensuring stability and creating 
a skilled and productive workforce (Hall & Ikenberry, 1989). The problem with 
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this approach is that it only benefits a percentage of individuals necessary for the 
reproduction of capital at any given period, leaving a large percentage not catered 
for. It is in this respect that most governments in Africa handle the urban housing 
problem indirectly by focusing on policies aimed at deflecting population 
movement away from the urban areas. While housing provision is limited to those 
necessary for capital reproduction. 
3.2.0 The African Context 
Until the mid 1980s, a large percentage of African countries did not formulate 
urban development policies or housing policies as such but pursued what this 
study conceptualises as, 'decongestion' policies. Policies applied at addressing 
urbanisation problems that have mainly two instruments, development of rural 
areas and alternative growth poles. The aim being to reduce the growth rate of 
urban centres as well as keeping potential migrants away from them. The method 
of redirecting the migrants to other areas, which are less urbanised is the core of 
the two policy instruments. A United Nations survey of 126 countries in 1987, 
showed that three quarters of the countries covered were pursuing policies aimed 
at either slowing or reversing migration to major urban centres (Harris, 1988). 
These policies include mainly the development of rural areas and alternative 
growth poles as discussed below. 
3.2.1 Accelerated Rural Development 
In rural development, governments pursue a number of approaches, which include 
providing better facilities in terms of infrastructure and services and improvement 
of agriculture. The idea of most governments being a reduction of population 
movement to the urban areas; whereas it should be the improvement of income 
in order to enable individuals to spend on their priorities. In some countries, 
govemments have supported well-planned programmes, whereas in others 
disjointed attempts have been made towards supporting and developing rural 
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areas. In cases where planned programmes have been undertaken, large amounts 
of expenditure through international funding have been incurred. Across the 
Continent, this can be seen in the number of major housing, water, irrigation, 
electrification and communication programmes undertaken. Many now in ruins 
because governments did not attend to their management. 
Examples of long term rural development exist in Tanzania, Egypt and Botswana. 
In Tanzania, the Ujamaa villagisation initiated by Nyerere was a deliberate policy 
attempt to improve rural areas. This ideologically oriented policy of the left 
covered almost all areas of rural Tanzania. However, its success has been limited 
due to financial constraints. The same has been going on in Egypt through the 
development of the Aswan region, where areas such as Assyut and Quena/Naga 
Hanadi have been identified for future regional planning. Ibe Botswana 
government through their national settlement policy CRemote Area Development 
Programme'), seeks to reduce rural-urban imbalances through allocation of 
investment and provision of infrastructure in the rural areas (Obudho, 1989). 
Rural development as a concept has been successfully used in Africa during both 
colonial and post-colonial era. It is a strong political and policy instrument in that 
a large majority of the African population still reside in the rural areas, and the 
use of the concept rallies support and confidence in central governments. 
However, it has not been accompanied by Local Government development. 
During the colonial period, it was mainly geared to areas under cash crop fanning, 
at the expense of peasant agriculture, left to fend for itself. Despite this, urban 
residents who were not formally employed were expected to go back to the rural 
areas and be engaged in agricultural activities. With Independence governments 
have not done any better. Until about ten years ago, when SAPs were introduced, 
a high percentage of African States still concentrated on cash crop fanning for 
their foreign exchange requirements. 
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3.21 Alternative Growth Centres 
The development of rural areas is being supported by concurrent development of 
Alternative Growth Centres. An approach referred to using different concepts 
(growth poles, satellite cities, new towns, development corridors, intermediate 
cities, optimum size cities, small towns, etc. ) and viewed as a 'macro spatial 
planning' process, which varies in name, scope, emphasis and practicality 
(Rodwin, 1986), but concentrates on the development of intermediate sized urban 
and regional centres. -A number of works for example, Westcoss & Obutho 
(1982), Habitat (1986) and Meekya & Rakodi (1990) indicate that such centres 
are supposed to provide; markets for agricultural produce thereby increasing 
incomes, business goods produced elsewhere, small scale food processing, 
manufacturing and Social interaction and information exchange. 
Some of the above views are held by some governments but they have failed to 
sustain it. So far, the majority of governments have not been able to effectively 
provide the relevant services and necessary infrastructure, notwithstanding the 
inadequate sources of economic activities. In this case, the growth poles located 
in the rural areas are already facing a number of problems related to service 
provision and management. Asýects which were, and still are, key to major urban 
areas and have been partly the reason for adopting policies of 'decongestion'. 
When one reviews the scenario of where the population is con-dng from and 
where it is being deflected, the situation becomes more grim. The rural areas and 
the growth poles are supposed to be provided with basic infrastructure and 
services in the midst of minimal economic activities. 
3.2.3 Implication of the Policies of 'Decongestion' 
'Decongestion' policies are largely concerned with the distribution of population, 
but has little access to, and knowledge of, mechanisms which produce and sustain 
the distribution. For example, it has limited knowledge on the wide range of 
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traditions, attitudes, culture etc of the targeted population. Rodwin points out that, 
public policies often favour big cities, often unfairly and unnecessarily. However, 
cities have been noted to be the focal points of development and many key 
institutions, including central government operations, are in most cases located 
within them. 
Experience suggests that except in very special circumstances, spatial planning 
strategies designed to slow down or change these trends take too much time, are 
costly and hard to'implement. 'I'he benefits too, are less conclusive than claimed. 
Rodwin (1986) argues that the efforts of such policies are too dispersed, as 
controls on bigger cities continue to prove ineffective and generally inappropriate. 
To Rodwin, one of the weaknesses of the policy is the development of expensive 
industrial estates in towns which have little industrial potential. His contention is, 
therefore, that the policy may only succeed if the scope is limited and methods 
realistic; aspects which remain to be evaluated for Africa. 
When rural policies are analyzed in respect to the urbanisation problems facing 
the African states, one wonders whether the rationale for concentrating on them, 
without effective correlated programmes in the urban areas, can achieve much. 
Success stories of the policy exist in Latin America and India. In Latin America, 
the annual growth rates of intermediate cities, are becon-dng equal to, or larger 
than, those of large cities, as in the developed economies (Harris, 1988). India has 
also experienced similar development (Harris, 1984). 
The stagnation of the population of many of the largest cities in India and Latin 
America, while many smaller cities accelerate, is seen to demonstrate a positive 
effect. Whereas the two cases provide good examples of success, they cannot be 
directly applied to Africa, where the number of large cities is very limited. To 
some extent, where the number of large cities is greater, potential migrants tend 
to have broader options on where to migrate. This provides a spread effect which 
may realise a reduction of the growth rate of major cities. Africa, mainly rural, 
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has restricted options of movement to urban areas, and it win take some time 
before the situation of both Latin America and India is attained. Most of the 
countries have only one city (or none) with a population of over half a million 
(appendix 3.6). 'Ibis makes the few cities vulnerable to large movements of 
population, which they cannot contain, and hence the policy of diverting 
population to areas with less concentration. 
No substantial impact of 'decongestion! policies has been felt in the existing major 
urban centres in Africa. Since the beginning of its implementation, major cities 
continue to grow rapidly, even as services deteriorate. This calls for more 
attention from the city managers. However, quantifying the effect of 
'decongestion' policies has not been easy due to lack of relevant statistics. The 
majority of countries rely on census data, collected every ten years. By the time 
the data is processed, it is often out of date and does not represent the situation. 
Other relevant basic statistics such as household and consumer surveys are hardly 
ever done. Planning is therefore based on estimates, which are at times not 
representative. Despite the lack of sufficient data, the fact that population growth 
of urban centres is increasing as services deteriorate, remains an accepted fact, 
continuously leading to the search for more appropriate policy options. 
The search for policy options in Africa should be geared first and foremost 
towards policy options able to sustain the existing urban population in situ. This 
is due to the failure of rural based policies, which should merely be additional 
efforts. The urban based focus should mainly include: strengthening urban 
governments; generating locally based economic activities through low capital 
intensive manufacturing enterprises supported by expert financing organisations, 
including the development of alternative methods of service provision. These 
areas are related, although strengthening urban governments, form a base for the 
other two. Most urban governments charged with the development of urban areas 
are indebted, poorly managed and face serious financial constraints. Their capacity 
to collect taxes, exercise expenditure controls or service public departments, is 
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therefore limited. Implying a reduced capacity of responding to peoples needs and 
resulting in an inability to design appropriate and affordable services and 
infrastructure. 
The many problems facing urban governments have not stopped them from 
spending the scarce available resources on imposing controls hoping to achieve 
an ideal city. Lippe (1988) notes that the web of rules and regulations used to 
control the Informal Sector, only helps to force more of the city underground. 
Instead efforts should be made to encourage the initiative and channel the energy 
of the poor working in the informal sector into the main stream economy. For 
indeed they are the main spring boards for generating future employment. 
In their efforts towards managing cities, the urban governments have very limited 
options if they do not recognise and promote the informal sector. A sector 
currently providing 52% of services, especially in the area of housing and 
employment opportunities. 'lliere should be policies that give clear directions on 
the formation of partnerships between urban governments and the informal 
sector. A trend which is currently being considered, but with difficulty due to the 
conservative nature of bureaucracies in Africa. If such policies are adopted they 
will provide necessary support, especially in areas which are beyond the reach of 
the sector. This includes focusing on policy issues such as; land tenure, servicing 
land, business sites and services, appropriate procedures for improved commercial 
operation, development of markets, provision of enabling infrastructure, and the 
regulation, organisation and training of an improved local Government service. 
3.3.0 The Kenyan Housing Policy Context 
In Kenya, housing has been a key development issue both during the colonial and 
post-colonial era. However, implementation of stated objectives has largely not 
been accomplished. It is therefore necessary to understand the policy approaches 
which have been used and the institutional framework through which they have 
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been implemented. This is done mainly in reference to the capital city (Nairobi), 
which has been the national focus as far as policy formulation and implementation 
is concerned. This analytical review is therefore aimed at placing housing within 
the context of the city's present development. It discusses the evolution of policy 
development, housing projects and programmes, the institutional framework for 
housing implementation, housing provision mechanisms and the impacts of 
housing policies. 
In Kenya, it is difficult to find a well defined policy relating to low income 
housing. Looking at the situation, the most difficult aspect is whether to adopt 
what exists on paper or on the ground. The situation can at times be even more 
confusing by a prevalence of reactive official decrees, which in many cases have 
to be implemented haphazardly. As noted earlier, in this study, all these forms are 
important in analyzing housing policy and even in cases where some policy areas, 
housing being one, remain unattended and without any reviews for long periods, 
that in itself may constitute policy. 
Housing policies, as other sectoral policies are the responsibility of central 
government. Hence, housing as a sector is not exempted from the three factors 
which often determine state resource allocation to any sector, namely; social 
objectives at the national level, the state's political objectives and economic 
objectives at the national level. Assuming that allocation of required resources are 
done correctly, the execution becomes responsibility of a multiplicity of agencies; 
LAs, NHC, private and community groups who act as instruments of policy. 'Me 
type and extent of control government exercise over these policy instruments can 
be said to determine policy. Although this sounds as if it is possible to separate 
policy and administration, it is not the case. The govenunent provides only an 
enabling framework of policy; its operation lies at the local level. Implying that 
if administration is deficient, the likelihood is that ý policy will turn out to be 
inadequate. In the case of Kenya, both arms share the blame in relation to. lack 
of success in providing low income housing. 
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A number of studies, for example Kabagarnbe & Moughtin (1983); Lee Smith et 
al (1988); Hoek-Smit (1989); Malombe, (1981,1990), have focused on various 
problems relating to housing for low income groups. Malombe (1981), points out 
four factors which limit the success of public policies relating to housing. They 
include; unrealistic and vague policies, disparity between planning and 
implementation, unrealistic housing standards and lack of specified policy on 
finances for low income housing. Lee Smith (1988) notes problems related to 
institutional framework which include; lack of morale, inability to deliver public 
services, lack of sufficient, qualified and comn-dtted staff, inadequate budget and 
financial controls. Some of these aspects are also mentioned in an evaluation 
study of Umoja 11 by Hoek-Smit (1989). 
The policy norm in the housing sector in Kenyan seems to be inaction 
(Noormohammed, 1988). Noormohammed raises the question of whether Kenya 
has a housing policy or just inaction. He argues that the government has not 
applied itself to housing as it has done in other sectors such as education, health 
or infrastructure. He gives reasons to be both neglect and lack of follow up. 
These two explanations infer that stated policy on housing has remained on paper, 
a contention which may be representative if policy objectives are correlated with 
policy outcome or actual programmes on the ground. Whereas, this contention 
may be appropriate, policy should be perceived as action, inaction, intention and 
sometimes all the three. In the case of Kenya, one cannot argue that there has 
been totally no action as Noormohammed contends, rather the problem seems to 
be the lack of appropriate policy focus, a single policy document and the 
subsequent limited accessibility for particular groups. 
Ile outcome of the discrepancy between intended state policy objective of 
housing the low income groups, can be said to have resulted in the growth of 
informal settlements Cunplanned'). Ibis has been referred to as the 'missing linle 
(Hargrove, 1975, Ham, et al. 1984)) or 'gap' (Edwards, 1980). In Kenya, the 
informal settlements have managed to exert themselves by filling this so called 
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gap, and thus winning policy consideration. The determination of planned or 
% unplanned' urban settlements is based on housing standards and regulations. 
Unfortunately, the regulations which date back to the colonial period and have 
hardly been reviewed, have very high stringent standards based on middle and 
high income. This has a negative impact on housing the urban dwellers especially, 
the urban poor who can not afford what is officially referred to as 'an acceptable 
housing unit. ' Mabogunje et al. (1978) argues that the notion of an "adequate' 
house is based on standards which represent aspirations, rather than realisable 
goals, and are therefore often totally inappropriate. Such aspirations are often the 
product of the policy process, where both the policy makers and the implementing 
agencies play a key role. 
Rakodi (1986), in support of the above contention, points out that to define 
housing need in terms of normative planning standards unrelated to the cost of 
housing must result in non achievement. Moreover, it is not only cost as Rakodi 
contends but also the socio-cultural underpinnings which are present in different 
environments. In the case of most developing countries with a colonial history, 
housing standards applied are often out of context and therefore can neither be 
afforded nor adopted by the majority of would be consumers. 
Implementability is one test of a good plan and therefore an important aspect of 
any policy, and yet it often has many shortcomings and the important question is 
whether a particular policy ever has a chance of being implemented. No matter 
how good the policies pursued are, little progress towards accomplishing goals 
may occur, unless there is effective implementation (Edwards, 1980). It is possible 
to plan well, but to implement the plan unwisely (Giandomenico (1989). 
Giandomenico further notes that it is difficult to separate policy from 
administration and that legislative mandates are often vague, ambiguous, or 
contradictory. There are also no clear standards for administrators and experts to 
apply and therefore their values inevitably do count a great deal. Subsequently, 
a situation exists whereby good policy objectives and goals exist on paper but 
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hardly any means of effective implementation is realised within the policy itself. 
The notion of responsible government and the fact of urbanization is important 
in understanding this scenario. The former 'grew up' in colonial times, when 
housing for the rural people did not appear on the government agenda. The latter, 
has largely occurred since Independence and there is thus no previous 'model' of 
how the government should act. 
Implementation of policy includes a variety of actions undertaken by different 
individuals and agencies operating within different environments. Edwards (1980) 
points out that the actions include; issuing and enforcing directives, disbursing 
funds, making loans, awarding and signing contracts, collecting data, 
disseminating information, analyzing problems, assigning and hiring personnel, 
creating organisational units, proposing alternatives, planning for the future, and 
negotiating with private citizens, businesses, interest groups, legislative 
committees, bureaucratic units and even other countries. Pressman and Wildavsky 
(1973), whose work fall among the pioneering implementation studies, noted that 
action on policy depends upon a number of links in an implementation chain and 
the cooperation among agencies required to make those links has to be close to 
a hundred per cent in order to avoid implementation deficits. The extent and level 
of communication, resources, dispositions and bureaucratic structure, the actions 
required, have in many cases been a problem, especially to the developing 
countries. More so, it has been complicated by the lack of adequate and sufficient 
local resources. 
3.3.1 Housing Policy During the Colonial Period. 
In almost all developing countries, rapid urbanisation has been basically a product 
of colonial development and most current policies owe their origin to colonial 
policies which restricted movement to urban areas. In Nairobi, the colonial rail 
complex provided a number of commercial and earning opportunities, some of 
which were not directly related to the rail network -but attracted a number of 
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individuals to the centre. During this period the residents, apart from the 
Europeans, were mainly people of Somalia, India and Swahili origins. There were 
also a few pioneering Africans of non Swahili origin (Hake, 1977). These groups 
became the nucleus of what was to turn into a large city without adequate and 
sufficient services. Settlement policies pursued during this period did not require 
any non railway or government employee within the town and were therefore not 
officially catered for in planning. This restrictive planning was seen more in 
housing, where the Africans were disadvantaged. A number of them had moved 
into town 'illegally' and without any employment and had to fend for themselves. 
They thus opted to settle in their own way Cunplanned'), either on the boundaries 
of the town if there were reserves near enough to accommodate them, or in the 
town itself (Parker, 1948). 
As, population increased individuals and groups erected structures seen by the 
colonial governors as unhealthy, poorly built and not up to standard. Such houses 
became a worry to the governors, who were at that time under financial strain and 
unable to get support from the railway authorities (Smart, 1950). In typical 
response, the colonial administrators became very strict on who should reside in 
Nairobi. Thus repressive policies that included the demolition of houses were 
adopted, leading to the demolition of the African settlement, Pangani, in 1938. 
Thus, it can be argued, that the 'official' response to informal African settlements, 
picked up by the incoming African Government, was equally restrictive at worst 
and wilfully neglectful at best. 
The first colonial policy which had an impact on housing was taken in 1901, 
when the government outlined policy of land administration within the city of 
Nairobi. It adopted a -racially segregated space allocation for housing. Areas 
designated within the township for railway complex use were clearly demarcated. 
The surplus land was taken over by the colonial administrators, and most of it, 
especially the northern parts, was set aside for the European settlers (Parker, 194 8). 
On the other hand, the Asians were allowed to acquire control of particular areas 
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( Ngara, River Road and Eastleigh). These areas were at that time outside the 
town boundary. There was also segregated land allocation in the commercial 
areas. However, this became functionally difficult because the European 
administrators and entrepreneurs needed Asian and African customers, if they 
were to continue in business. 
One aspect to note in the above segregative zoning policy is the position of the 
disadvantaged, who at that time were the unemployed Africans but who today 
form the group popularly referred to as 'the low income'. During the first half of 
the colonial period, the Africans were in the process of being introduced to a 
monetarized economy. They were therefore at the bottom of the income bracket. 
Besides this, they were hardly considered as part of the urban economy. It is in 
this respect that Stren (1978) argues that until the end of the inter-war period both 
central government and local urban authorities in the main towns of Kenya dealt 
with African urbanisation as essentially a problem of control. He goes further to 
note that three objectives determined the approach. These included the desire to 
keep African wages low, segregate African living quarters, and ensure appropriate 
health standards. These variables are closely linked to each other, since wages 
determine the other two, and yet the wages were intentionally kept low. 
It therefore followed that the Africans could not afford to live in appropriate 
housing conditions. It was partly due to this that Nairobi Municipal Council 
(NMC) had to declare Nairobi except Eastleigh as out of bounds for unemployed 
Africans. Any African living in the township other than in an appropriate African 
zone without a permit or good reason would be repatriated to their 'tribal' land 
under the Vagrancy Act, (Parker, 1948). Despite this strict Act, the problem 
persisted and the colonial government had to formulate a remedial housing policy 
in 1929. Ibis policy required all employers in the township to be responsible for 
housing their African employees. During the same period, the government and 
NMC begun building rental housing for African subordinate staff. Such isolated 
attempts seem to have been spring boards aimed at integrating the Africans within 
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the urban economy. Subsequently, a study of African housing conditions which 
had been commissioned, presented its findings in the form of a memorandum in 
1939 (NMC, 1939). The findings, not surprisingly, showed that the housing 
shortage among Africans was very high. About 14,617 Africans and their 
dependents who worked in Nairobi, were not supplied with housing by their 
employers, and only 8,916 could be accommodated in the 'native' location. 
Another finding was that the wages were too low with two thirds of the labour 
force earning below the minimum wage. 
The memorandum recommended that the issue of housing and wages be looked 
into if the output of the African worker was valued. In response, the government 
accepted the memorandum and indicated that the 'ultimate solution was the 
provision of adequate and suitable housing at rents properly related to native 
income' (Comn-dssioner for Local Government, 1939) There was also an 
indication that other services such as education would be provided but there was 
no mention of increasing wages. Ibis positive note led to the setting up of a 
Committee in 1942, which examined the African housing situation in Nairobi. At 
the same time a Bill was introduced to set up a Central Housing Board and a 
special fund to make loans available to LAs. In it, a high priority was given to 
African housing. This was followed by the construction of 1,170 temporary units 
for African workers. From this time onwards, housing provision became a crucial 
government concern, mainly for their own expanding staff. 
The 1950s witnessed the onset of progressive housing policies, dominated with 
specific housing issues such as subsidies, regional allocation of funds, house 
types, standards and estates planning. This led to Government Commissions and 
reports looking into housing and the general conditions of the workers. The main 
ones being; the Ernest Vasey Report (1950), Carpenter Report (1954) and the East 
African Royal Commission (EARC, 1956). The Vasey Report recommended the 
encouragement of home ownership, maintaining that it would lead to a stable 
population and therefore policies which integrate the whole urban population 
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should be adopted. The Report pointed out that the State could only provide 
services in proportion to the efforts of individuals. In this respect, its position was 
that the colonial government should move away from provision of rental units 
which were being rented out at over subsidised rates. 
The Vasey report's position on rental housing marked a departure from emphasis 
on rentals to home ownership. Certainly a misplaced emphasis carried over to 
Independence and is still being applied. Whereas it was true that sustaining rentals 
was expensive, the other option need not necessarily have been total focus on 
home ownership. The report had a good option but in a wrong context. Most of 
the African population which the report was aiming at were still basically rural 
and had no intention of making the urban areas their home but rather a temporary 
place for making income. One important contribution of the report, which seems 
not to have been carried over at Independence, is the recommendation on land 
banking. The report noted that land for African housing (low income group) be 
set aside in all towns. In such areas plots should be 12 metres by 15 metres and 
the first lease should be for 40 years extendable for a further 25 years. 
Additionally, temporary building materials would be allowed for the first ten years 
after which improvement using standard materials should be undertaken. The 
aspect of land banking disappeared with Independence and instead land preserved 
for public use has been sold off, with NCC being the most affected. Despite its 
shortcomings the Report demonstrated the realisation of the state's inability to 
provide services without the active involvement of urban communities and the 
need to understand the characteristics of the urban residents. 
On the other hand, the Carpenter Report stressed the relationship between wages 
and housing. It pointed out that the minimum wage should be able to support a 
man, wife and two children. Indeed a misconception of the African family, which 
was averaging eight. The Report also noted that by 1965 basic services such as 
education, health centres and recreational facilities should be provided within 
African areas. Of such services the development of adequate housing was seen as 
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. key. Thus the report called 
for a coordinated and centrally directed housing 
programme, related to definite objectives of housing the majority of the working 
population on a family basis by 1965. The EARC mainly did an assessment 
between policy and economics, within the British controlled territories of East 
Africa, which recommended the 'removal of any barrier which prevents Africans 
from full participation in the life of the cradle (urban) of development' (Colonial 
Government, 1956), at that time. 
Thus the colonial administrators' settlement and residential policies were 
segregative and depended on zoning approaches which basically ignored the 
existence of the group referred to as 'natives', on grounds that they did not belong 
to towns. Despite this negligence, 'native' numbers increased on a continuous 
basis, posing a problem to the administrators. The 'native' position symbolised 
the origin of poor state or lack of urban housing; a condition which has continued 
despite numerous efforts to abate it. The position of the disadvantaged, did not 
improve with Independence as discussed below. 
3.3.2 Post Independence Housing Policies 
(a) From Independence To 1972 
Post colonial housing policies can mainly be categorised into two era; from 
Independence to about 1972 and the period after. Prior to 1972 the government 
pursued mainly restrictive policies with emphasis on appropriate planning coupled 
with demolitions of 'unplanned' houses. An execution of such policies was, for 
example, witnessed in Nairobi in 1970, when nearly 39,000 people had their 6,733 
dwellings in Eastleigh area of Nairobi demolished through bulldozing, under the 
orders of NCC (Hake, 1977). At the same time, the government was the main 
provider, especially of low income housing with over subsidized rental housing 
schemes being provided. With the entry of massive international finance into 
urban development using housing as a focal point, the approach begun to shift 
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from restrictive to supportive policies. Thus, since 1972 a gradual move on 
pragmatic approaches that consider upgrading of informal settlements, in addition 
to encouraging people's own initiatives to provide themselves with housing 
through provision of building sites with basic services under the site and service 
schemes, are being adopted. Notwithstanding, sporadic demolitions do occur and 
in 1990 a total of 44,000 residents were affected (NCCK, 1991), thus negating 
much of the Government policy of housing low income households. 
Immediately after Independence, a UN mission to Kenya led by Bloomberg and 
Abrams (1964) was commissioned to conduct a short and long term housing needs 
survey and make recommendations. This report reiterated the position of other 
colonial reports of the 1950s which showed that housing for Africans was 
inadequate and insufficient, and led to extreme overcrowding. In view of the 
pressing problems, the mission recommended the establishment of a housing 
authority within a new Ministry of Housing. This led to the establishment of the 
National Housing Corporation (NHC), replacing the colonial Central Housing 
Board. It was mainly charged with the development and initiation of LAshousing 
programmes. Tbrough it, the production of large scale low cost housing was to 
be ensured; a role which the Corporatio n plays to-date, despite the fact that a 
large majority still remain poorly housed. Subsequently, in 1967, the Housing 
Finance Company of Kenya (HFCK) was established with the objective of making 
loan funds available to people wishing to acquire their own houses in the main 
urban centres. 
The above restructuring was made with the overall desire of ensuring that 'every 
family in Kenya would live in a decent home, whether privately built or State 
sponsored. The expectation was that the housing units should provide at least the 
basic standards of health, privacy and security' (Republic Of Kenya, 1974). 
Despite this desire, the 1965 Sessional Paper on housing remained the only policy 
guideline, (although it had been overtaken by events) until 1986, when the Kenya 
government had major changes on econon-dc management, This began with a key 
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Sessional Paper on Economic Management for Renewed Growth; a paper which 
displayed a departure from the previous practice of relying on the public sector, 
for provision of services and economic growth. In the area of housing, this paper 
acknowledges the importance of the informal sector and gives directions on sale, 
rental of housing, housing plots, and to the leasing of government lands in urban 
areas. Its position was that the charges for the above items should be raised, partly 
because; 
'The stated objective of subsidising the urban poor is rarely 
achieved and partly because the equity goal can be achieved 
effectively by charging market prices to the few who currently 
benefit in order to expand provision to the many more who are still 
in need (GOK, 1986 p. 50)'. 
The above paper was followed by the 1987 declared year of Shelter For the 
Homeless, which realised concerted efforts on the government performance 
towards reviewing its policies. A policy document entitled 'National Housing 
Strategy For Kenya' was prepared by the Housing Department, for presentation 
to the UN. In this document, the government refers to its new directions, which 
aim at shifting its role from 'one of direct developee of housing for low income 
households involving moderate subsidies, to one of workingwith and facilitating 
the development of housing by private entities charging market prices. This is 
consistent with the aims of the Sessional Paper 1 of 1986 and has recently been 
accelerated by the preparation of a housing policy document (Republic Of Kenya 
1990), still awaiting Parliamentary approval. Besides these key documents there 
have also been other studies commissioned to look into the by-laws and general 
issues relevant for policy review. These include studies by Yahya & associates 
(1981), Struyk & Nankman (1986) and Agevi (1989). At the same time, the 
pressure of multi-party politics pushed the ruling one party to review its 1965 
manifesto. With the introduction of multi-party politics, a number of changes are 
expected to take place. 
Although one may argue that Development Plans are intentions, supported by 
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convictions justified by statistics, the Kenya Government Development Plans have 
remained key reference documents for anyone interested in policy studies. There 
has hardly been any specific housing policy passed through parliament, except for 
the above mentioned Sessional paper of 1965. Housing issues, such as those 
relating to land and planning, have been handled in piece meal approaches 
whenever deemed necessary. In this respect, it is appropriate to reflect on aspects 
of the Development Plans related to housing. 
The first independent Kenya Government Development Plan (1966/70) showed 
the government's desire to provide 'decent' housing through both the public and 
the private sector. This plan came almost at the same time as the above mentioned 
1965 sessional paper, which enunciated the housing problems facing the country 
and how the government planned to deal with them. One negative aspect of this 
paper was that it also ratified demolition of slums, which eventually became a 
consistent ugly feature in the housing policy of the independent State. By this 
time Nairobi had several unplanned housing areas and the policy was used as a 
tool for bulldozing them; a move which led to the government knocking down 
more homes than it built. Chana & Morrison (1973) note that, by 1972 housing 
units in informal settlements in Nairobi had grown to 22,000 and by 1979 the 
units had increased to 110,000 housing about 40% of the city's population (Amis, 
1984). Currently it is estimated that about 240,000 households of the city's 
population reside in unplanned housing (NACHU, 1990), accounting for about 
52% of the total population. 
(b) Post 1972 Period 
The development of informal housing in Kenya between the mid Sixties and mid 
Seventies was full of demolition. Haldane (1971) notes that the Nairobi City 
Council (NCC) continued reducing the number of. housing units available by 
demolition. Despite this, more structures came up. This was a clear demonstration 
of the housing need, but it took the authorities too long to recognise the efforts 
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of the informal housing sector. By 1970 the rationale of the policy for demolition 
was being questioned. In any case, it was based on the premise that the 
government would manage to reduce rural/urban migration by enhancing rural 
development and at the same time would manage to provide adequate urban 
housing. Desires which remain unfulfilled to-date as unplanned areas continue 
expanding. 
Among all the Development Plans, the 1970/74 had numerous housing policy 
directives. It postponed slum clearance until the housing shortage would be 
substantially reduced. Apart from this key step the Plan noted that; 
'The government housing policy is to utilise all resources available in a 
manner to achieve the maximum possible improvement in the quality of 
housing over the plan period. This will be done by expanding and 
introducing a number of programmes for promoting housing: loans to 
Municipalities and other Local Authorities for housing, direct construction 
of housing where Local Authorities cannot do it, pilot schemes in rural and 
urban areas, participation in the financing of private housing by business 
enterprises and by individuals, assistance to companies which undertake 
employee housing projects... research into housing markets and constraints 
of supply, especially in finance, contracting and building industry as well 
as in building codes' (GOK, Development Plan 1970n4. p. 514). 
This Plan provided the first tentative steps towards what might be called a 
housing policy examination. However, as can be deduced from the above, the 
policy was vague and was a non- starter. It was to be achieved through both the 
NHC and the HFCK in liaison with relevant organisations. By the time the third 
Development Plan (1974/78) came out, the goverrunent agreed that a more 
realistic housing policy should be pursued. In this respect, demolition of 
slum/squatter settlements was not only postponed but stopped. In cases where it 
was unavoidable, it would not be undertaken without providing the concerned 
households with alternatives. The plan also isolated Slum Improvement as an 
alternative to demolition. This was a departure from the government's housing 
policy of 1965, and the 1970/74 Plan which backed the conditional demolition of 
slums. At the same time, it recognised the futility of slum demolition, an approach 
which had its origins in colonial development and did not take the interest of the 
85 
majority into consideration. The approach was self- defeating and could not be 
sustained. Whereas the move to stop demolition of slums was a good policy, it 
has partially resulted in speculative moves by those who have learnt to invest in 
such areas. This trend is not negative as such, but contributes to the proliferation 
of unplanned areas, thereby intensifying problems of service provision and 
management. It has also contributed to the commodification of housing and hence 
the prevalence of more tenants than owner/occupiers in such areas. 
Both the Fourth and Fifth Development Plans (1979/83 and 1984/88) reiterated 
the government's commitment to increase the housing stock, meet shortfall, and 
ensure that the produced stock benefits the low income families. However, there 
was no specification as to how they would benefit. In particular, the 1979/83 Plan 
indicated that of the existing 440,000 urban households, only about 30% have 
sufficient incomes to afford minimum cost of conventional housing. The 1989/93 
Development Plan dedicates a very small portion to housing but gives directions 
relating to regulations and building codes. It points out that the government 
intends to review a number of regulations and building codes under Town 
Planning, Land and Housing Laws, the Public Health Act and the Local 
Government Adoptive By-Laws, which are obstacles to rapid housing 
development. 'Mese aspects have been a problem to housing development and 
should have been reviewed immediately after Independence. However, the 
government has tended to postpone their review, partly due to lack of financial 
resources but mainly due to lack of political and bureaucratic commitment of 
leaders who themselves have an uncompromising view of a modem city, and are 
luxuriously housed. 
3.4.0 Housing Projects and Programmes, 
Having the above policy directions as a basis, Kenya has attempted to implement 
a number of housing programmes aimed at housing the urban residents. Such 
programmes have mainly been dominated by both the World Baffles funded sites 
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and services and upgrading schemes and USAID's tenant purchase schemes. lbese 
programmes have been geared for low income urban households but have not 
ended up being occupied by them. This has mainly been due to lack of access. 
Accessibility is a complex matter. It is linked to affordability, income and 
preference of any given household. Since the beginning of the 1970s, when the 
World Bank started the promotion of the policies of sites and services and 
upgrading schemes, affordability has been a key issue. This is because 
affordability is taken to be the bedrock of cost recovery and the subsequent 
expected replicability. The affordability stance assumes that low-to-moderate 
income households can spend between 15 to 25 percent of their income on shelter 
and related services (Mayo, 1985). However, Mayo (1987), refers to such 
assumptions as 'rule of thumb' which is used regardless of a country's income 
level and ignores the relative income level of the target population within a 
country. It has thus contributed to lack of access, and Mayo notes further, that 
only households above approximately the 80th percentile of income distribution 
can afford to house themselves without subsidies. Subsequently, to this study, an 
analysis of access to housing, especially in the sub-saharan Africa has to consider 
not only low income but no (disposable) income or certainly no regular income 
in terms of repaying loans and other commitments beyond subsistence. 
A large percentage of the urban population do not have easily quantifiable 
incomes and bunching them into such groups merely distorts the approaches to 
be applied. Fisk (1975), Hicks (1966), and Sundrum (1990) elaborately discuss the 
problems of income as a variable. Sundrurn in particular has elaborated the 
difficulties entailed in tabulating income in the developing countries. Fisk gives 
two main reasons: that a number of sources of income are not monetarized but are 
in kind and at the same time accounts are also not well kept and when available 
are problematic. Hicks waters down the concept by referring to it as a concept 
which the positive theoretical economist only employs in his arguments at his 
peril. What all these points imply is the problematic nature of a concept, which 
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has been used as a key criteria for assessing the types of housing each household 
should access. Despite the issue of income, access to housing has been found to 
be problematic even in cases where the issue of income has been sorted out. One 
problem area of interest to this study being the bureaucratic procedures and 
requirements embedded in the institutional framework of implementation; and the 
mix up of ideologies as manifested in 'Plans' which at times integrate aspects of 
the Eastern block (before its disintegration), ex- colonial capitalists and their 
inherent policies. 
3.5.0 Institutional Framework for Housing Policy 
Apart from the inadequate policy, the lack of success in the area of low income 
housing is also attributed to the ineffective arrangements for implementation. This 
is associated with the nature of public administration reflected in the bureaucracy; 
an administrative apparatus charged with the task of implementing the laws and 
regulations and related development programmes. Weber characterised an ideal 
type with written rules, precedence, predicability, consistency, equity, routine, 
efficiency, technique and a trained workforce. 
Whereas the above values may be appropriate depending on the environment 
within which the system operates, they have been noted to be rarely operational, 
especially in the developing countries. Albrow (1970) points out that it is at times 
meant to be administrative inefficiency; a position which to some extent is due 
to the fact that Weber, who came up with the concept, never defined it but only 
specified the features as listed above. In Kenya, like other developing countries, 
the highly structured efficiency-oriented model of administration was adopted 
from the colonial government and in many cases was not suitable. 
The model does not permit greater initiative and discretion at operating levels or 
greater involvement of clients in shaping programmes of action that accommodate 
the objectives of government to client needs. Hence the administrator has too 
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much power, he is a teacher, experimenter, negotiator and technician, whereas the 
recipient is basically a subject. More so, local experience of effective public 
participation in development planning indicates that it is difficult, time consuming 
and expensive. In many cases the disadvantaged and unorganised groups, such as 
the urban poor who operate within the infonnal sector and the less articulate rural 
residents, are hardly integrated in development planning. It is due to this that 
recent interest in management styles has focused on 'organisational culture' and 
on the 'loose/tight'model of management (Davey, 1989) thought to be appropriate 
for achieving '-excellence'. It emphasizes a combination of tight control by central 
management over strategic directions, with substantial decentralisation of 
responsibility for day to day operations and resource use. 
Hyden (1983), notes that the problems facing the attempts to establish 
development administration in Africa has not been the persistence but the 
disappearance of bureaucratic norms and principles. A fact authenticated by an 
examination of most bureaucracies in Africa. Most of these countries inherited 
administrative systems which were mainly concerned with law and order and were 
seen by the Africans as extensively authoritarian. For example, in Kenya, just 
before independence, the British introduced parliamentary rule, an impartial 
judiciary and a welfare and development minded administration. Although such 
introductions were appreciated, they were alien to the African context. They did 
not take into consideration the traditional cultural norms, African political thought, 
equality and voluntarism in social and political action as aspects which were 
inherent in society. Kenya thus started off at independence with a system of 
public administration which was not clearly understood. Subsequently, most 
citizens did not identify with it and viewed it more as a source of order and 
regulations and in some instances as a channel for accessing free welfare and 
development services. A perception which eroded people's capacity to plan, 
implement and manage relevant programmes. 
A World Bank publication (1983) notes that the Bureaucracy plays a key role in 
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setting of public policy agenda and in the formulation of policy, even when the 
actual decision lies elsewhere. Despite this, most bureaucracies have been 
associated with all sorts of negative connotations which can be summarised with 
the concept of 'dysfunctions'. A concept applied by Hicks & Gullett (1981) to 
mean the opposite of functions. Whereas, the bureaucracy should be characterised 
by specialisation, structure, predicability and stability, rationality and democracy; 
it has been characterised by unintended consequences such as rigidity, 
impersonality, displacement of objectives, limitations of categorisation, self 
perpetuation and empire building, cost of controls and anxiety. In most 
bureaucracies of the developing countries, procedures of doing things are hardly 
institutionalised; exposing them to different methods of handling assignments. 
Some of which are contradictory and/or parallel to the desired goals. 
Mehta (1989) in his assessment of the Indian bureaucracy notes that actual 
achievement of any given programme greatly depends on the general development 
strategy and related policies as well as the functioning of the administration. Since 
policy is formulated as a guideline without going into implementation details, it 
remains the role of the bureaucrats to translate it into an implementable 
programme. In most economies, the bureaucracy plays such a central role to the 
extent that development performance has become synonymous with it. However, 
as Mehta notes in the case of India, most bureaucracies are neither 'goal-directed' 
nor 'action- oriented'. To a large extent the Kenyan bureaucracy bears a lot of 
similarity to that of India and this study assesses its potential in translating policy 
into action and what influences its action or inaction at any given period. 
There are a number of variables which contribute to the poor performance of 
bureaucracy in Kenya. The basic ones being inappropriate policies and lack of 
adequate required resources. Whereas the former generally retards and frustrates 
focused development, the latter contributes to a number of related inefficiencies. 
These include; lack of an effective financial accounting system which is often 
accompanied by poor planning, misappropriation and embezzlement. In a number 
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of cases this is reflected in the annual reports of the Auditor General. At the same 
time the high level man power is not correlated with assignment, implying that 
the planning system is wrong. Other variables which influence the poor 
performance of the bureaucracy include; socio-cultural and political circumstances 
and conditions under which the bureaucracy operates, low morale arising from 
absence of incentives, hence laxity and inefficiency, corruption and use of public 
office for personal gain. The end scenario being efficiency undermined and 
meagre resources depleted. 
Of all the problems (poor policy focus, planning, implementation and 
management, misappropriation, embezzlement of funds and lack of adequate 
resources) facing the bureaucracy in Kenya, poor policy focus coupled with poor 
management, largely due to limited resources, seems to be key. These have an 
influence on the other variables. In many cases, programmes can only be run 
effectively for about six months after the annual budget allocation, when most 
programmes come to a halt except those run on donor funds under donor 
surveillance. 
The inefficiency of the bureaucracy has largely contributed to the problem of 
housing. In many LAs the money collected as rent is never recouped into housing 
but used by the bureaucracy to supplement other budgetary needs. In many cases 
the housing estates owned by the LAs such as NCC are never managed in any 
way and the level of deterioration has been pathetic. Some analysts have tended 
to link this situation with the fair rents charged. However, when one analyses the 
bureaucracy rationally, such aspects should score as inefficiencies and not credits. 
3.5.1 Housing Provision Mechanisms 
Urban housing is provided through various channels which can be categorised into 
public and private. Direct public intervention consists of institutional housing 
provided or owned by government institutions such as hospitals and schools or 
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any other staff housing. There is also pool housing which has been a scheme for 
housing civil servants but is currently being discouraged. State Cooperations 
(parastatals) have also been providing housing. The main public agencies 
translating policy into action have been LAs, NHC and State-linked financial 
institutions such as the HFCK. LAs implementing mainly low cost housing 
through the sites and services, upgrading and tenant purchase schemes and the 
NHC, following the line of LAs but concentrating on lower income mortgage and 
tenant purchase schemes; whereas HFCK focus on higher income mortgage 
schemes and direct production of houses by guaranty for clients. 
The second category of provision has been through the private sector, which can 
further be divided into two categories; formal private and informal private. The 
formal consists of individual efforts to put up houses for owner occupation or for 
rental; the private company producing large scale housing for outright sale or 
rental and financial institutions who increase housing stock either by direct 
intervention or indirectly through loans or mortgage schemes. On the other hand, 
informal provision is done through spontaneous production of housing. This type 
of production accounts for about 52% of total production and normally fills a gap 
which the government refers to as 'housing shortfall'. 
It is not possible in this study to discuss all the above forms of housing provision 
and their channels of delivery. However, since this study has an interest in the 
provision through LAs and to some extent the NHC, an in-depth discussion on 
LAs using the case of Nairobi is necessary. Most housing programmes geared for 
low income groups are normally implemented through LAs and the NHC. Most 
of the LAs, led by the NCC (which has some of the worst housing problems), 
have faced a number of problems in an attempt to provide services. Most of the 
problems seem to be embedded in the institutional framework of implementation, 
although the LAs have always indicated a lack of adequate financial resources as 
their major problem. For example, in the case of housing, inappropriate policy 
focus, the politics of project implementation, failure to review rents, restrictive 
92 
by-laws, building regulations and imported concepts of town planning all 
contribute to inefficiency and poor management. 
According to the Local Government Act (1978), the NCC is an undertaker of 
most services including water which in many local authorities is supplied by the 
Ministry of Water. The 1989/93 Development Plan (GOK, 1989/93) emphasizes 
the role of LAs in providing social and community services including housing, 
education, health and recreation. Notwithstanding, LAs such as NCC lack 
appropriate housing for most city residents, nor do they have any lucid policies. 
In most of them,, it is difficult to find clear policy guidelines on housing; except 
in cases where they are undertaking donor-funded projects, which push them to 
have a clear vision (often shaped by the funding agency) relating to such specific 
projects. Such policies are in many cases not integrated in their overall policy and 
planning. To this extent, they are not available to other individuals or groups 
outside the funded projects. Ibis leaves other types of housing development such 
as those of small scale private sector without any direction and hence what most 
of authorities refer to as 'unplanned' development. 
It was partly due to the push from the donors which led NCC in 1976 to realise 
its inability to provide 'decent' housing as popularized during the first ten years 
of Independence. A realistic look focusing on the housing market as a whole was 
seen as an immediate need. A study of housing operations (NCC, 1976) aimed at 
coming up with housing policy for Nairobi was thus commissioned in 1976. The 
study was undertaken by a consortium of expatriates and had high connotations 
on the market options of provision, which supposedly was the orientation the 
expert group had. , 
The study noted that 'NCC should play the leading role in developing the means 
to satisfy the overall housing needs of the city and should therefore bring about 
a rapid acceleration in housing creation'. The financial constraints and 
uncertainties of NCC was noted and recommendation against opting for a welfare 
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approach given. Whatever option taken it was not to impose intolerable financial 
burdens on the city but should as far as possible be self-financing. The 
beneficiaries 'must as far as possible meet the full cost', since the rates collected 
by NCC were not capable of significant subsidy. This was as opposed to the past, 
where NCC desired to keep costs and rents as low as possible with the. result that 
not all the direct costs associated with housing provision were charged to the 
schemes concerned. An approach hardly able to recover construction costs and 
other financial implications such as internal design, interest during construction, 
salaries and the inherent service and infrastructure provision. In view of this, the 
study recommended that NCC should opt to mobilise private financial and 
manpower resources for development of housing. This was to be done with 
caution, since the private sector *cannot provide properly serviced plots on which 
to build,. especially for the low income households'. NCC should address this 
issue. 
The above study was undertaken at the peak of NCCs involvement on -massive 
housing programmes funded by international finance. The UTP scheme was being 
implemented, while the Dandora Site and Service Scheme was at the final stages 
of negotiation with a number of others in the pipe line. By 1979, a year before 
the completion of the case study, the city had a rental housing stock of 150,245. 
Ibis included provision by the NCC, private sector, government and corporations, 
with the private sector accounting for 112,835; whereas the NCC, Government 
and State Corporations accounted for 19,427,10,656 and 7,326 respectively. By 
1981, NCC housing stock had increased to 32,393 units composed of 19,429 
rental units, 12,786 tenant purchase and staff housing totalling 180. Most of the 
increase of the NCC housing came through international funding with the aim of 
housing the low income groups. 
Most of NCC housing stock was developed before the advent of World Bank and 
USAID funded projects. A period when implementation and management of 
housing was done by both City Engineers Department and Department of Housing 
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& Social Services. The two departments were responsible for implementation and 
management of housing and the ancillary community facility programmes. As the 
World Bank came up with their Urban Development Programmes conceived 
around housing, the development of housing in three major urban (Nairobi, 
Mombasa and Kisumu) areas of Kenya shifted to a new department, Housing 
Development Department (HDD). 
The HDI)s are charged with provision and management of low income rental 
housing schemes. In smaller towns, where they have not been established, 
additional staff are recruited in relevant departments to facilitate implementation 
of the international funded housing schemes'. To the World Bank, HDDs and the 
employment of additional staff are seen as institutional capacity building. 
However, although HDDs are continuously becoming important in low income 
housing development, they have not been well integrated in the overall working 
of the Councils' operations. Whereas they are supposed to be project development 
departments, they remain mere administrators of projects funded by international 
finance. 
The first HDD was established in Nairobi under the Dandora Site & Service 
(DSS) Scheme. It began merely as a project within DSS but was later upgraded 
into a full fledged. department charged mainly with the implementation of the 
World Bank site and service schemes and later USAID and EEC funded projects. 
According to NCC, the primary responsibility of the department is to provide 
adequate shelter to low income earners within the city (Anyetei, 1990). However, 
the department has mainly been implementing projects funded through 
international finance and playing a marginal role in the general area of housing 
development within the city. 
'UTP was implemented through the City Engineers Department using the additional staff approach. 
At this point HDD was not fully established; it operated as a project within Dandora Site and Service 
Scheme. 
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HIDD in Nairobi is headed by a director with a rank of chief officer, assisted by 
two deputy directors and three assistant directors. The department has four 
divisions; administration, community development, finance and technical division. 
The Administration Division is headed by a director and is responsible for 
directing and coordinating all activities and for efficient adminstration including 
programming and budgeting. The above includes overall supervision of 
consultants and contractors and liaising with financiers relevant to projects being 
undertaken. The division is also the coordinating arm of the department on all 
matters relating to execution of projects. It links up with other departments of 
NCC, Government Ministries, other LAs, Parastatals and NGOs. Internally, it 
programmes work, trains staff and processes recruitment of staff in accordance 
with NCC laid down procedures (Anyetei, 1990). 
The Technical Division is managed by a cohort of experts (engineers, architects, 
quantity and land surveyors) and headed by an assistant director responsible to the 
director for efficient administration of the division. It is responsible for detailed 
engineering design, tendering of-, contracts and construction of civil works, 
building and land survey in the project areas. Whereas the Finance Division deals 
with all the department's accounting, preparation and control of cash flow for each 
project site, financial analysis of the projects and recurrent costs, financial control 
of contracts, calculation and review of charges, administration of allottees' loans 
and preparation of documentation for withdrawal. The department also does the 
application of World Bank and other funding agencies loan disbursements, follow 
up of allottees' arrears and preparation of financial reports for HDD. In cases of 
arrears the division forwards to the director allottees who have accumulated 
arrears for six months. Eviction is only effected after an approval from a standing 
committee of NCC. 
The Community Development Division is headed by an assistant director 
reporting to the director. The division is responsible for a range of community 
development activities within the sites and services and upgrading project areas. 
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The division links both potential and target beneficiaries and HDD. It facilitates 
self help efforts and transmits information among concerned parties. In the site 
and service schemes, the division publicises the project, solicits and processes 
applications, orients and trains allottees prior to settlement and works with 
families during the construction period. In some cases it assists in the 
establishment of community organisations and co-operative self-help building 
groups. 
Apart from the four divisions, HDD has a legal support unit headed by a legal 
counsel reporting to the director and liaising with the town clerk's department in 
providing legal advice. With the support of law clerks it undertakes the legal tasks 
of the department which include: advising on legal implications of HDD's housing 
operations; scrutiny of consultancy, contract, tender documents, preparation of 
offer agreements of plots to allottees and liaison with the registrar's office in case 
of deceised allottees. By 1990, twelve years after its establishment, IIDD had 
been key implementer of 23,000 serviced plots and houses, 18 primary schools, 
six health centres, 7 community centres, 14 markets and four nursery schools. 
These projects include Dandora site and service, Moses Mudavadi2 tenant 
purchase, Kayole site and service, Mathare Valley North site and service, EEC 
Ngei site and service and Huruma. site and service (Anyetei, 1990). All of them 
were policy instruments aimed at solving the housing problem of the low income 
groups financed by international agencies and cost about Ksh. I billion. 
The other important institution in the area of low income housing is NHC. In 
most cases it Raises with LAs in housing provision. Like the government and the 
LAs, NHC does not seem to have clear guiding policies in its operations. An 
examination of NHC projects in the planning stage and those under construction, 
as well as the size and their location for the last ten years,, shows a big variance 
2MOSeS Mudavadi is the second phase of UTP, which was originally called Umoja Two but was 
renamed after the death of the Minister for Local Government and UTP, which was originally referred 
to as Umoja One, got a deletion of one and retained Umoja although the public still refer to both schemes 
with their original names. 
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(Annual reports, 1980 - 1990). Implying that those schemes which were planned 
never got implemented for one reason or the other . In the area of 
design, 
although the corporation's policy has been consistent in some cases, it has been 
compromised. This is reflected in the USAID funded projects being implemented 
in several small towns. In most of them USAID dictated the design aspects. The 
design standard accepted was too high for the available resources and NHC had 
to go back to USAID more than once seeking authority to spend more than what 
had been agreed on (interview, 1992). Whereas the original unit cost was 
supposed to be Ksh. 55,000, the total cost was above Ksh. 65,000. This was 
complicated further by the fact that all units were designed uniformly with the 
same cost, as if the schemes were to be constructed in the same area. The World 
Bank funded programmes have not escaped these criticisms. For example, in their 
support in the area of squatter upgrading, the Bank pinned down the design policy 
of the corporation and came up with its own recommendation (interview, 1992). 
NHC's implementation policy has been weak and open to influence. For example, 
in the case of squatter upgrading, NHC at times intervenes by providing only 
infrastructure whereas in some cases it undertakes complete redevelopment. This 
is coupled with problematic project implementation schedules and cost controls 
as demonstrated by loan arrears accumulated by the LAs (table 3.2). 
The huge loan arrears from LAs is partly a result of weak implementation policy 
which does not consider post implementation stage, whereas the comn-dtment of 
payment normally goes beyond twenty years. Since 1970, NHC and LAs have 
undertaken a number of housing projects jointly, especially in relation to 
disbursement of funds. However, most LAs such as NCC do not seem to have 
developed any housing strategy within which the various programmes can be 
integrated. This has resulted in a number of LAs getting involved in loans 
undertakings without taking all the relevant factors into consideration. 
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LA 
Nairobi City Council 
Mombasa Municipal Council 
Kisumu Municipal Council 
Other Municipalities 
TOTAL 
Town Council 
County Council 
TOTAL 
GRAND TOTAL 
Ksh. 
347,063,658.15 
100,998,577.70 
119,549,671.10 
75,953,949.25 
643,565,856.20 
18,009,225.95 
22,173,420.90 
683,748,503.05 
1,327,314,359.25 
Table 3.2: Loan Arrears Owed by LAs to NHC by 31/12/91 
Source: Compiled from NHC Annual Reports and Files. 
Although NHC was established to assist LAs in providing low income housing, 
it has faced serious financial constraints due to its over reliance on international 
funding and inability to recover loans. Its inability to perform is demonstrated by 
financial problems and inherent issues such as land and loan repayments. Lack of 
cheap funds has in recent years forced the NHC to continue relying on the 
Exchequer for funding low cost housing. But the poor economic situation has led 
to less funds being provided and thus an inability on the part of the corporation 
to provide adequate low cost housing. At the same time, concessionary terms of 
lending by donors has been reduced and the local capital market is too expensive 
for low cost housing. Loan repayments which could bail out the NHC have been 
very poor and it cannot establish a revolving fund for housing. The option has 
therefore been to keep on relying on donor funding as the capacity to repay the 
loans deteriorates as reflected on table 3.2. 
In NHC, LA's joint operations, LAs take the development upon themselves as a 
loan payable in instalments of yearly quarters. The repayment has been very poor 
and NHC has failed to evoke the clause in the loan agreements allowing it to take 
over the houses from LAs. NHC depends on land allocation by the Commissioner 
of Lands for low income housing development. This is due to the cost implication 
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of urban land which makes it prohibitive for low income housing development. 
In recent years, stocks of government land has almost been depleted, especially 
in major towns. The Corporation seems to be left with no alternative but to 
purchase private land, with the resultant cost implications on houses built. 
The above will push the goal of low cost housing further from being achieved. An 
objective which is already strained due to the nature of relationship between NHC 
and LAs. A relationship whereby, except for NCC, NHC builds low cost housing 
but has no control of what takes place after construction is over. The District Plots 
Allocation Committee, which NHC attends as an observer, allocates units 
developed. NHC therefore cannot influence the decision of the committee. In this 
case, their goal of low cost housing can easily be compromised, especially given 
the political influence the Committee has. Such Committees are often full of 
political interplay and controversies which limits goal achievement. The same 
trend has an influence on the inability of NHC to evoke the clause in the loan 
agreement, which allows the take over of units in cases where arrears have been 
accumulated. 
3.6.0 Impacts of Housing Policies 
The government of Kenya has mainly relied on the policies of providing low 
income housing through sites and services, upgrading and tenant purchase 
schemes, implemented mainly through LAs and the NHC. Although these 
concepts existed prior to thQ Seventies, they were not undertaken on a massive 
scale as happened with the intervention of international finance from the early 
Seventies. Despite the above policy approaches being popular among international 
financiers and local politicians, they have had both credits and shortcomings at 
policy level. In Nairobi, where a number of such programmes have been 
implemented, the housing problem has hardly been curbed. 
In all the three policy approaches, affordability determines the eligible target 
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beneficiaries, which are normally selected before implementation. Affordability 
in these schemes has been defined within the range of 15-25 percent of household 
income. However, a study by UNCHS indicates that the determined affordability 
is normally 'reduced by excessively high building and construction standards, 
application of rigid requirements for mutual aid by restrictions on the use of 
houses for commercial and informal sector activities and by limitations imposed 
on the way in which loans are used' (UNCHS, 1987). 
The above aspects have limited the chances of access for low income households 
within most urban areas of Kenya. Notwithstanding, the fact that it is often those 
who fall within the 35th income percentile and above who may automatically 
qualify and probably few who fall above the 20th income percentile is noted. 
Thus the affordability level as understood and practised in the three policy 
approaches completely excludes the most needy who fall below the 20th income 
percentile. The case of the first major World Bank funded site and service scheme 
in Nairobi (DSS) and an upgrading project in the second urban project (Migosi) 
is used to demonstrate in detail some of the limitations of these policy 
approaches. Full cost recovery or near full cost recovery was expected in the DSS 
and this automatically put off those below 20th income percentile. A high 
percentage of those who fell below 35th and above 20th income percentile were 
also excluded from the target beneficiaries. It was felt that such groups could not 
afford to pay the loan and at the same time construct additional rooms. As 
opposed to this, there were a number of households who were allocated units but 
could not afford to promptly pay the loan instalments, nor could they construct 
additional rooms without external support. 
The DSS scheme was planned to benefit households earning between Ksh. 280 
and 650 per month. The hope was that they would manage to develop their units 
to completion and this would earn them additional income by sub-letting. 
Contrary to this, a study by the Mazingira Institute (1983) found that in the first 
phase of the project only 45% of the allottees were within the target group. In the 
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other phases the percentage of those falling within the right target group is even 
lower. The Mazingira study attributed this to the reduced supervision of the World 
Bank which opened the way for councillors' intervention in plot allocations. 
Knowing the nature of the World Bank, one would assume that it did not 
intervene basically because the bank's interest was not at stake. For instance, in 
Kisumu Municipality (the third largest urban centre), where the Banles interest 
was at stake, it insisted that the original target group be changed due to delays in 
implementation which had led to escalation of cost per unit (NIitullah, 1984). 
Nflgosi upgrading project in Kisumu drove out the majority of the poor 
households. The poor who were mainly tenants of both 'traditional 6 and 
% emerging4 landlords had to move out as improvements continued. This was due 
to the high rents charged by the landlords supposedly to pay for services and 
partly to make profit. In the past, upgrading has been based on the premise that 
those who live on the plots own the plots and their shelters. 'Meir problem is 
therefore lack of tenure and provision of services. However, this is not always the 
case. In Migosi 82% of the residents were tenants, whereas, only 18% were owner 
occupiers. The policy thus focused on the wrong target group which did not need 
subsidy. It can only be meaningful if geared to benefit the majority of the 
residents. If the majority of residents are tenants, it goes without saying that the 
benefits should go to them at the expense of landlords. This calls for strong 
political will able to undertake some radical changes where necessary. But which 
most politicians are not able to undertake since in many cases they have a vested 
interest. To some extent, this explains the proliferation of informal settlements as 
the government continues with massive low income housing programmes. 
Standards of housing are closely linked to affordability. The requirement for 
3'Traditional' landlords were the original inhabitants of Migosi housing scheme or those who bought 
land in the area before 1965. 
4'Emerging' landlords are the comparatively wealthier individuals who have been buying land from 
the haditional landlords since 1965. 
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comparatively high standards has often led the poor to resort to informal housing 
which planners, administrators and policy makers may view as sub-standard. A 
point to note is that standards can only be realistic if the housing and 
infrastructure meeting such requirements are affordable to the target groups or if 
the public sector can provide. In the developing countries, the prevailing standards 
have not been a conscious choice; they have reflected inherited colonial standards 
and ways of thinking. In some cases high standards have been demanded as 
evidence of modernization and economic progress; whereas in others high capital 
cost required to meet high standards are preferable to high maintenance costs 
(Rodwin, (ed). 1987). None of the above intentions integrate the low income 
households, clearly demonstrating why they are often excluded from projects 
claimed to be intended for them. Additionally it illuminates why policy makers 
have not been active in formulating appropriate standards. 
'Me lower standards applied in both SS & UG schemes have always been 
negotiated in each case and there are still no national guidelines or rules which 
individual developers can apply. The standards accepted depend on a given Local 
Authority since they enjoy a large degree of autonomy on such matters and are 
free to adopt or not standards proposed by central government. Ille low income 
housing by-laws completed in 1985 proposed amendments to the building code 
and introduced the principle of performance standards. Amendments to the 
drainage and latrine rules were also suggested (GOK, 1985). To supplement this 
review was the low income housing report outlining affordable designs (GOK, 
1985). Problems still persist and these attempts have been referred to as isolated 
proposals that have not reached the stage where they are applied at a large scale, 
while no revisions are being undertaken in important fields such as that of town 
planning standards (Nankman, 1986). 
In DSS, although standards were kept comparatively low, many allottees still 
found the development too costly. The very fact that standards were kept low 
brought a dispute between the project designers and the World Bank on the one 
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hand and the city council on the other. The City Council's Health Department 
ruled that the entire first phase of the project failed to conform with health 
regulations and was therefore unacceptable to the city administration. The dispute 
involved the site of sewers, which was not resolved until several revisions had 
been made to the city's building code. Other measures for lowering standards 
involved reduction of plot sizes in order to cut the cost of ý infrastructure and 
maximize possible number of rooms per plot to between 5 to 6. The use of 
murruni for road construction and open drains further departed from the colonial 
inherited approaches and were all aimed at reducing costs to make units 
affordable. 
At NCC's policy level, attitudes and approaches to building standards are 
changing but the administrative aspect of it leaves a lot to be desired. For 
example, NCC has been silent over the housing upgrading activities of Udungu 
Society of Kenya. A local NGO assisting in the improvement of informal 
settlements by improving sanitation and housing units without taking the building 
code into consideration at all. At the Central Government level, consensus on the 
revision of building by-laws exists but there is no agreement among the concerned 
parties on how minimal or low the standards should be. This is largely due to 
elitist approaches to development in the midst of scarcity, which seem to give 
marginal consideration to majority interest, who happen, at the same time to fall 
among the low income group. 
Affordability, which in many cases is reduced by the standards set, is influenced 
by the concept of cost recovery. An important prerequisite which has to be 
assessed by the financiers before agreement on loans can be signed. Prior to en- 
mass intervention of international finance in the area of housing, most 
governments in Africa were providing complete houses with all necessary 
infrastructure and services. Ibis proved unaffordable as economies deteriorated. 
Instead, the current approach of the State providing land with basic infrastructure 
and services, while beneficiaries undertake the development of their houses was 
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adopted. This has been aimed at cost recovery. 
71bere are mainly two methods of recovering costs in low income housing. It can 
either be done directly by charging the beneficiaries, or indirectly by increasing 
charges such as water rates or property taxes to the population of the urban area 
as a whole. VAiich ever method is used depends to a large extent on the LAs' 
financial position, and the political commitment to reach the poor. Many LAs 
have very poor tax collection records and may not rely on the second approach, 
although it may be best for reaching the low income groups. In some cases, both 
approaches can be used depending on the items concerned. 
In Kenya, effective methods of cost recovery have not been designed, although 
Kenya has been said to have a better record. In DSS, where the percentage of 
tenants is higher than the allottees, cost recovery has been very uneven. After the 
allocation and occupation of 1,033 plots in Dandora phase one at the end of 1976, 
only 13 plots were in arrears at the end of the first six months. These tenants were 
evicted. A further 27 and 22 evictions were carried in 1977 and 1978 respectively. 
Up to this point the amount of defaulters owed was less than 5% of the total due. 
However, the political interference against further evictions in 1979 greatly led to 
poor performance in cost recovery. Out of 27 plots in arrears in June 1979, only 
one was repossessed leading to laxity among allottees and arrears started 
mounting and by January 1980,72% of the allottees in phase one were in arrears 
(World Bank, 1986). 
Habitat (1987) argues that cost recovery seems better in SS than UG. However, 
a consideration of the extent of target beneficiaries participation during 'initial 
planning of the two schemes seems to favour UG. In cases where effective 
community participation is achieved during initial planning of UG, the target 
beneficiaries may become very active participants of the project which can 
produce a good record of cost recovery. On the contrary, if effective community 
participation is lacking the target beneficiaries may not co-operate at all. For 
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instance in Nakuru (fourth largest urban centre), the beneficiaries of an upgrading 
project rejected to use services provided in order to avoid making any payments. 
Ibis was as opposed to planners perceptions which viewed improvements as gifts 
to the poor which should be automatically accepted. 
Experiences of cost recovery has led to the emphasis on active community 
participation which in the past was either ignored or passive, mostly through in 
depth studies and surveys. This did not involve consultation and involvement of 
respective communities in decision making but the experts determining what was 
right for communities without necessarily getting their opinion. A trend which can 
be associated with the fear of governments over sharing power with the masses. 
In many cases Communities have been involved only during implementation when 
their labour or willingness to move for planning purposes is required. It has been 
contended that the main obstacle to participation of poorer groups in decision 
making is generally related to the form of power sharing. It is likely to affect 
adversely the interests of privileged groups and consequently alter the political 
power relationships in society (Majeras, 1985;, Lisk, 1985 and Hughes, 1985). 
In most low income housing programmes funded by international finance, 
community participation has been a requirement by financiers. This has 
pressurised the government through LAs to recruit trained community 
development officers, responsible for working with project beneficiaries. In spite 
of this, community participation is still far from being fully realised. UNCHS 
points out that it is easily realisable in upgrading projects as opposed to SS and 
TP schemes. This can be explained by the fact that upgrading schemes are based 
on well established settlements, whereas the other two bring together a community 
of strangers. Notwithstanding, most low income housing programmes assume an 
attachment to the shelter but this is not often the case. In some cases the tenants 
are willing to 
' 
move to other areas when demands of particular areas are not 
conducive. Hence the difficulty of mobilising active community participation in 
low income housing programmes. 
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Another factor which affects effective community participation in cases where the 
beneficiaries are willing to participate is the ignorance of modem approaches to 
housing development. Projects tend to stress a rapid rate of construction, choice 
of modem and permanent materials, material loan programmes, technical 
assistance, and sound construction procedures and methods (UNCHS, 1986). 
These demands are not inbuilt in self help and mutual aid which most urban poor 
households are versed in. UNCHS notes further that demands of low income 
programmes ignore the approaches which the low income groups are used to, such 
as the use of galvanised iron sheets, old oil drums which can be flattened out, 
discarded wood from crates and old cardboard. It is not the ignorance of the 
approaches but rather the inability of building regulations to accommodate what 
is practical and affordable. 
In Nairobi like other urban centres, community participation has not been 
effective in spite of several government attempts to make it work. This is mainly 
due to lack of interest among the 'target beneficiaries5, tenants and ineffective 
community mobilisation approaches. In DSS, community participation has been 
through building groups which are organisations of comparatively poor households 
which could not afford to develop their units through their own savings. The 
objective of building groups which was conceived by the project team and not the 
beneficiaries, was to develop two rooms on each member's plot., The building 
groups did not integrate all households which were unable to develop, this left 
some poor households who could not even afford to join the building groups 
relying on borrowing from the welfare fund which was another idea of the project 
team. Initially there was hope of building groups as an effective self help 
approach, able to assist allottees complete their units. Nevertheless, increasing 
costs due to inflation made it difficult for group members to attain their goal. 
-'The actual beneficiaries are often not the target beneficiaries. In many cases they are individuals who 
have adequate resources and do not need support systems which call for community participation. On the 
other hand, the few who fall within the target beneficiaries may either be too few for active community 
participation, with others simply selling out their units as a source of income and escaping from the project 
requirements. 
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GeneraUy, the group members were poor and group membership per se did not 
increase their incomes while building costs continued to rise. A similar approach 
has been on trial in Moses Mudavadi tenant purchase scheme without any success. 
Community participation can only be enhanced and not instilled as has been 
happening in most low income housing programmes. Taking the case of USAID 
funded Umoja Two tenant purchase scheme, where the condominiums are very 
congested with a shared court yard. The project planners and implementers 
thought that having associations for each condominium would lead to effective 
community participation, which would in turn ensure the upkeep of the units and 
the general welfare of the occupants. Contrary to this, an evaluation of the project 
shows that very few allottees are conversant with the associations; whereas the 
tenants have no idea of what they are or what they are meant for (Matrix 
Development Consultants, 1988). If effective community participation is to be 
achieved in a project like Umcja Two, the focus has to shift from allottees to 
tenants. In this respect, the legal constraints and the mobile nature of tenants have 
to be taken into consideration. 
3.7.0 Conclusion 
The difficulty entailed in compromising the different interests and actors dominant 
in the production and consumption of housing has been noted in this chapter. In 
spite of this obstacle, most UN agencies such as Habitat have been pressurising 
governments to treat housing as a right, ensuring that all individuals have access. 
However, this goal has limitations, especially when the economic conditions of 
the developing countries are taken into consideration. The very recent shift of UN 
and international funding agencies from a project approach emphasising housing 
for individual households to creating a self-supporting housing sector that serves 
61nterview with Monica Mutuku, one of the founders of the building groups. She worked for NCC for 
over twenty years as a Community Development Officer rising to the position of head of HDD's Community Development Division before an early retirement. At the time of interview (May, 1992) she 
was in charge of UNICEFs Kenya programme on Urban Basic Services. 
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all the interests and actors involved, shows an acceptance that the State has 
limitations in making housing accessible to all citizens. 
It is noted that the broad policies applied by most African States, with the aim of 
curbing population movement to urban areas in order to reduce urbanisation 
problems, have had limited impact on population movement. These policies are 
seen to have been influenced by colonial policies, which restricted movement into 
urban areas. In Kenya, they have not improved the living conditions in the urban 
areas, as demonstrated by the poor environmental conditions in the informal 
settlements. To some extent, these policies contradict the priorities, values and 
approaches which the ordinary urban residents hold and utilise. This exposes the 
discrepancy between what policy makers and planners have in mind and on paper 
and what is on the ground. 
The Kenyan urban housing policy evolution is assessed showing the link between 
colonial and post-Independence policies. It is noted that the position of the 
disadvantaged who during the colonial period were the unemployed Africans, 
became the low income groups with Independence. This occurred in the midst of 
fluid housing policies integrating, action, inaction, intention and at times reactive 
policies. In all these forms of policy, the position of the low income groups has 
not significantly changed. Implying that the State's emphasis on housing the low 
income groups has been unnecessary and the current shift, focusing on the broad 
economy and subsequently the housing sector may not have a significant impact. 
The policy failure is reflected in an examination of the projects and programmes 
undertaken by the State and its implementing arms, manifesting inability to reach 
their targets. Mainly due to the inefficient implementing agencies coupled with 
their inability to design appropriate housing strategies and methods for policy 
implementation. Their total reliance on funds from the international funding 
agencies for the development of low income housing is seen to usurp their ability 
to mobilise local funds for the development of housing. 
109 
CHAPTER FOUR 
URBAN GROWTH AND NIANAGEMENT IN KENYA 
4.0.0 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the global nature of urbanisation pointing out the high 
growth rates leading to problems of service provision and management. Ilie 
evolution of urbanisation and urban development policies in Kenya are presented, 
stressing both colonial and post-independence urbanisation as well as the three 
key policies aimed at abating urbanisation problems, of service provision and 
management. Subsequently, the management of urban growth in Nairobi is 
discussed, including the history of Nairobi, the state of services and the 
implication for low income housing. 
4.1.0 Overview of Urbanisation 
Urbanisation has been viewed as the a basis for most urban problems, housing 
included. It is therefore appropriate to place housing within its context. In its 
original setting, urbanisation was a sign of progress, expected to generate 
employment and income. This is because rapid urban growth accompanied 
economic advancement. However, urbanisation in itself cannot assure economic 
growth at an adequate pace (Peterson et al, 1990). As the world continues to 
experience rapid urbanisation unmatched with both employment opportunities and 
incomes, this process has become a myth. An examination of patterns of growth 
indicates that the developing countries have experienced rapid growth as 
compared to the more developed countries (figure 4.2). Whereas in the past 
sixteen years the urban population of the developing countries as a whole has 
been growing at around 3.5%, the growth of the world's poorest, mostly in Asia 
and Africa, has been close to 5%. 
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The gap between levels of urbanisation in both the developing and developed 
countries is narrowing with the developing countries taking an upward trend as 
the developed takes a downward trend (UN, 1986). It is projected that between 
1985 and the year 2000, the world's urban population will increase by a further 
871 million, of which 760 million will be in the developing countries. An analysis 
of the UN statistics notes that in 1991 the urban population of the poorest 
countries stood at more that 5000 n-dllion, accounting for nearly half of the urban 
population of the developing countries. By the year 2000, the urban population 
of the poorest countries may double and by the year 2020 it may be in the order 
of 1.8 billion people, 1.2 billion would be living in the urban areas of China and 
India (Obudho, 1991). , 
African countries fall among the developing countries noted to urbanise at 
historically unprecedented rates (Todaro, 1985; Rodwin, 1987; Stren & White, 
1989). In 1960 only 20% of the total population of these countries were 
urbanised. In 1980 it had increased to 27% and UN projection indicates that by 
the year 2000 it will be 39% reaching 59% in the year 2020 (UN, 1986). The 
annual growth rates differ across countries, between 1980 and 1987, the urban 
annual average growth for the continent was estimated to be 5%, about double 
that of the world of 2.7% (Obudho, 1989). Examples of Tunisia, Ghana, Kenya 
and Tanzania show that between 1980 and 087 their annual growth rates were 
2.9%; 4.1%; 8.6% and 11.3% respectively (see appendix 3.6) 
Scholars contend that the position of urban systems and centres in the developing 
countries are reflections of the role that the national states play in the international 
economic system. They are thus determined by the world political economy, a 
system which subordinates the peripheral capitalist states (Frank, 1967; Amin, 
1974; Wallerstein, 1974; Cohen, 1981; Armstrong and McGee, 1985 ). Although 
consensus exists on the urban centres forming an institutional and structural link 
between the developed and the developing countries, there is no consensus on the 
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product of this link. Ibere are those who argue that the link is characterised by 
exploitation of the developing countries. For example Amin (1974), sees their role 
as that of promoting and siphoning out the accumulation of capital. In this case, 
the urban centres do not have the potential of promoting and developing national 
capital, which can compete internationally. Roberts, on the other hand, 
acknowledges the potential of the urban centres to develop national capital. He 
maintains that the link is causing the integration of third world countries, creating 
rapid independent capitalist development and has set a process for industrialisation 
(Roberts, 1978) 
Roberts' contention belongs to the school of thought that dominated the 
development arena in the developing countries for many decades. It had an 
orientation of classical Marxist ideology, which saw the African states moving 
into an integrated capitalist development, where industries would dominate the 
economy. This school of thought contends that the impetus for urban growth is 
industrialisation, as did happen in Western Europe and other parts of the Western 
world. These countries which experienced early industrial development had their 
capitalist interests extended beyond their national boundaries by acquming i 
colonies; such colonies became sources of cheap raw materials which sustained 
many of their industries. A development which the developing countries have 
never had and may never have. 
As reflected above, industrialisation (for example in Britain) to a large extent 
realised the development of large scale machine production (Clampman, 1932). 
This development reduced the capacity of small scale industries, and triggered the 
exodus from rural to urban areas. Eventually, the production of raw agricultural 
products shifted from the rural areas of Britain to their colonies. This is quite 
different from the developing countries, where urban areas largely owe their origin 
to the development of capitalism through colonialism. They were basically 
admi'mistrative and collection centres for export products, mainly raw agricultural 
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or mineral products. It was therefore not possible during the colonial period to 
generate any national capital within urban areas through industrialisation. When 
Independence was eventually achieved, the few industries which developed were 
owned by international capital. Most of such industries retained very little of the 
capital generated in their countries of operation. This trend still continues through 
multinational corporations, as well as by the unequal terms of trade (Trainer, 
1989). 
Thus, urbanisation in the developed world was shaped by the availability of job 
opportunities within industrial urban centres. Contrary to this, most developing 
countries had a different sequence whereby movement was not triggered by 
industrial development in the urban centres. For example, within the African states 
it is rare to find people moving to the urban areas due to the demand for labour. 
Their movement is often based on anticipation of better economic opportunities 
but often it is frustrated. The unfulfilled hope resulting in large numbers resorting 
to the informal sector of the urban economy. A sector which provides both 
services and employment to most of the urban poor but until recently was given 
marginal consideration by most governments, partly due to their view of the 20th 
century Western model of development. 
The issue of poverty is central as one discusses urbanization in the developing 
countries, especially Africa. Whereas urban areas are traditionally meant to be 
centres of economic wealth, in Africa they are becoming centres of poverty. This 
is demonstrated by the proliferation of informal settlements where services are 
lacking except for few basic ones such as water points. Most inhabitants of such 
areas are employed in the informal sector where incomes are so low that they are 
hardly adequate for subsistence. Thus, the picture in most of the African cities are 
the unmet needs of the rapidly growing numbers which in turn is reflected in 
serious physical, social, economic and political pressures on the population. 
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As much as one would wish to see the human resources available in the urban 
areas turned into economic power, it has not been possible. The majority of the 
urban residents make incomes that cannot sustain them and their families. This 
is why they opt to stretch their meagre resources by staying in informal 
settlements. Areas 'unplanned' according to city authorities and are mostly not 
entitled to any service provision. Such areas have very poor environmental 
conditions and the residents are prone to numerous diseases linked to the poor 
environmental conditions. Although, there are cases where such areas are as old 
as the city, the city authorities tend to ignore them or give them very minimal 
services. This, in many cases, is done after intervention by International Agencies 
and NGOs. 
The rapid growth coupled with poor urban economy is reflected in unemployment, 
under employment, inadequate and insufficient services and the proliferation of 
unplanned settlements (Onibukun, 1989; Mitullah, 1990). These aspects have led 
to a dismal situation as the number of families who are desperately in need of 
survival strategies increase. As Africa approaches the year 2000, it is estimated 
that more than 30 of the 51 countries will be unable to feed their population due 
to the poor economic conditions (Redclift, 1987). 
The dismal scenario in African countries should not be taken to be only in the 
area of governing cities. Indeed it is part of the broader economic crisis facing 
most countries within the Sub-Saharan region. A World Bank Report (1989) notes 
that 'Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole has witnessed almost a decade of falling per 
capita incomes, increasing hunger, and accelerating ecological degradation, the 
earlier progress made in social development is being eroded, overall Africans are 
almost as poor as they were thirty years ago'. This outcome has been influenced 
by the global environment characterised by recession, inflation, protectionism, 
falling commodity prices and growing debt burden (Winsome, ý 1987)., 
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Whereas this study is not aimed at discussing the political economy of 
development, it is worth noting that the poor economic performance of the 
developing countries is a product of multiple variables. These include ecological 
disasters (especially for Africa), colonial background, external and internal factors. 
Any attempt to explain the problems of the developing countries, using a single 
variable approach is bound to either fail to capture the real situation or end up 
with a distorted perception. 
The poor urbanisation trend in the developing countries has resulted in the 
attention of most development agencies, especially international finance and 
United Nations organisations, shifting from financing programmes and projects 
to institutional capacity building. Stren (1989, p. 20) indicates that the focus is 
evident in a new generation of World Bank urban projects, which include support 
for 'improvements in national housing finance schemes; urban management and 
planning; local government revenue generation, budget procedures and 
decentralisation of national government authorities over cities. 
Stren is sceptical about the role of international organisations such as the World 
Bank in this endeavour. He notes that the programmes and projects implemented 
during the Seventies, through the same approach did not succeed much. It is 
ironical that the World Bank which has often played a key role in deterrmiming 
which way for Africa, is currently viewing most past approaches and development 
goals as wrong. In its current Housing Policy Paper, the Bank notes that 'the scale 
of the bank's interventions in the past has been narrow to have a major effect on 
the performance of the housing sector in the developing countries' (World Bank 
1993, p. 52). 
The World Bank had to wait until the African states had completely sunk to come 
up with their Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). A policy strategy being 
imposed from outside on existing political structures; which lays emphasis on 
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public finance, monetary policy, prices and markets and completely ignores basic 
survival which is currently the key problem in Africa. Whether the institutional 
capacity building currently being undertaken by international organisations under 
SAPs will succeed or not is debateable and a matter of time. 
The urban governments need to improve their development and management 
capacity. This would be more meaningful if it were internally initiated and 
funded. An approach which can bring change but has been obstructed mainly by 
the world political economy and the fear of politicians of possible loss of power 
and inability to come up with an alternative approach. With limited external 
influence supported by a strong and benevolent urban government, both service 
provision and generation of economic activities can be addressed with greater 
reality. 
In many of these countries, urban services have deteriorated, whereas in some 
cases required services are totally unavailable. In Kenya, the deterioration of 
services and/or the lack of it is reflected in the rapid growth of informal 
settlements and the poor management of the available services. This is in spite 
of the attempt aimed at providing 'decent' housing, especially for the low income 
groups. The focus has been on the promotion of large scale public housing 
programmes such as SS and UG, funded mostly by international finance. These 
programmes have been based on the assumption that if enough houses are built, 
there would be no housing shortage but enough have not been built - and the few 
built have not been accessible to the target group (Laquian, 1983). Evidence from 
a number of countries point out that housing need is far from being met (Habitat, 
1986; Rodwin, 1987; Shidlo, 1990). The current trend of thought is that only the 
people themselves can arrest their housing problem since the state cannot afford 
to do it. Instead the state should concentrate on enabling aspects such as 
encouraging the establishment of less expensive building materials, land/plots and 
planning procedures among other things. 
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Most problems of urban growth and management in countries such as Kenya can 
only be understood with a good understanding of both local and central 
government and their role in development. Services or lack of services is a good 
manifestation of local, city or Central Government performance. It is the latter, 
or lack of it, that Hes behind the poor services and there are numerous reasons 
behind it which this study will not delve into but are worth mentioning. For 
example, the centralisation of power by national Governments in the capital city 
and the lack of understanding of the importance of the role of LAs is problematic. 
This has often been aggravated by the lack of resources resulting in use of 
patronage for accessing services and urban wealth. Overall, the imposition of and 
continuing prevalence of 'democratic' procedures/institutions and a one-party 
system that did not fulfil its function leading to; lack of accountability and 
corruption, the going along with the above state of affairs by Western (and other) 
nations due to the past cold war preoccupations. 
The result of the need to cope with all the above problems and legacies and 
interventions has meant confusion of city and regional government manifested in 
the lack of services. But even then, the most important 'service' that of aiding 
employment; of generating income growth through (if necessary) exploitation of 
labour to make capital, that can in turn be taxed for reinvestment in national, 
regional and city infrastructure has not been effectively carried out. This scenario 
is improved in Asia, where some governments have set their population to work 
and have reaped the benefit. As for Africa, there has been constant deterioration 
of services reflected in the inability of LAs to perform most of their functions. 
Although managing urban growth is a global problem, the case of cities in most 
of the Africa countries has been worse with many of them experiencing constant 
deterioration. Ibus, the poor state of urban growth and management can be 
correlated with the lack of urban services, as Onibokun describes the situation in 
Nigeria; 
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'The most noticeable and enduring problem is the absence or inadequacy 
of necessary supporting infrastructure and social amenities in most urban 
areas. Water supply, sewers, roads, electricity, health facilities and social 
services are heavily overloaded and unreliable. The environment is 
dangerously polluted - each increment of urban growth leads to further 
deterioration of the environment. A high propbrtion of roads are in 
disrepair; garbage is irregularly collected and poorly disposed of-, piped 
water is generally a scarce commodity, as over twenty five percent of 
urban dwellers depend on wells and streams. A very significant portion of 
urban dwellers use crude and unhygienic methods for the disposal of their 
liquid waste. Electricity remains a luxury in many homes as even those 
homes connected to a network cannot predict regularity' (Onibokun 1989, 
p. 7 1). 
As much as the above description may seem odd, the majority of African urban 
centres suffer from at least three quarters of the above problems. This varies 
across the continent, with the situation being worse among the economies grouped 
by the World Bank as 'low income economies'. In these economies urban 
development has relapsed to the extent that the comparatively better off 
households opt to seek for private services. Overall, the inability of urban 
governments to develop and provide services for areas, which have risen 
spontaneously, has had a spill over effect on the other areas of the city, as 
demonstrated in the case of Kenya. 
4.2.0 Colonial Urbanisation in Kenya 
In order to understand the housing problem in Kenya, one needs to grasp the 
urbanisation trend and how it has been managed. En-mass urbanisation in Kenya 
dates back to the 19th century colonisation of the country by the British (figure 
4.3). During this period the construction of the railways, aimed at opening up the 
country in order to allow the various British Companies to operate successfully, 
led the development of a number of trading centres. Such centres acted as supply 
and resting points and as the political and socio-cultural centres for respective 
regions. Often they sprung up on roadsides and the railway network (Soja, 1968; 
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Obudho, 1975) and were evenly spaced, with most of them being between one 
hundred and one hundred and twenty five miles apart (Obudho, 1990). 
Subsequently, apart from the coastal towns, they became the initial stage of urban 
development in Kenya. However, Obudho notes ftniher that they had a weak 
influence on local economic factors and hence their limitation in generating 
wealth. An explanation of this maylie in their being based on the transportation 
and administrative network, as opposed to local economic activities. 
The hinterland of Kenya did not have urban centres as such, what existed were 
the periodic markets, which are noted to have started appearing during the latter 
part of the 16th and 17th century (Kraph, 1960; Obudho & Wailer, 1976). Most 
of them were based on caravan routes linking the coastal towns with the 
hinterland. Thus they provided resting places, replenishment of supplies and 
information on commercial conditions in coastal markets and further trade inland. 
Although these centres seemed to have inherent dynamics for urban development, 
they disappeared with the coming of colonisation. It is difficult to give a 
comprehensive explanation as to why they never developed into full fledged urban 
centres. However, one possibility is that with the development of colonial 
communication systems such centres could have been left out, as business resorted 
to the more advanced colonial system. Hull (1976) has indicated that the 
missionaries and colonial administrators completely ignored the African spatial 
system which had existed for a long time. Had these areas been integrated into 
the colonial economy the scenario would probably be different. 
As opposed to the hinterland, urbanisation within the coastal region of Kenya 
dates to the period prior to the 9th century. Hull (1976) has noted that more than 
forty distinct administratively autonomous market towns thrived along the coral 
stranded coast and on the offshore islands before the European conquest. Malindi, 
which is the oldest town within the region, dates back to 470 A. D. Between 1900 
and 1960, the colonisers introduced three types of central places. Towns, or bomas 
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as they were referred to during that period, are essentially the present urban 
centres with a population of 2000 and above. The other two were the trading 
centres and periodic markets. Both the towns and the trading centres were new 
introductions, whereas the periodic markets had existed in various parts of the 
country prior to colonization of the mainland. Obudho (1990), in his analysis of 
the nature and extent of pre-colonial urbanization, indicates that there were a 
number of compact settlements that could be appropriately referred to as urban 
centres. They were contact spots for intra ethnic groups and non Africans. At the 
same time they played the role of ceremonial and commercial centres of 
exchange. 
The key function of the colonial developed urban centres were economical in 
nature. They were intended to administer or facilitate the export of raw materials 
and the import and sale of manufactured goods. In this context, urban centres 
became the domain of the colonial masters and a few individuals who provided 
them with support services. The rest of the African population were restricted 
from staying within them. It was indicated that 'the African reserves were... the 
proper place for the Africans whose presence in the towns were no longer 
required' (Kenya Colony & Protectorate, 1934). Ibis left the majority of the 
African population in informal settlements on the peripheral areas of the urban 
centres. 
4.3.0 Post Independence Urbanisation 
Since Independence (1963) the rate of urbanisation has increased. This correlates 
with the general national population growth rate, which has been higher than that 
of the neighbouring East African (Table 4.3) countries. During the last two 
decades, the urban population has been growing within the range of 6.4 to 7.9% 
per annum. This is twice as fast as that of the developing countries' average. This 
is in tune with the overall population growth rate, which in 1979 was 3.8% p. a., 
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making Kenya one of the countries with the highest population growth rate in the 
world (Kenya 1984, p. 143). 
Obudho (1979) indicates that urban population in Kenya has grown faster than the 
total population. Whereas the annual growth rate was 3.4% between 1948 and 
1979 and an estimated 4.1% between 1979 and 1985, the share of urban 
population increased from 7.8% in 1962 to over 18% in 1990 (Obudho, 1990). 
This has been clearly reflected in the growth in the number of areas designated 
as urban centres. In 1948 when the first census was undertaken, there were only 
17 urban centres with an aggregate population of 286,000, representing 5.3% of 
the national total. This population was concentrated mainly in the two urban 
centres (Nairobi and Mombasa) and accounted for 83% of the total urban 
population. 
Year Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
1950 5.6 3.4 3.6 
1955 6.4 4.4 4.2 
1960 7.4 5.3 4.8 
1965 8.6 6.5 6.6 
1970 10.2 8.0 6.9 
1975 12.0 9.8 9.2 
1980 14.2 11.9 11.8 
1985 16.7 14.4 14.8 
1990 19.2 17.2 18.2 
1995 22.7 20.3 21.6 
2000 26.2 23.5 24.9 
2005 29.9 27.1 28.6 
2010 33.8 30.8 32.4 
2015 37.8 34.7 36.4 
2020 41.8 38.7, 40.4 
2025 45.7 42.7 44.4 
Table 43: Urbanisation Growth Rate in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania 
Source: UN, 1988. p. 28 
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By 1962 the urban centres had increased to 34 with a total population of 671,000 
being 7.8% of the total national population and an annual growth rate of 6.6%. 
At Independence in 1963 the urban population accelerated such that by the 1979 
population census, there were 90 centres with a population of about 2.3 million. 
Analysis of the 1979 census indicated that between the inter censal-period of 1969 
and 1979 the urban centres with a population of between 2,000 - 4,999; 10,000 - 
19,000; 20,000 - 99,000 and those of above 100,000 had growth rates of 5.7%, 
7.1%, 5.7% and 5.6% respectively. In spite of this, about two thirds of the urban 
population still came from the major municipalities of Nairobi, Mombasa and 
Kisumu. 
Whereas the above growth rates points out that smaller centres experienced higher 
rates, Nairobi still remained the prime urban centre offering more opportunities 
for potential urban n-dgrants. The 1989 provisional census data shows that there 
are 74 urban centres with an estimated population of 3,430,500. r1be urban 
population increased from 2.3 million to 3.8 million, giving an inter-censal growth 
rate of 4.8% and 19% proportional share of the total population compared to 15% 
of 1979. During the inter-censal period the number of urban centres with a 
population of 10,000 and above increased from 25 to 45. Nairobi maintained 36% 
of the total urban population as in 1979 (GOK, 1991). 
There are a number of factors which influence the rapid growth rate in Kenya. 
One being the mortality decline, which is as a result of the decrease in infant 
mortality from an estimated 184 deaths per one thousand in 1948 to 76 in 1986. 
Whereas this reduction applies to the whole nation, when specific areas are taken 
into consideration, some regions still experience comparatively low infant 
mortality. The second factor is the rapid socio-economic development especially 
in areas of education, agriculture and availability and accessibility of medical 
facilities. Whereas these factors affect the overall national growth rate, the urban 
growth rate is accelerated by both rural-urban migration, urban natural growth rate 
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and in some cases extension of urban boundaries. 
4.4.0 Urban Development Policies and the Management of Change 
At Independence until the beginning of the '80s, emphasis was on 'decongestion 
policies' of developing rural and alternative growth centres. The 1970/74 
Development Plan stated that 'the key strategy was to direct an increased share 
of total resources available to the nation towards the rural areas' (GOK, 
Development Plan 1970/74). Not much was realised during the Seventies but as 
problems intensified, the Government came up with more vigorous rural based 
policies. The majority of policies implemented since 1983 have had the intention 
of the 1970/74 Plan as their basis; the aim being to encourage growth in smaller 
centres and the rural areas. For example, the adoption of District Focus for Rural 
Development (DFRD) in 1983, Rural-Urban Balance Strategy (RUBS) in 1984 
and the development of Rural Trade and Production Centres (RTPCs) since 1987. 
These are efforts aimed at the achievement of balanced development in both rural 
and urban areas. 
4.4.1 District Focus For Rural Development 
DFRD is a policy, whose key objective is to decentralise planning from the 
central government based in the capital city, Nairobi, to the districts. It aims at 
promoting rural development by making District Development Committees 
(DDCs) responsible for rural development planning and co-ordination. Inherent 
in this role are: project implementation; management of financial resources; 
overseeing local procurement of goods and services,, the management of personnel 
and provision of public information (GOK, 1987; Habitat, 1986). Before this 
policy, planning was centralised withvery little coordination with districts. It was 
believed that it resulted in plans which were not feasible, and, in turn rural 
development was stunted, leading to exodus, of population to the urban areas. 
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Adequate research has not been done, so it is not possible to ascertain how 
effective this policy is in effectively mobilising and developing local resources for 
the generation of local capital. On the same note, it is not known whether it is 
curbing population movement from the districts. These are aspects which can only 
be adequately analyzed with time. 
4.4.2 Rural Urban Balance Strategy 
RUBS is currently the policy focusing directly on urbanisation. Its thrust is neither 
in the urban nor the rural but aims at achieving growth and development in both 
areas. As opposed to the regionally oriented DFRD strategy, which has the 
objective of encouraging local participation in planning and management, RUBS 
calls for co-ordination of development in both urban and rural areas. Sessional 
Paper Number 1 of 1986 outlined the objectives of RUBS as: reduction of 
population concentration in larger cities, promotion of growth of secondary towns 
and other alternative growth centres through the development of agriculture, 
encouragement of production linkages between agriculture and other sectors of the 
economy, between rural areas and local service centres, market towns and 
secondary towns. The overall objective being to enable all regions to access 
renewed economic growth which is the core of the sessional paper. 
4.4.3 Rural Trade and Production Centres 
Since the introduction of the policy of RUBS, a policy shift has occurred. 
Emphasis has moved from small towns to RTPCs- Centies aimed at becoming 
% nuclei of economic activity, providing markets and outlets for farm produce and 
serving as centres for the purchase of farm inputs and other goods and services' 
(GOK, Development Plan, 1989/93). In theory, such centres were assessed to have 
potential for supporting agriculture and other related activities. However, most of 
them have shortcomings, especially in relation to infrastructure. 
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RTPCs fall under the concept of Alternative Growth Centres (AGCs), as discussed 
in chapter three, are an important component of RUBS. During the 1960s and 70s 
AGCs in Africa were expected to play an important role in what Kiamba (1990) 
refers to as "'limited decentralisation, limited concentration' strategy for urban 
development. Kiamba notes that the Centres were expected to provide many 
intermediate functions including: diffusion of development impulses, innovations 
and social change down the urban and regional hierarchy; promotion of national 
spatial integration via a spaced population; provision of high order services to the 
population; more equitable distribution of services (among urban and regions) 
resulting from the alternative growth centre strategy and the inherent development 
of employment opportunities. The rationale being to retain population in such 
areas. RT? Cs, whose choice is based on a set of empirical criteria combining low 
rates of urbanisation with high rates of agricultural and livestock productivity 
(GOK, 1987), are part of AGCs- These strategies seem appropriate but 
unfortunately they do not go into details as to how the goals will be achieved. 
Initially the AGCs were to be developed from larger settlements that lacked one 
or two key elements of basic infrastructure, such as adequate road links or a 
market place. However, this has not been closely followed, especially in cases 
where political balance within a district has to be kept. An example being 
Kapsowa, which replaced both Tot and Tabach which had been chosen based on 
criteria of agricultural and livestock productivity. Another problem which the 
development of RTPCs has faced, as noted by the planning officer' interviewed, 
is the option of most LAs to go for structures such as markets, slaughter houses, 
and bus parks at the expense of programmes which increase productivity. 
Additionally, in most of the centres, the relevant infrastructure and services have 
not been provided and most potential migrants would not opt to move into them. 
Thus migration to the major cities, such as Nairobi, continues in Kenya, as in 
'Mr. 1.0. Karnande, Planning Officer, Ministry of Planning and National Development. Interview, 1/2/93. 
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other African countries. 
The continuous growth is causing pressure on most services. In spite of an 
increment on expenditure on social services during the last twelve years, the 
situation is still far from being arrested. During the last five years the new policies 
under SAPs have thrown the situation into chaos and the government has had to 
rely on community efforts for service provision. In the area of education, Parents 
and Teachers Associations (PTAs) have to design their own approaches of 
developing and managing the schools. As for health, families have to pay some 
fee and in some cases purchase drugs, which previously were provided without 
any payment. 
What is currently going on in the area of health and education has been going on 
in the area of housing and there seem to be no major changes. If at all, the 
government needs to learn some lessons from the housing sector, which has 
managed itself for several decades. In most urban areas of Kenya, a large number 
of households live in housing not provided by LAs or Central Government. For 
many years most LAs failed to recognise the informal settlements, a position they 
had to back out of as unmanaged urban growth became uncontrollable. 
4.5.0 Management of Urban Growth in Nairobi 
Urban management basically involves control and allocation of resources, co- 
ordination, project programme completions on schedule, communication and 
overall ability of institutions charged with the tasks to perform. The 'decongestion' 
policies implemented in Kenya since the beginning of the Seventies has not 
reduced urban growth nor solved the problems of service provision and 
management. Rapid growth has continued with Nairobi taking the major share of 
urban growth. In 1948 the city had a population of 118,976 this increased to 
266,974 in 1962. By 1969 it was 509,286 reaching 827,775 in 1979. The 
128 
provisional figures for the 1989 census indicate 1.35 million, a population size 
given by the government estimates for 1988. The annual growth rates between 
1948 - 1962,1962 - 1969,1969 - 1979 and 1979 - 1989 were; 5.9,9.7,5.1 and 
4.8 respectively. Within the informal settlements, the growth rate has been higher 
(between 4% and 6%), with some areas such as Kibera recording a growth rate 
of 12.1% per annurn (Nachu, 1990). 
4.5.1 History of Nairobi 
Nairobi is one of the colonial cities which sprung up as a railway depot and later 
became the administrative and economic base for the Imperial Government. Its 
structure and management at Independence was thus shaped by its colonial 
origins, segregating residential zones and service provision on a racial basis. The 
settlers acquired the best hilly parts of the city to the west, north and north west, 
whereas the Africans were squashed into the eastern part of the city, with minimal 
services provided. 
At inception in 1896, the authorities did not envisage problems of managing the 
city but as the population increased the need to have a management team became 
necessary. Ibis led to the establishment of the Township Comn-fittee in 1900 with 
only six members. This marked the birth of Local Government, which has had a 
bleak future in relation to management of the city. In 1919, Nairobi was upgraded 
to the status of Municipal Council but without the full mandate of running 
services. At this time the city still considered only those employed by the railway 
or related imperial institutions as belonging to the city. Such individuals were 
provided temporary accommodation and were not expected to stay with families. 
'Me rest were seen as surplus and were not catered for in planning. By 1935 the 
Municipal Council took over children! s welfare services and clinics from the 
Colonial government, and in 1934 it took over the African maternity hospital (Lee 
Smith, 1989). 
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By 1948 the necessity to have a comprehensive plan for the city had been 
conceived and a Master Plan was prepared. This plan gave minimal services for 
Africans, as African opposition grew with the economic expansion and further 
growth of settler power. From 1948, when the implementation of the Master Plan 
began, a lot of changes -occurred in the management of the city, especially in 
relation to the provision of services. Marginal recognition was given to the city 
residents who had earlier been seen as surplus to the city requirements. A number 
of reviews of the problems facing Africans, who by 1948 comprised of 54.1 % of 
the population, were undertaken. In 1950, at the height of the Nationalist 
movements, Nairobi achieved the status of a city and in 1962 the first African 
mayor was elected. 
Independence witnessed the gradual transfer of management of the city from the 
colonial government to the African managers. Nairobi became a model city to 
most leaders and citizens. Most industries, infrastructure and services continued 
to be concentrated in the city, thereby attracting huge numbers of migrants. Over 
the years, this led to problems of coping with urban growth, its management and 
the inherent problems. Despite this, its outstanding position as a primate city, 
national metropolis, dominant industrial and political centre linger and greatly 
contribute to population increase today. 
Problems related to service provision continued with Independence and in 1973 
the city came up with another master plan; the Nairobi Metropolitan Growth 
Strategy (NMGS). A strategy conceived in the wake of uncoordinated planning 
based on sectoral issues and full of political rhetoric. Meanwhile, the informal 
sector was rapidly growing, absorbing the migrants, with the City Planning 
Department unable to cope with the growth. NMGS was undertaken by the 
Nairobi Urban Study Group (NUSG), formed in 1973 with funding from UNDP 
and charged with the responsibility of coming up with a strategy of arresting 
urbanisation problems. 
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The plan hoped to integrate employment and housing areas and a corresponding 
alleviation of transport problems. Twenty years later, these goals are far from 
being achieved. The decentralisation of industries from an additional four 
locations, apart from the existing industrial area, has not occurred. Instead land 
sub-divisions have occurred in such areas, to the extent that only upgrading may 
solve the situation. Industries are very few within the zones and most residents 
have to travel out of their distant residential zones for employment. UNCHS notes 
that; 
The forward planning of urban growth in which sites and services 
development was to play key role in ensuring a well organised 
environments, has been overtaken by events. Since 1980 most areas 
designated for metropolitan growth have been subdivided into plots by co- 
operatives and companies, sometimes according to approved plans and 
sometimes not. While Dandom has supplied 500 plots per year since 1975, 
it is estimated that private sub divisions in the metropolitan area may have 
created 5000 plots per year in the same period' (UNCHS, 1987, p. 10). 
Although master plans are not the best way to manage rapidly changing situations 
as in Nairobi, they are meant to guide development. In the case of Nairobi, the 
MGS has not been observed nor have planned options been provided. The option 
left may be massive long term problems of regularisation and upgrading, because 
the development has been entirely unco-ordinated and implemented without any 
kind of planning (UNCHS, 1987). The performance of the City Planning 
Department (CPD), established in 1981 as one of the recommendations of the 
NUSG, has been appalling; especially in the area of land allocation and housing 
development. A comment which applies to most departments of NCC, which for 
a long time have been run on a patron-client basis, with most key officers relying 
on 'god fathers'2 and ignoring the public interest. 
The serious malaise of planning in the city Is seen in, the area of housing 
'Management whereby one does not bother about professionalism or planned goals butother higher 
placed individuals who ensure that they keep their job. 
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development by private formal developers. The city has allowed a number of 
housing estates to come up under private development without provision of any 
social facilities. In some cases not even land is left for future development of such 
facilities and in cases where land is left, nobody seems to have an idea of how 
services will be developed. This has placed such developments in a situation 
similar to that of the informal settlements. The only difference is that some of the 
residents of such areas can afford private services or are able to use their 
influence to access NCC services elsewhere. Overall, these developments have 
complicated the development and management of services since the city cannot 
cope with their rate of development. 
The population size of the city has been controversial with different institutions 
giving different figures, thereby making it difficult to plan. NCC, which should 
have the most up to date figures, has in many cases maintained a higher figure. 
In 1988 when the government estimates showed 1.35 million, the NCC estimates 
showed two million (NCC, 1988). If the provisional census data is correct then the 
city estimates are far from the truth. However, the NCC maintain that their 
estimates includes the transient city population. A population which does not 
reside within the city boundaries but is either employed within the city and/or 
uses services within the city. 
The rapid expansion of the city since Independence is partly a product of the ease 
of movement of the African population after Independence, improvement of health 
services and the new government's employment policies, which expanded African 
representation in government and industry in Nairobi. The Independence policies 
did away with restriction of movement of the African population. Ibis led to en- 
mass movement into urban centres. For example, two thirds of the population 
living in Nairobi at the time of 1979 census were born elsewhere. 
Spatial expansion of Nairobi has been accelerated by the extension of boundaries. 
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The city began in 1896 and by 1900 covered 18 sq km, increasing to 25 in 1920 
and to 688 in 1963 (figure 4.4). This consisted only of the city centre and the 
immediate surroundings and was administered by the Nairobi City Council. It 
covered a very small area, which included mainly the central business district and 
its environs. The environs had the residential areas for Africans and Europeans 
clearly marked. 
The adjustment of provincial boundaries at Independence (1963) extended 
the boundary to cover a total area of 688 sq km. Ibis led to areas such as 
Embakasi where UTP is located, Dagoretti, Karen and Kasarani being brought 
within the city boundaries (Morgan, 1962, p. 98. ) Whereas this extension of 
boundary was seen as a credit and prestige to the city, adequate thought was not 
given to its implication on the provision and management of services. It meant an 
additional assignment to an institution which was already experiencing problems 
of service provision and management. At Independence rural-urban migration was 
seen as the major cause of urban population increase. In response "decongestion' 
policies were undertaken with a hope of reducing urban population and problems. 
However, in recent years urban population increase has been seen not only to be 
influenced by rural-urban migration but other factors, such as natural urban 
population growth due to improvement on health facilities and urban-urban 
migration. Despite these additional factors rural-urban migration is still thought 
to contribute to a high percentage of urban population increase. 
Rural-urban migration is a response to a number of variables; land scarcity, rural 
poverty, rural-urban income differentials, urban monopoly of modem sector 
employment opportunities and the greater availability and quality of urban 
services (UNICEF, 1989; Obudho, 1988). During the 1970s many studies based 
on, census and labour force confirmed the essential economic rationale of strong 
rural-urban ties and why and how migrants are attracted to towns especially, 
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Figure 4.4: Growth of Nairobi City Boundaries (1900,1920,1927,1963) 
Source: Mazingira Institute, 1985 
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Nairobi, despite the growing urban unemployment (Collier & Rempel, 1973; 
Oucho et. al, 1983; Marc Ross, 1975). 
Rural homesteads are both a point of origin and ultimate destination for many 
urban migrants, who form a circulating pool of labour and whose sojourns are 
undertaken to generate family income. In a sample survey of residents of two 
public housing estates in Nairobi, most residents were born in rural areas and few 
of them considered Nairobi as their home (Marc Ross, 1975). This contention still 
prevails, although the percentage of those born in Nairobi and those having lived 
in Nairobi for over ten years has increased over the years. 
ribe majority of migrants maintain close links with their rural kin. A 1971 survey 
in Nairobi covering middle and low income households found that 90% of the 
males sent remittances, averaging 21% of their salaries to rural wives, parents and 
relatives (Johnson & Whitelaw, 1974). Another survey of male migration between 
Maragoli in Kakamega district and Nairobi found that 92% of the migrants visited 
their wives who were left in the rural areas to manage the holding at least once 
a year (Moock, 1978). The dual nature of the urbanite in the African context is 
an important element in the rural-urban scenario. Most planning and regulations 
of African cities such as Nairobi assume a complete urbanite, whereas studies 
have shown the dual nature which should be catered for in planning. In the area 
of provision of services such as housing, the need to understand the relevant 
forms of service provision requirements is basic and yet it is rarely done. 
Most low income residents of cities such as Nairobi need basic accommodation 
within the city as they generate income for survival not investment. This is further 
complicated by both monetary and non monetary remittances they make to their 
rural areas. By 1983 about 27% of urban earnings were transferred to the rural 
areas (Oucho et al. 1983). However, this percentage is thought to have drastically 
reduced due to the prevailing economic pressures (Oucho, personal 
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communication, 1993). It thus seem that urban households are increasingly going 
to find it difficult to be urban home owners. This does not imply a conclusion 
made by Danida (1986), that many urban residents are migrants and have no 
intention of remaining urban dwellers. A number of factors influence the option 
of staying within an urban area and prediction can only be made when such 
factors are taken into consideration. 
Notwithstanding, Government policies which insist on making individuals home 
owners may not be appropriate, especially to the low income groups. A status 
their kind of income and economic activities cannot access for them. The outcome 
has been a production of services which only an insignificant urban population 
consume. As the significant population resort to informal modes of production and 
consumption, manifesting the urban crisis facing most African countries. 
Lee Smith indicates that 'to a large extent, the urban crisis in Africa can be 
measured by the failure to cope with the informal sector, while useful urban 
reforms have been those which are designed to accommodate or aid the sectoe 
(Lee Smith, 1989). In Nairobi, failure has been seen in both the formal and 
informal sector. NCC does not only have problems of managing the informal 
sector but also the formal one. The rate of deterioration of existing services is 
difficult to cope with. In the area of rental housing owned by the city, 
maintenance was struck off budget before the Eighties. Development of more 
units for rental or home ownership has been forgotten except in cases where 
international finance has packages for the city. Meanwhile, the city continues to 
mismanage its resources, leading to inability to provide adequate and sufficient 
services. 
4.5.2 State of Services 
The city suffers from inadequate and inefficient provision of services. In most 
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cases local authorities in Kenya such as the NCC are held up in a vicious circle; 
the Councils lack revenue, and cannot provide adequate and efficient services. The 
provision of services is affected by the poor management common in most LAs 
and because of poor management revenue collection is poor and LAs therefore 
lack revenue. This vicious circle has been very difficult to break. However, the 
World Bank (1990) notes that the bulk of city's effectiveness lies in the 
performance of routine tasks of service provision and maintenance such as refuse 
collection and road repairs. For these, the major tools of good financial 
management are appropriate measurement of demand, standard setting and unit 
costing (emphasis added). 
In cases where servi ces are provided there is hardly any maintenance. Examples 
in service areas such as water, refuse removal and housing, demonstrates the 
pathetic situation. Water had been a problem for the city until the World Bank 
provided funds in 1978. The agreement was that NCC should have a water fund 
accumulated from the consumer charges and the surplus should be used for 
renewing water supply infrastructure. From the fund the city authorities were 
allowed to borrow if need be not more than eight million Kenya shillings. 
However, the poor and corrupt financial management, which led to the dissolution 
of the Council in 1983, had mismanaged the water fund to the extent that by the 
time it was dissolved they had borrowed about two hundred million Kenya 
shillings. As this took place the water services were deteriorating with colonial 
pipes not maintained constantly bursting as extension of the water supply took 
place. Residents are often subjected to water shortages, low pressures, wrong 
billing and poorly maintained systems which are in many cases a nuisance. 
Refuse removal has perhaps been the most poorly handled. It is closely linked to 
water in that the two services share a bill and . 
it is 
. assumed that once a water 
meter is installed refuse will be collected. However, refuse removal is a rare 
service which the city authorities do at their own will in a very erratic manner. 
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Uncollected refuse is a common sight in both the city residential areas and 
sometimes even in very prime areas of the city centre. In the residential areas the 
tendency has been to dump refuse on the road side to await collection whenever 
possible. This results in a vicious circle wheieby the city collect refuse from the 
unplanned roadside dumps, as planned residential dustbins fill up and head back 
to roadside dumps. This scenario is due to inadequate and insufficient collection 
vehicles. There are never enough and the few which exist are poorly maintained 
and therefore rarely collect refuse. On the other hand, the consumers do not know 
who to complain to since they have lost confidence in the city managers. 
In the area of housing, poor provision and management is demonstrated by the 
fact that, despite international financial support, the city authorities have failed to 
provide the right type of housing for low income groups. Nor have they been able 
on'their own to replicate the programmes. Areas most hit within the city are the 
low income planned areas and the informal settlements. The city has undergone 
a situation whereby other worse off informal settlements have sprung up as they 
improve older and known informal settlements such as Mathare Valley. Currently, 
the city has about 78 informal settlements housing about 240,000 households with 
a population of about 1.2 million. As noted for the population of the city, these 
estimates are controversial and the point to note is the magnitude of the problem 
which may not be statistically quantifiable. 
4.6.1 Implication for Low Income Housing 
In spite of urban areas being generally favoured in terms of the accessibility and 
quality of services, growth is limiting availability. 'Me urban population has 
almost doubled but development of infrastructure and service provision has 
lagged. This has produced a widening gap between need for and supply of 
essential services such as water, refuse removal, sewerage, housing, health 
facilities and schools. In a number of cases the urban residents, especially the low 
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income groups have to fend for themselves or utilise services (for example health, 
education and water) not planned for them. NCC has not only failed to provide 
required services, but even the maintenance of existing services has been poor. It 
is thus common to find roads, housing estates owned and managed by the 
Council, health and education facilities among other things, poorly maintained in 
cases where they are available. 
Of the problems facing the NCC, housing is one of the most evident. At the same 
time, most, services available or desired are inherent in housing. The increasing 
cost of building materials, high building standards, poor credit facilities and 
shortage of urban land have made conventional housing increasingly expensive 
(Ndinda, et al. 1989). In turn, most households live within informal settlements 
which lack almost all essential services. In such areas sanitation is normally very 
poor causing environmentally linked ailments. In 1979 it was estimated that 35% 
of all urban housing was in the informal areas. Estimates currently put the figure 
at about 52%. The scarcity and inflation push rents upward and make low cost 
housing the only alternative for the middle-class and well beyond the reach of the 
urban poor. 
The housing conditions of low income groups or informal settlements in Nairobi 
cannot be generalised. It is also not possible to pin point the city regulations 
relating to them. This is because, whereas the city regulations do not allow any 
intervention in areas which have been developed without their authority, there 
have been isolated cases of minimal provision of services and development of 
infrastructure. This is more prevalent in old established informal settlements. To 
some extent, is can be associated with the Central Government policy which 
often by-passes that of the city managers. Once the government stopped the policy 
of demolition of informal settlements, the urban authorities whose by-laws and 
other related planning regulation's remained unchanged, were, caught up in a 
dilemma. Tbus both occasional support and harassment can be experienced. : 
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Support normally includes refuse removal whenever it is posing a health hazard, 
provision of water points and mobile outreach clinics. Whereas, harassment comes 
in form of eviction and/or demolition. Support is usually provided on a skeleton 
basis and is never planned, and hence their negligible impact as the urban poor 
struggle to manage their basic survival. Although environmental issues have been 
noted to be key to livelihood, when the case of the urban poor is taken into 
perspective, one may conclude that it is secondary as far as their priorities are 
concerned. Therefore, it becomes the key responsibility of other development 
agencies, government included, to provide the necessary support needed to ensure 
appropriate environmental conditions. 
In a survey done in 1983, only 58% of all urban households in Kenya were found 
to, have sanitary facilities that may be fully acceptable. Similarly, only 44% of 
households were using electricity. A recent study by Nachu (1990) points out that 
in Nairobi most informal settlements have inadequate and insufficient sanitation 
facilities. Most of them are constructed in poor locations due to lack of land and 
hardly have any infrastructure or services. In such developments the city by-laws 
and regulations are hardly taken into consideration. For example, the city by-law 
which requires that one latrine and one ablution be provided for each family or 
group not exceeding six persons and that latrines be located thirty feet away is far 
from being achieved. Instead they are located as near as ten feet away and in 
some cases they are only separated from the housing unit by a wall (Nachu, 
1990). 
Despite the survival difficulties faced by the urban poor, it has to be noted that 
some residents of informal settlements with the support of the City Authorities, 
NGOs and International Agencies have been very active in improving their 
environmental conditions. In Nairobi, this has been accelerated by UNICEF 
supporting both the NCC and the NGOs working with given communities. In this 
respect, two divisions (Pumwani & Kibera), which have the highest percentage 
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of infonnal settlements, have been the focal points of such efforts. In these areas, 
for example Kibera, UNICEF (1990) has noted that toilet facilities are poor with 
99% of the population relying on pit latrines, which are shared with as many as 
twenty households but have no organised method of emptying. At the same time 
the majority of the households use open drainage with sources of water being 
community taps and water vendors. 
The concerted efforts of the inhabitants of informal settlements with support of 
other agencies, have been aimed mainly at primary health care (PHC). In the 
1989/93 Development Plan (GOK, 1989/93), the government indicates its 
commitment to PHC, stressing the need for health care strategies with inherent 
approaches for the provision of essential health services that correspond to basic 
needs, universally accessible and allow for participation of the communities 
themselves. This position has been reiterated and elaborated by UNICEF (1991). 
The core of PHC programmes has been first and foremost the creation of 
awareness (where it does not exist) and the inherent community mobilisation. 
Resulting in the construction of pit latrines, drainage and sometimes compost pits. 
In cases where there are no compost pits, burning is used as a method of refuse 
disposal. Although such efforts are contributing towards the goal of a clean 
healthy environment,, a lot remains to be done and this study contends that both 
the Central Government and the City Authorities should take the lead in this task. 
As unplanned settlements spread, the threat of diseases looms, as UNCHS notes; 
'The diseases of shanty towns tend to be the diseases of poverty. 
Respiratory infections such as bronchitis and pneumonia are prevalent in 
conditions of overcrowding, where up to ten people may share a single, 
badly ventilated room. Water supplies and sewage disposal systems are 
generally inadequate, leading to diarrhoea and dysentery, both of which can 
take their toll of young children. Infestation with parasitic worm's can 
reduce the vitality of the community. Afiaen-da and tuberculosis are usually 
common and are accentuated by. widespread malnutrition. In areas where 
shanties are built over swamps or near to water, malaria can be a major 
cause of death' (Habitat, 1990, p. 8). 
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The above quotation gives a good summary of the environmental implications of 
the informal settlements in any given urban setting. As it notes, the nature of the 
housing units contribute to the poor health conditions; this is accelerated by the 
availability of unplanned water supply and sanitation. Water supply and sanitation 
is always a requirement where settlements develop and according to the United 
Nations, 1981 - 1990 was designated as the International Drinking Water Supply 
and Sanitation Decade. A period within which it was expected that almost all 
settlements should have adequate and efficient water supply and sanitation; goals 
which are still far from being realised. 
Whereas this study appreciates the United Nation's goal of availing water and 
sanitation to settlements, it also acknowledges that without an efficient plan and 
management the very provision often becomes the source of health problems. In 
many cases informal areas are provided with water points and sometimes pit 
latrines, however, in most cases this is done on an isolated basis with no clear 
plan on how waste water will be disposed. At the same time, non conventional 
cheap methods of draining waste water which are often used have been known to 
be too expensive to maintain. Reed (1991) indicates that small amounts of water 
may be disposed of in the pit or by soakage into the ground on the plot, but in 
general, some form of sullage drain network is necessary. He goes further to note 
that sullage drains are notoriously difficult to maintain. They frequently become 
blocked by food waste or refuse and act as breeding grounds for flies and 
mosquitos. An occurrence prevalent even in the planned low income areas. 
In Kenya, the environmental implication of unplanned settlements have been 
pointed out to result in the predominance of diseases related to poor sanitary 
conditions such as intestinal parasitosis. A study undertaken in Kibera, in Nairobi, 
showed that up to 42% out of a total sample of 105 children under five years had 
parasitic infestation. This trend is common within the informal settlements which 
lack some of the most basic services. In this respect, the task of urban authorities 
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and other development agencies should focus on a search for strategies aimed at 
improvement. However, before this can be done there has to be conducive policies 
within which such improvements can be based. In this respect, one can argue that 
the environmental implications of the informal settlements cannot be understood 
without having a clear perception of their legal status. Essentially, they should be 
examined within their context of evolution, and the type of policies which have 
supported them. 
Shabbir (1987) lists five stages in the evolution of public policies governing such 
settlements. The first stage is that of none recognition which leads to clearance 
and forced migration; this stage is long past in the case of Nairobi. The second 
stage entails marginal recognition involving slum clearance and public housing. 
A stage which normally turns out to be inadequate due to large public subsidies 
required and the inability of government to keep up with the demand. The third 
stage is an acceptance of their existence, which is often followed by positive 
government actions involving initiation of service provision with elements of cost 
recovery. r1be fourth involves policy shifts aimed at mobilising financial and 
% sweat equity' investments by low income residents to improve their own 
settlements, with government providing that which people cannot provide for 
themselves, for example, trunk infrastructure. The final stage is a full recognition 
of the legitimate role of low income settlements in urban development. This is 
accompanied by a variety of policies governing land delivery, building and 
infrastructure, standards, land use, long, time financial and cost recovery and the 
role of the private sector. 
An analysis of the above shows that unless an informal settlement has passed at 
least the first two stages improvement may be quite difficult. For the case of 
Nairobi the settlements differ and one can almost find all representations of the 
above five stages. However, one positive aspect is the Central Government policy, 
which has evolved through all the above mentioned stages, except for the last two 
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stages, which are still to be fully achieved. Practical aspects of this evolution are 
seen in both the sites and services, upgrading and tenant purchase schemes which 
are being developed through joint efforts of beneficiaries, NCC, Government 
Ministries, parastatals and international financiers. 
4.7.0 Conclusion 
A critique of the urban development policies pursued by the Kenya Government 
shows their inability to solve urbanisation problems as reflected in the 
management of urban growth in Nairobi. The proliferation of informal settlements 
with inherent service provision and management problems continue, as policies 
focusing on rural areas with an aim of solving urbanisation problems continue to 
be emphasized. This approach is closely linked to the colonial policies which 
restricted movement to urban areas, providing services only to those employed in 
the formal sector, albeit inadequate. 
The city of Nairobi operates on a vicious circle, whereby provision of services is 
affected by poor management and because of poor management revenue collection 
is poor and hence no revenue. In this vicious circle, the low income groups are 
most affected and the brooding idea of privatization of services may worsen their 
situation. Most low income households rely on public services offered in 
neighbouring residential areas. A shift to basic services being offered through the 
private sector will imply no access to any such services. It therefore seems that 
the current trend of turning to the private sector for service provision will require 
an intensified role of the State or other agencies such as NGOs and communities 
themselves. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT OF UMOJA TENANT PURCHASE. 
5.0.0 Introduction 
Ibis chapter discusses the planning and development of low income housing using 
UTP as a case study. A brief on the concept of planning and its technicalities vis 
a vis the human dimension is outlined. A background of the project, covering the 
negotiation between the funding agency (USAID) and NCC among others, 
follows, bringing out the limited planning on the part of NCC, which left USAID 
to come up with what they perceived appropriate for low income households in 
Nairobi. A discussion of project objectives and implementation which was marred 
with numerous problems, partly due to the creation of the Project Management 
Unit (PMU), is also undertaken. 
5.1.0 The concept of planning 
Planning as a concept occupies a special place in most of the developing 
countries. However, the rhetoric of planning and the act of planning are not the 
same, and while the former is common enough throughout the third world, the 
latter is not always present (Jackson, 1970). Planning as an ideal assumes the 
application of rational and ordered choice to development activities, especially 
economic affairs. It is taken to be 'an organised, intelligent attempt to select the 
best available alternatives to achieve specific goals' (Waterson, 1965). If this 
premise is assumed, then the logical sequence of planning may include; selection 
of general objectives and their subsumed goals and targets, identification of 
available resources to serve the selection of appropriate means, including various 
types of policies and measures for mobilising the available resources and the 
determination of the best combination. This leads to formulation of more specific 
programmes within the general plan and finally, the provision for the plans 
implementation. As opposed to this contention, planning never works as smoothly 
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as would be expected. 
The above has been considered utopian. It assumes optimal goal attainment, 
through ensuring that the combination of means, that will realise an objective at 
least possible cost, is possible on paper but difficult to practise. Planning is 
probably much more a practical art involving choices among fewer alternatives, 
ends and the selection of 'available', 'appropriate' or 'satisfactory' means for the 
realisation of goals. Hence, Herbert (1965) observes that 'human beings must 
% satisfice' because they have not the wits to maximize'. This may be the 
alternative for planners operating in plural societies dominated by scarcity of 
resources, lack of information and clearly defined roles. In satisficing, planning 
becomes a technical, political and organisational activity involving three basic 
elements; selecting objectives, identifying possible and practical alternative means 
and securing the coordinated action and co-operation judged satisfactory for the 
realization of planning aims. The latter involving mainly administrative and 
political problems in the co-ordination of plan implementation. 
Communication between different actors in the planning process as well as 
problems of authority, in guiding and influencing the present and the future 
actions of individuals and groups involved in or somehow related to planning and 
development activities, is therefore important (Jackson, 1970). Since planning 
involves problems of communication and authority, it ceases to be solely a 
technical process and domain of experts. Plans are 'political programmes' and 
therefore planning is part and parcel of a country's 'political process'. If planning 
organs are to cope successfully with their task, they have to 'largely become 
negotiating and almost diplomatic agencies of government (Myrdal, 1968). To be 
effective, implementers must be skilled in the art of politics and must understand 
well the environment in which public policies and programmes operate (Grindle, 
1980). The inherent task being how best to co-ordinate and control actors in the 
development process in such a manner that the plans' objectives are achieved. 
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In the above discussion of planning, two models arise. The first one with an 
assumption of a rational man able to comply with well-conceived Plans' Its basis 
being plan design rather than the implementation, and so long as those concerned 
in the implementation process are properly informed of the planned goals and 
content; it is assumed success will be realised. This model never occurs in 
practise since human beings do not necessarily operate in this manner. A large 
percentage of human beings act according to more private, selfish and base 
motives (Jackson, 1970). The second model to securing coordinated action in 
planning is the classical option. In this model, the planning agency should be 
endowed with sufficient hierarchical authority to command compliance from 
actors in the planning process (Dahl et al, 1963). The Soviet Union before its 
demise provided a good example of a command economy handled through the 
application of hierarchical authority. 
Most developing countries such as Kenya apply the hierarchical authority model, 
but it is not as effective as it was in the Soviet Union with the party ensuring 
compliance with the plan and planners. In the developing countries, the 
concentration of power is lacking and therefore ensuring compliance is more 
complicated. There are cases where concentration of power and authority in 
central political institutions is not used for compliance but to defeat plan 
objectives. There has to be a designed method of achieving compliance with the 
stated policy goals. For example, the support of political elites and the compliance 
of implementing agencies, of bureaucrats charged with carrying out programmes, 
of lower level political elites, and of intended beneficiaries, has to be acquired 
(Grindle, 1980). In some cases, planners have to ensure that the wishes and needs 
of other critical decision makers are accommodated, even when they are not in 
the interest of planned goals, as will be demonstrated in the case of UTP. Grindle 
further notes that, opposition of those who may harm the programmes must be 
turned to support and those excluded who n-dght sabotage the programme have to 
also be amicably handled. 
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The above implies much bargaining, accommodation and sometimes conflict. 
Subsequently, an interest in what is planned vis a vis the outcome has to also 
explore the negative externalities, which may result from the attempt to achieve 
the planned objectives (Macoloo, 1989). Additionally, an assessment has to be 
made of the central focus of the planned objectives, in the case of this study, the 
objective of housing low income groups. Most low income housing programmes 
in Kenya have been highly influenced by the international agencies funding them. 
There is thus a predominance of the agencies influencing planning, at times with 
only partial consideration of the local context. 
UTP fell among USAID funded programmes aimed at producing low cost 
expandable housing for ownership by low income groups. The initial target was 
that the houses produced should not exceed Kenya pounds 1,200 per unit, with 
selling price of Kenya pounds 1,600. Allottees were to construct additional rooms 
and improve the quality of finish of the houses. Generally, evaluation studies put 
emphasis in different areas, the goal of assessing UTP after about fifteen years of 
implementation is mainly to examine the policy gap between what was planned 
and what has been achieved. However, before discussing the implementation, a 
clear understanding of the background of the project is essential. 
5.2.0 Background of UTP 
UTP housing scheme lies on the eastern part of Nairobi city (figure 5.5) and is 
about six miles from the city centre. During the initial planning, the area seemed 
quite far from the city centre, due to lack of other developments around the site. 
Since the 1980s, several developments have taken place around and beyond it, to 
the extent that it is no longer considered far. The scheme benefited from the 
extension of NCC boundary during 1963 and recommended by the Nairobi Urban 
Study Group in the 'Nairobi Urban Planning Strategy'. This was an appropriate 
approach, especially for land banking. The extension of the boundary was aimed 
at providing more land for both residential and industrial purposes. The hope was 
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Figure 5.5: Income Levels by Ward, Showing Location of UIT 
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that industries would be located within the extended areas and residents would 
find employment within their residential vicinity. Although this was a good plan, 
industrial development has lagged behind as several housing developments have 
occurred. So far, very few industries are located within the extended areas with 
the majority of the residents being employed outside the areas. 
Prior to the extension of the city boundary in 1963, the project site was part of 
a large Greek-owned sisal plantation and there was hardly any development 
around the area. Since the beginning of the 1980s, several (for example DSS & 
Kayole Sites & Services, Moses Mudavadi Tenant Purchase, Komorock Mortgage 
Housing Scheme and Tena co-operative) housing schemes have come up within 
the eastern extended area, where UTP is located. Thus, making the extended area 
heavily populated, with pressure being exerted on provision of services and 
development of infrastructure. Additionally, the lack of employment opportunities 
within the area has made public transport a major problem. 
UTP was conceived in March 1975 by both NCC and USAID. 'Ibis was a period 
when a number of housing projects were coming up under different international 
funding agencies aimed at low income groups. In Nairobi, the major ones 
included DSS scheme, planned for low income groups and funded by IBRD and 
BuruBuru mortgage housing scheme planned for middle income groups and 
funded by CDC. Tbus, UTP owes its origin to the popular post-1972 housing 
policies in Kenya aimed at the low income groups. Most of the developing 
countries pursued such policies. 71be World Bank, in its quest to expand 
investment in the area of low income housing, influenced and funded such 
policies; with Turner's and Abrams's approach on self-help housing being seen as 
the way forward. 
Although low income housing was becoming a popular policy of international 
financiers, the Kenya Government had not compromised its stand on low income 
housing, similar to that developed in DSS by the time implementation of UTP 
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begun. This delayed the implementation of DSS, which was negotiated earlier 
than UT? but implementation only begun in 1978, when the first batch of UTP 
units had been occupied. Although UTP was claimed to be low income housing, 
it applied restrictive high building standards and hence its immediate ratification 
for implementation. An assessment of the Kenya Government position showed 
that pressure from both USAID and the World Bank between 1972 and 1974 was 
crucial in resolving the Government of Kenya% housing debate in favour of 
programmes for low cost housing (USAID, 1979). A situation which explains the 
double standard policy of low income housing as demolition of settlements for 
low income households continued. 
Despite commitment on paper to provide housing for the low income groups, the 
practise after Independence until 1974 was the provision of middle and high 
income housing. Most high level national government decision makers did not 
originally support the idea of low income housing through progressive 
development, such as the site and service schemes. Implying that 'during 
implementation of policy, benefits eluded low income target groups and were 
allocated instead to the political and econon-dc elites, most closely tied to 
government' (Temple & Temple, 1980). By the time UTP and DSS were being 
negotiated hardly any schemes developed were accessible to the low income 
households. Although these schemes have not achieved their goals as such, they 
demonstrate reversal of policy interest (at least on paper), although with numerous 
problems around unclarified issues, such as housing standards and the type of 
infrastructure and services to be provided. 
It can be argued that the acceptance of housing programmes in the name of low 
income groups was due to the prevailing economic conditions; making it difficult 
for the Kenya Government to reject housing funds from institutions which were 
already providing the country with a number of development funds. For example, 
in the case of DSS, the Kenya Government opted not to reject finance for a 
project that the World Bank, which provided the country with much development 
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finance had indicated, was in the best interest of the country (Temple & Temple, 
1980). Whereas the acceptance provided funding for housing projects it came in 
an haphazard manner to the extent that proper planning was not possible. The 
external push to accept low income housing projects, partly explained the lack of 
consensus on the guiding principles of urban development, especially in the area 
of housing. 
By 1976, when implementation of UTP began, NCC had provided 20,667 housing 
units. These included 16,599 rental units, 2,900 tenant purchase schemes and 
1,198 and site and service schemes (Coopers and Lybrand, 1975). Malombe 
(1990) notes in her study that 
-NCC 
prior to 1975 concentrated its resources on 
tenant purchase schemes (table 5.4) which were not only few, but were 
constructed at a slow pace. Although UTP was the major tenant purchase scheme 
in terms of the number of units provided, since its partial completion in 1983 
there has been less programmes of its type being undertaken. Instead the focus 
has shifted to sites and service and upgrading schemes. This is despite the latter 
two schemes being seen as providing more grounds for sale of plots due to secure 
tenure which tenant purchase schemes such as UTP should not provide until 
completion of payment. However, comparative research has not been undertaken 
to compare the rate of sale of plots in the three programmes. 
Tenant purchase schemes in Kenya owe their origin to the Vasey report of 1950, 
which recommended the expansion of home ownership among Africans. The 
assumption was that it would contribute to the creation of stable urban based 
families. This was aimed at ensuring the availability of labour for capital 
development and had very little to do with housing low income households as has 
since been adopted. However, within NCC, it led to tenant purchase schemes 
accounting for two thirds of the total capital expenditure on housing by 1972. 
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Estate Date built No. of units 
Jamhuri 1969 156 
Pumwani Relief 1970 216 
Pumwani Redev. 1968- 1969 100 
Harambee Phase 1 1968- 1970 154 
Uhuru Phase 3 1968-1969 236 
Kariobagi Phase 3 1968- 1969 206 
Kimathi 1969- 1972 345 
Uhuru Phase 4 1970-1972 294 
Kariobagi Re-Cast 1970-1971 67 
Kariobagi Phase 4 1970- 1972 390 
Mathare Valley 1972- 1973 557 
Kariobagi Phase 5 1973- 1974 28 
Harambee Phase 2 1973- 1974 151 
Umoja 1976- 1978 3,009 
TOTAL UNITS 5,753 
Table 5.4: NCC's Tenant Purchase Projects 
Source: Malombe, 1990 
Since 1972 international finance geared for expansion of capital has actively 
participated in housing development by exploiting the gap in "low income' or 
% near low income' housing. Whereas it is true that the housing problem was 
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mounting, the inner investment motives of international finance such as USAID 
and the World Bank should not be overlooked. To a large extent, they determined 
the nature of programmes undertaken and the innate conditions. Thus UT? was 
implemented under the USAID Housing Guaranty (HG) loan programme. 
According to USAID, it was developed as part of US foreign assistance 
programme'in the early Sixties in response to the rapidly mounting worldwide 
shortage for adequate shelter (USAID, 1983). More so, this was in line with the 
type of programmes USAID was pursuing during the 60s. 
In Kenya, the USAID HG programme begun with the implementation of Kimathi 
housing project; the first HG project in Africa. This was a pilot demonstration of 
home ownership for NCC, which as early as 1929 had mainly been developing 
rental housing. Kimathi thus became important to NCC, and its planning and 
design approaches became models in similar projects undertaken later such as 
UTP. Although Kimathi was conceptualised in the wake of serious housing 
problems for low income groups and was supposed to be geared for low income 
households, the Government of Kenya decided that it should be for 'middle 
income families'. Ibis was to be expected since the Government still held to the 
myth of a 'decent house', whose characteristics were not clear and in many cases 
were not locally determined. Having the knowledge of the deteriorating economic 
situation, they came up with a focus on a target group they considered would be 
able to pay back their investment. The aim being basically housing econon-dcs and 
not sympathy or interest in the poor as often quoted. As USAID launched its en- 
mass intervention in the area of housing in Kenya they noted that; 
'The most important objective of the AID guaranteed loans is to help the 
GOK implement a housing policy with emphasis in favour of the poor, by 
demonstrating that lower cost houses can be built - despite the rises in building materials and other construction costs. The accomplishment of the 
objective should have a significant impact on GOK housing policy, 
particulary with respect to lower income housing. It is highly unlikely that 
the lower income housing prograrnme would proceed as projected without 
the input of the programme. With HG funds, however, the programme... 
should be able to give an impetus and establish a new direction for GOK's 
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policy for lower cost housing' (USAID, 1979 p. 93). 
The above statement came at a point when U. S. A's legislation had adopted new 
directions. In it, USAID was directed to aim its programmes at the improvement 
of the lives of the poorest of the people. A position also perpetuated by the then 
president of the World Bank, McNamara. Capitalism was expanding and at the 
same time attempting to acquire a human face; a task not conducive to its laws, 
hence contradictory. Notwithstanding, from a policy perspective it seemed clear, 
at least on paper, that UTP was aimed at the low income groups. The aim was 
that the project 'should as near as possible reach the lowest income level of the 
regularly employed persons'. This position demonstrates the inherent economic 
interest which ýis intertwined with a willingness to support low income groups. 
The economic interest of USAID is made very clear by the concept of the 
% regularly employed', a notion which excludes the majority of the low income 
groups who mostly depend on self and casual employment. 
It is not clear whether GOK or NCC during the conceptualisation of UTP had an 
adequate perception of the characteristics and magnitude of the low income group. 
If they had, they would have known that the concept of 'the regularly employed' 
integrated very few if any of the low income groups in Nairobi. At the same time, 
the relevant Central and Local government apparatus of implementation was still 
conservative; its policy and planning approaches dominated by an emphasis on 
standards at the expense of providing appropriate housing. 
When NCC made a submission request in 1973 of 10 million Kenya shillings for 
three basic house models costing Kenya pounds 1,000; 1,200 and 1,600, the 
project had not evolved beyond the 'concept' stage (USAID, 1979). As is expected 
of an investor, USAID conducted a 'pre investment survey' in 1972, which 
concluded that a 'percentage to be determined of houses costing not more than 
Kenya pound 1200 should form the bulk of the project. The team felt that NCC 
estimates were costly and worked on reducing the cost by changing certain design 
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details relating to floor and roof. The changes included an incorporation of an 
increased amount of later self help construction. It was expected that after the 
changes a large proportion of UTP project would have selling prices of between 
Kenya pound 800 and 1,100, which were thought to be affordable. 
The survey also indicated that the project should not only be in Nairobi but cover 
other urban areas. It therefore became an entry point for USAID into housing 
development, which has since extended to massive urban development 
programmes only comparable to that of the World Bank. The product of this entry 
was a HG loan of US$ 15 million to be divided between NCC and NHC. NCC 
was granted US$ 10 million (referenced HG 003) to enable the implementation 
of UTP, whereas NHC had US$ 5 million (referenced HG 004) for other urban 
areas. 
The interest rates for UTP were set at 10% and this became problematic with the 
Kenya treasury. The regulation at the Central Bank was that all foreign loans 
should not have an interest rate exceeding 9%. Although this was a period of high 
interest rates due to the oil crisis, other international financial agencies funding 
housing programmes, such as IBRD and CDC, were quoting subsidised rates of 
between 7% to 8% and it became very difficult for the concerned authorities to 
understand such a deviation. This delayed the completion of loan agreement 
procedures and it was not until June 1975 that NCC and USAID signed the final 
project contract and NCC, as the sole implementing agency, was left with the task 
of implementation, experiencing numerous problems including constant 
surveillance from the funding agency. 
5.3.0 Project objectives 
The objectives of UTP was to implement an affordable tenant purchase scheme 
in the eastern part of Nairobi, located on vacant public owned land. The basic 
house design was an 'expandable house' but the plan was drawn for a three room 
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house plus kitchen, bathroom and toilet. 75% of the units were to be built of only 
single rooms and the allottees through self help would gradually develop the units 
to completion. The houses were grouped in blocks of 5,6 and 8 units in a 
hexagonal grid, so as to provide vehicular access to each plot (USAID, 1979). 
Although there was only one drawing, the one-room version was called house 
type 01, two room version, type 02 and three room, type 03 (Figures 5.6,5.7, 
5.8). Their development was to, 'apply restrictive building by laws and therefore 
the standard of services such as roads and markets was high; the expectation 
being that the cost of building would be lower and would accommodate the low 
income group. The income group to benefit was to fall within 3rd and 5th decile of 
income as shown on table 5.5. 
Income Annual Household Income Annual income required 
1975 1ý 76 
. 
Ksh. Ksh. Ksh. 
30% 11,019.00 12,561.00 
Lower 13,760.00 (type 01) 
Middle (Ksh. 1,146 monthly) 
35% 13,446.75 15,329.00 
16,160.00 (type 02) 
(Ksh. 1,346 monthly) 
16,726.00 (type 03) 
(Ksh. 1,394 monthly) 
40% 15,874.50 '18,097.00 
45% 18,302.25 20,865.00 
50% 20,730.00 23,633.00 
Table S. S: Income Groups of Target Beneficiaries 
Source: USAID, 1979 
The above chart assumed that, using 1976 estimated household income, type 01 
house could be purchased by a family with household income of the 23rd - 33rd 
percentile bracket; Type 02 by a family with household income of the 36th - 37th 
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Figure 5.6: UTP Expandable House Plan, Type 01 
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Figure 5.7: UTP Expandable House Plan, Type 02 
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Figure 5-8: UTP Expandable House Plan, Type 03 
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percentile bracket and Type 03 by a family with household income of 37th - 38th 
percentile bracket (USAID, 1979 p. 100). These affordability statistics, based on 
a number of assumptions on income, started faltering hardly one year after the 
first batch of units were occupied. A follow-up evaluation commissioned by USAID 
in February 1978 covering 335 households revealed that incomes of residents had 
increased (table 5.6). 
Household Type Allottees Ksh/monthly Non Allottees 
KshJmonthly 
01 1,156 1,502 (29.9% higher) 
02 1,293 1,826 (41.2% higher) 
03 1,279 2,255 (76.3% higher) 
Table 5.6: Income Groups After One year of UTP Occupation. 
Source: USAID, 1979 
At planning stage, it was not clear how many houses in total were going to be 
produced. USAID's evaluation indicated that the numbers of the units were not 
definitely known until the very end of the project, when the money had been 
stretched to its limit (USAID, 1979). A point which is reflected in the 
inconsistency of the quoted number of units in different documents. 71be initial 
agreement documents indicate total number of 2,563 units, whereas other NCC 
documents indicate 2,924 (table 5.7). Two other works indicate 3,009 (Malombe, 
1990) and 2,400 (Kiamba, et al. 1988) respectively. On the other hand, the NCC 
project site office, which is part and parcel of NCC, deals with 3,084, a figure 
assumed and applied by this study. 
Type Planned Delivered 
01 870 2123 
02 1305 637 
03 725 164 
Total 2,910 ')A 2,924 
Table 5.7: Planned & Delivered Units 
Source: USAID, 1979 
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This inconsistency came about due to USAID's insistence on a reduction of type 
2 and 3 and an increase of type 1. As reflected in table 5.8, there was an addition 
of 144 units of type 01 and a reduction of 51 and 71 of type 02 and 03 
respectively. This total of 2,924 still leaves the presence of a number of units 
unexplained, especially when the statistics from the site office are used. NCC's 
decision to develop a further 170 units outside the plan and on unfavourable sites 
brought more confusion. 
The 170 controversial units ought to have brought the total number to 3,024 but 
as argued above, the actual number of units remained unclear. The details of how 
NCC reached a decision to add the extra units is also not clear but from the 
minutes of the Council, one gets the impression that the additional units were a 
creation of the project director in collusion with other members of the Council, 
mostly members of UCC. Ihe units caused intensive disagreement and the 
Ministry of Works had to intervene and a sub-committee of the Council was 
appointed to look into the matter. 71lie bone of contention being adverse effects 
their location had on other infrastructure. Some of the units were constructed on 
top of a 375 mm diameter foul sewer, others encroached on the foul sewer way- 
leave whereas the rest were constructed on a line 150 mm diameter PVC water 
main. Roads to serve the units had been constructed directly on top of a 200 mm 
PVC water main which was laid just a meter from the power line way-leave 
(NCC, Minutes 5/7/79). 
One would assume the above occurred without the participation of professionals, 
but lay men seeing land lying idle. This may not be the case, rather, it seemed 
that most of the competing interests which needed units were not satisfied and the 
extra units would easily serve that purpose. After protracted debates the units were 
developed but with an adverse effect on the project. It was resolved by the 
Council committee that the project pay for the inconveniences caused. The sewer 
was to be realigned at the expense of the project at an estimated cost of Ksh. 
100,000. 
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Due to the fall in gradient, the 375 mm diameter sewer had to be replaced by 450 
mm diameter sewer. A3 meter way-leave had also to be provided necessitating 
the demolition of one building. The 150 min and 200 mm diameter PVC water 
main had to be realigned at a cost of approximately Ksh. 434,200 and the cost 
had to be bome by the project. In addition, the cost of service connections to the 
additional units amounting to 85,000 was also to be met (NCC, Minutes 5/7179). 
An interview with an architect' revealed that professionalism is at times not 
respected within NCC. He gave the example of UTP where the Engineers 
determined housing and architects only came second, pointing out that often 
professionals have to resort to funding agencies when things get out of control. 
Another example was in Moses Mudavadi (Umoja Two), where the architects did 
not recommend a fire place within the one room condomimiums but the Engineers 
insisted and currently the residents use them not for cooking but as storage points. 
The other component of the project was a planned inner core where larger plots 
were to be sold at market rates but this got delayed for over ten years and was 
only beginning during field work for this study. The original plan was that the 
surplus derived from the plots would be used to cross-subsidize other plots 
belonging to low income groups. This approach was also used in DSS, where 5% 
of plots were intended to benefit all other income households through sale at 
market rates. The surplus generated was to cross subsidize about 50% of the plots 
which belonged to those in the lowest income decile (Malombe, 1990). However, 
in the case of UTP, the inner core plots have had numerous problems relating to 
allocation delaying their development and thus failing to serve the intended 
purpose. 
According to contract agreement, AID's funding was supposed to be used for the 
development of the houses, whereas NCC was supposed to finance community 
'Mr. Murno Mwendwa worked as an architect with Mutiso Menezes, a private fm awarded the tender 
for Umoja Phase Two (Moses Mudavadi). At the time of interview (2/2/93), he was operating his own 
firm 
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facilities which were specified as; market, primary, secondary and nursery schools 
and a health clinic. These facilities were not budgeted for at the initial planning 
stage and by the time the first group of houses were occupied, there was no single 
community facility in place. The primary school (work was interrupted after a 
contractor abandoned it and another had to be contracted) was the only facility 
under construction, whereas others were still in design stage. The difficulty 
envisaged in squeezing budgets for community facilities led the town clerk to 
point out to USAID that in future all such projects must have community facilities 
associated with them right from the very beginning and that the council must have 
the funds appropriated right from the beginning to ensure that the facilities are 
built. These are aspects which NCC ought to have considered at conceptual stage 
and the town clerk's statement is an acknowledgement of the haphazard and 
inadequate planning which goes on within NCC. 
NCC only managed to provide some social facilities planned (but not budgeted 
for) two years after the houses were occupied. Facilities which USAID evaluation 
(1979) indicated were of very high standards. For example, the market had 
enclosed tiny stalls with electricity, which did not serve the'purpose of many 
small scale entrepreneurs they were meant for. The design was poor and many 
entrepreneurs who retained their stalls display their commodities in front of the 
stalls (Figure 5.9) and charged high prices in order to pay the required rental fee. 
Whereas, the rest who could not afford to pay monthly rent of Ksh. 230 had to 
opt out, with some moving into infon-nal trade around the planned market. 
Despite the fact that UTP was conceived when pressure was mounting on 
governments in the developing countries to produce low cost housing, the details 
of their nature remained obscure. Thus the objectives of UTP from the point of 
view of NCC was not clear at the conceptual stage. It was born out of the 
fashionable concept, housing for 'low income groups' conception of the early 
1970s. A fact supported by NCCs submission of a very general request for 
funding. It did not go beyond a rough estimate of the unit price of the planned 
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Figures 5.9a and 5.9b: UTP Market Stalls with Commodities Displayed Outside. 
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housing. Aspects such as standards, type of house, building materials and 
provision of services were not considered during conceptualisation. This left the 
funding agency with no adequate local knowledge; with an upper hand in 
determining what was appropriate. Although the idea of low income remained 
unclear to NCC, to USAID, it was the type of house the target group they were 
focusing on could afford and thereby be able to repay the loan. They had to be 
sure that who ever gets allocated a unit is capable of making tenant purchase 
repayments, the only way to ensure recovery of funds. 
5.4.0 Implementation and Political Alliances 
Prior to the study by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) on implementation, most 
political science work concentrated on studying how policies were made. 
Pressman & Wildavsky's study revealed that governments were better at 
legislating than at affecting desired changes and this was resulting in what 
Dunsire (1978) refers to as 'implementation gap'. Since then, a number of studies 
have focused on implementation bringing out the inherent difficulty in achieving 
planned goals. Problems of implementation seem more rampant in the developing 
countries where most programmes, especially those aimed at the low income 
groups, have failed. 
Most political activity in the developing countries is focused on the output stage 
of policy making with very marginal information about the input stage. This is as 
opposed to most of the developed world where it takes place at the input stage. 
As indicated earlier, the distinction of the policy process between policy and its 
implementation is quite fluid. However, as much attention on specific policies in 
the developing countries comes at the implementation stage and is dominated with 
bureaucratic politics, it is appropriate to examine the output stage. In this stage, 
internal dynamics, pressures and complex patterns of interaction characterise 
policy. Thus, implementation of projects such as UTP witness individual and 
collective demand making, the representation of interests, and an emergence of 
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resolution of conflict. 
Out of the competing interests, power seem to be concentrated in the bureaucracy, 
leaving various interest groups out of the game and hence Rigg's contention; 
% since the clientele is unable to organise or exercise political influence to modify 
the rules, its primary strategy involves direct pressure upon the officials concerned 
with policy implementation, to secure a suspension of the rules or speed the 
provision of authorised services' (Riggs, 1964 p. 271). In most cases limited 
interest groups are involved in policy fon-nulation but once formulated and its 
product displayed publicly, it becomes a contested product. Ibis trend has been 
more pronounced in projects funded by international finance, because such 
projects are more public as opposed to some which remain known to only officers 
of the council. 
Implementation of UTP was riddled with disagreement and crisis which cost 
officers concerned summonses, court charges and even dismissal. Basically, the 
bone of contention lay in the distribution of power within the newly created UTP 
Project Management Unit (PMU) and the City Engineers Department and their 
supporting agencies which included the Town Clerks Department, UTP Council 
Committee and USAID. Depending on which support either the City Engineer or 
the UTP project director and their institutions had, the two never got along until 
the City Engineer fought with the project director, got divorced from the project 
and ended up in prison for fighting with the project director. Years later, the 
project director was accused of corrupt practices resulting in dismissal and court 
charges. 
Unlike Kimathi, UTP was undertaken publicly with all the contracts going through 
the normal NCC tender procedures. It was probably the largeness and the finances 
involved that led to the many problems and controversies during its 
implementation. At the same time it was a period of escalating interest rates 
which to a large extent remained unpredictable. More so, NCC was bogged down 
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with standards, which often made it difficult to reach a realisable goal relating to 
the low income groups. It was therefore very difficult to come up with what the 
Central Government had failed to define, except for pointing out that the houses 
should be 'decent' and for 'low income groups; concepts which never had the 
same meaning across the bureaucracy and individuals charged with 
implementation. 
5.4.1 Establishment of PMU 
Prior to 1972, publicly funded projects and programmes were implemented 
through the normal government bureaucracy. However, as low income housing 
policies began to be funded and implemented en-mass through international 
funding, 'new' institutions began to emerge within bureaucracies. 71bey were seen 
by international funding agencies as options to the existing bureaucracies which 
were branded inefficient in relation to the successful implementation of 
development projects. Notwithstanding, the 'new' institutions were still operating 
within the broad framework of government bureaucracies and not much could be 
achieved. 
PMU was a product of the idea of the 'new' institutions and it is relevant to 
understand its establishment before discussing the implementation of UTR 
Basically, UTP was implemented through the NCC's City Engineers Department 
(figure 5.10) but with an additional clause that created a new institution whose 
power was not clearly defined and became very problematic to project 
implementation. PMU was headed by a director answerable to the City Engineer. 
The director had a project team composed of individuals with different 
professional backgrounds, drawn from various existing NCC's departments, mostly 
from the City Engineer's Department. The project director was answerable to the 
Engineer but had some form of autonomy, although the nature of autonomy was 
not specified. 
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Figure 5.10: City Engineer's Department, Organisational Structure, 1978 
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According to USAID, NCC delegated authority for implementing UTP to the 
project director. His appointment was discussed in Washington, and it was duly 
authorized by the NCC and subsequently approved by GOK (USAID, 1979). 
AID's evaluation undertaken at the height of implementation problems, insinuated 
that the project director had powers to run the project but it did not point out how 
the issue of being answerable to the City Engineer would be catered for, while at 
the same time being fully in charge. However, it only pointed out that the creation 
of PMU 'intruded into the functional areas of existing city officers' and thereby 
conceding the existing problem created by the establishment of PMU. 
The creation of PMU was extensively supported by USAID. RHUDO, the arm of 
USAID which deals with housing, 'was supportive of encouraging NCC to give 
the project director responsibility and authority for all aspects of the project 
implementation from planning and design through buyer selection until dwellings 
were occupied and tenant purchase agreements completed' (USAID, 1979). The 
statement was never clarified to specify how such power would operate in relation 
to the Engineers' Department under which PMU operated. It was left loose and 
could be interpreted by individuals holding positions as they wished. During the 
Field Survey, it was noted that most details of project implementation relating to 
the operations of the two institutions were sorted out as they arose and eventually 
led to PMU being divorced from the City Engineer's Department, after hardly one 
year of implementation. 
By mid 1976, after nine months of implementation, the director of PMU had 
become so powerful and autonomous that the City Engineer was requesting 
clarification as to whether the PMU director reported to him or not (USAID, 
1979). 'Ibis led to NCC's decision that the director of PMU take full control of 
the project and should not report to the City Engineer. A point which ought to 
have been clarified during the establishment of PMU and contributed to fights that 
led to the City Engineer losing his post in February 1977, as he served a prison 
sentence of two years for having fought with the director of PMU. 
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Whereas there were a number of issues in which the City Engineer's Department 
and PMU could not agree, the first main disagreement rose over the number of 
total staff to be employed. Staff employment within the City Council has often 
been political as different individuals and groups try to influence the process. This 
was demonstrated in the case of UTP where an agreement on the total number to 
be employed could not be reached, although in the Project Agreement Documents, 
the number was clearly spelt out. 
Although USAID's evaluation seems to view the events leading to the City 
Engineer losing his post as a matter of personality conflict, it seemed more of an 
institutional problem caused by lack of clarity on issues relating to lines of 
authority (power) and to some extent personal interests of the parties involved. 
This was accelerated by political interplay from various interests including 
USAID. Whereas the move by USAID to ensure that PMU was autonomous to 
facilitate their project objectives without going through the red tape of NCC 
bureaucracy, was beneficial to them, it did not serve in building a framework for 
implementation of the UTP scheme, instead it destroyed the existing one. 
USAID's on and off intervention, through collusion with the director of the project 
and the town clerk at the expense of the City Engineer drastically affected 
implementation. 
The establishment of the PMU under the Engineer's Department did not originate 
from NCC. What NCC had in mind during inception seemed to be more of an 
additional staff to strengthen the already existing NCC's City Engineers 
Department charged with the implementation of housing programmes. USAID 
seemed to have exploited the situation as the project implementation progressed. 
A step which eventually led to their influence in having NCC Council ratify the 
disassociation of PMU from the City Engineers' Department (figure 5.11). For 
example, the influence of USAID was reflected in a meeting where the City 
Engineer was put under pressure for not ratifying tender awards; he had to be 
shown a letter from the local USAID representative threatening to cancel the 
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housing loan, if tenders favoured by the representative were not accepted by the 
council (Weekly Review, 1976). The issue here is not whether PMU ran 
autonomously or not but rather the role it played in enhancing goal achievement 
and strengthening the capacity of NCC to implement UTP efficiently. 
5.4.2 Contracts and Tendering 
Grindle (1980) indicates that who should receive public contracts is normally an 
area of conflict and the inevitable desire of various interested parties to influence 
such decisions. This was demonstrated at the beginning of UTP implementation 
which begun with the tendering of contracts, where the two opposing institutions 
could not agree. For design and administrative purposes, UTP was divided into 
four contracts referred to as; CE: 7/l/l/75, CE: 7/l/2n5, CE: 7/l/3/75 consisting of 
542,785 and 610 housing units respectively. The number of units in the fourth 
contract, CE: 7/11/75, remained undetermined, causing the inconsistency of the 
actual total units to be developed as already mentioned. By the end of 1975, the 
first two contracts (CE: 7/l/1175 and CE7/l/2n5) had been awarded to LaIji 
Bhimji Sanghani as the main contractor and work had begun. -Each was to cost 
Ksh. 15.6 and 21.4 million respectively. 
Available project documents seem not to be clear on how the awarding of the first 
two contracts were done but the awarding of the third contract became the key 
problem of the implementation. In tendering for the third contract (CE: 7/l/3/75), 
four tenders were received with N. K. Brothers, LaIji MhimJi Sanghani, Coronation 
Builders Ltd and Patrickson Coxon (1971) Ltd biding Kenya shillings 
18,887,461.95; 18,297,474.30; 21,370,452.20 and 22,834,093.33 respectively. 
Among the above, LaIji N1himJi had won the first and the second contract and 
was still working with the project team. Although the firm's bid was the lowest 
among the four, it was rejected on flimsy grounds based on errors in the Bill of 
Quantities. Instead of giving a consideration to the second lowest bidder, fresh 
tenders were invited where Sanghani bid again at 19,986,213.80; Coronation 
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Builders Ltd, Patrickson Coxon (1971) Ltd bid 18,531,790.73 and 19,986,213 
respectively. Coronation Builders Ltd got the contract under suspicious 
circumstances. An analysis of their bid by interested parties such as the City 
Engineer, showed that it was a duplicate of what Sanghani had submitted in the 
first bid and was rejected. 'Me City Engineer viewed this as a foul play by those 
who were involved. He suspected that somebody must have leaked to Coronation 
what Sanghani had in the fast bid and condemned the second tendering as dirty 
and threatened to report the matter to higher council authorities. 
The City Engineer did not win this battle, before he could take any action he was 
abruptly summoned by the UCC warned of delaying project implementation and 
subsequently ordered to produce the tenders for the third contract. The UCC, 
which was being chaired by the Deputy Town Clerk, indicated to the City 
Engineer that USAID was threatening to withdraw funds if the council could not 
ratify the contract which the local representative had also favoured. The Engineer 
tabled the tenders to the comn-dttee but with a rider that 'construction of this 
tender is not recommended' (Council Minutes, August 1976). An action which 
clearly showed the extent of poor working relationship between the Engineer and 
other forces within and outside the council. The rider was seen by the Deputy 
Town Clerk as sabotage to a project he personally played a role in negotiating. 
However, UCC went ahead and awarded the contract to Coronation at a fee of 
234,416 higher than that of Sanghani. This was despite the Engineer's efforts to 
convince the comn-dttee that Sanghani, besides being the lowest bidder, had by 
virtue of their work on the first two contracts, gained considerable experience on 
the project, but his view did not prevail. 
Tendering problems continued in the awarding of subcontracts on civil 
engineering, where the Engineer awarded the contract to Messrs Highways 
Construction for 2,678,327 with an error margin of plus Kenya shillings 120 
based on the recommendation of the NCC quantity surveyor. The PMU director 
insisted that it went to Messrs Ahmed Khan, who bid Kenya shillings 2,678,327 
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with an error of minus 10,503.20. As the tug of war between the two went on, the 
director suggested that a correction be made on the two submissions and the City 
Engineer, knowing what the correction had cost in awarding the contract to 
Coronation, rejected the move. However, a combined contest by the director, the 
town clerk and 'USAID, who was increasingly becoming the major adviser of the 
town clerk on most aspects of the Umoja scheme' (Weekly Review, 1976) did not 
go far. The Engineer seemed to have been determined to make his case this time 
and he took the issue to the tender committee which backed his tendering to 
Highways Construction and the tender was awarded, but the committee put a rider 
as the engineer had done in the awarding of the third contract, 'should there be 
any surcharge on this sub-contract the city engineer be personally held 
responsible' (NCC Minutes, August 1976). 
The opposing camp, determined to do away with the engineer in a UCC meeting 
held on 3rd August 1976, not only divorced him from the running of the project 
and placed the director in total command but also condemned him for having 
awarded the contract to Highways Construction. Under minute two,, the Town 
Clerk outlined some of the administrative problems that had arisen due to the 
creation of PMU. In consideration of the Town Clerles presentation, the 
committee noted that if the administrative arrangements continued, the second 
phase of UTP consisting of about 4000 units might be plagued with more 
handicaps leading to delayed take off. The meeting thus resolved that 'the City 
Engineer be divorced from the administration of UTP in order to afford him more 
time for other Council works in his department'. The same meeting noted that the 
project director be requested to immediately take charge of and responsibility for 
the administration of UTP, and he be given authority to mobilise staff in getting 
Umoia Housing phase two off ground (NCC, Minutes 318n6). 
The minutes of the council leading to the above resolutions are not expounded but 
discussion with ex-council officers during field survey pointed out that they 
involved irregular deals with contractors and subcontractors, especially on pricing 
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and method of sub contracting and more so the role of the director vis a vis the 
City Engineer. The Engineer was angered by the resolutions of the committee and 
protested by tabling a report to a works committee meeting during the same 
month. In his report, he reviewed the assignments his department was given in 
respect to UTP, indicating how within nine months they had managed to complete 
80% of the work. The review pointed out that only 20% of the work was 
remaining and the department had expected the whole UTP implementation to be 
complete six months earlier than expected. He gave an elaboration of the episodes 
involving his department which led to the department being divorced from the 
implementation of UTP when more than three quarters of the work had been 
done. In all, the engineer detested the allegation that he was hampering the 
progress of implementing UTP, the rider statement of surcharge relating to 
tendering to Highways Construction and the decision to divorce his department 
from implementation of UTP. 
To the Engineer, 'the continued existence of the department was at stake'. He 
noted that 'the City Engineer is not a person per se, but an embodiment of multi 
disciplines and skills that he is supposed to lead, guide and direct in a professional 
reciprocal manner throughout the pursuits assigned or mandated to the 
department'. The insinuation was that the events surrounding UTP constituted a 
crisis detrimental to the department. The events contributed doubts as to the 
integrity of the engineer and his department. A position which, according to the 
engineer, meant both the department and the engineer could not be relied on. 
ne engineer concluded his report by calling for an investigation by professional 
persons (architects, engineers, quantity surveyors etc) conversant with matters in 
question, adding that the attention of Central Government should also be drawn 
to the crisis, otherwise the truth may never come out and the whole council will 
be held responsible; not only for condoning malpractice but also for continuance 
in trusting a person whose performance may be doubtful (Weekly Review, 
29/1 IM). Thus, insinuating the lack of objectivity and professionalism operating 
within NCC. Despite the blame and being ostracized from UTP, works amounting 
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to millions of pounds was still entrusted to the department, showing the level of 
inconsistency in NCC operations. 
Despite all the above problems, the City Engineer's Department could not be 
totally divorced from the project. The UTP Council committee still needed a 
constant link with the department, more so as the staff working in the UT? 
project were mostly drawn from the Department. The option taken by the UTP 
Council committee was to deal with junior officers and the Engineer lamented that 
'the whole UmqJa scheme, which was intended as a model for low cost housing, 
had changed and was never likely to meet the noble target and objectives that 
were so near and real' (Weekly Review, 29/11/1976). This statement was a visible 
tip of the administrative shortcomings of project implementation. 
5.4.3 Allocation Process 
The problems of allocation of resources within the city are not new; it is one 
aspect of management the city has had to cope with since Independence. In 1976 
a report comn-dssioned by the City and other international agencies noted that 
while the rationale for pricing public housing as cheaply as possible is to try and 
keep it within reach of the lower income groups, in practise a very different 
situation exists. The report noted that, the acquisition of a council plot or house 
for purchase or rental is seen not simply as a means of providing shelter for ones's 
family, but as a valuable commercial asset and a major potential source of income 
(NCC, Minutes 5/3176). 
By 1980 it had become clear that the housing allocation process within the city 
favoured the middle and the upper income groups so that poorer people did not 
receive many of the units appropriate to them except as sub tenants paying market 
rents several times higher than the official monthly cost (Temple & Temple, 
1980). This has been one way in which Nairobi's public sector housing 
programme has served the city's middle and upper income groups better than the 
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poor. Although better off people have been noted to prefer to buy homes if 
possible, while poorer people have preferred rental units, the government has been 
planning and developing housing based on home ownership for the poor. Thereby 
not taking into consideration the fact that renting a house or buying is closely 
linked to income (Temple, 1974), and is not necessarily dominant among the low 
income groups. 
In UTP, as the problems between the PMU and the Engineer's Department 
reached a stalemate leading to the City Engineer being divorced from the project, 
the selection of allottees for the units ready for occupation became another 
controversial political issue. Allocations of any nature be it a plot, shop, market 
stall or a kiosk space are normally very controversial and time consuming to the 
council due to competing interests involved. The legal officer in the Ministry of 
Local Government noted in a conference organised for chief officers and 
commissioners, of NCC that allocation of plots is a key issue in NCC, which has 
raised a lot of public outcry. The manner in which plots, stalls, and houses are 
allocated leaves a lot to be desired. There has also been illegal repossession of 
plots; court cases where injunctions are issued by the courts against the 
commission and payment of damages to the aggrieved parties (Tbairu, April 
1992). This occurs mostly in cases where NCC has to deal with other legal 
entities but when it comes to projects solely run by NCC, such as UTP, the trend 
is different, since potential allottees and/or allottees rarely take NCC to courts of 
law. 
UTP allocations were not any different but peculiar in that they remained known 
not to the public but to USAID and NCC. Ibis was unlike other projects such as 
the DSS scheme, where the allocation process was made public in the daily press 
and at the same time interviews were conducted for applicants. By the end of 
1976, NCC had printed application forms for the first lot of UTP houses to be 
occupied. About 30,000 forms and explanatory brochures were issued from City 
Hall between February 2nd to 28th March and were supposed to be returned in 
178 
the same place between 9th February and 8th March 1977. In the explanatory 
brochures, NCC noted that, "the scheme is meant to cater for lower income group 
families, who can certify to the satisfaction of NCC that they will abide by all 
rules, regulations and by-laws of NCC in respect of this scheme, they will occupy 
the dwelling units as their principal place of residence, a dwelling unit will not 
be purchased for purposes of speculation and that they do not own any other 
property in Nairobi. Further more an applicant has to be permanently employed 
in Nairobi and preference will be given to those who live with families in Nairobi' 
(NCC, 1978). Most of these rules and regulation are based on honesty and faith, 
which are not easily ensured when operating on an environment dominated by 
scarcity. At best, they create loop holes for irregularities. 
The rules governing the allocations were set around six issues (NCC, 1978); 
terms, relationship, residence, subletting and assigning, completion and repayment 
period. The lease was for fifty years and the relationship between the Council and 
the Tenant Purchaser was to be governed by the tenant purchase agreement and 
the lease document. Until the Grant of Lease in accordance with the Tenant 
Purchase Agreement, the Tenant Purchaser shall covenant to reside in the 
premises. During the first five years of the Tenant Purchase Agreement, there 
shall be no sub-letting of the premises or any part thereof or the assigning of the 
rights under the agreement. Applicants allocated the one and the two roomed 
houses were expected to develop the unit in full and the repayment of Tenant 
Purchase Agreement was 25 years. There was also the allocation procedure 
released by the project director (see appendix 5.7). 
The processing of applications involving queuing for forms and their return had 
all security measures ensured. The aim being to guarantee that procedures were 
followed and irregular practices reduced. The procedure was that once the 
application period was over, a preliminary count would sort the applications into 
complete and incomplete. Subsequently all the completed applications would be 
sent to the project director, ready for the allocation process. 
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The approach of complete and incomplete application forms raised eye brows and 
criticism in the press, when the city came up with 15,000 out of 24,000 
applications as incomplete, ineligibility being the main problem, accounting for 
11,000 cases. It further led to doubts on NCC's impartiality related to allocations. 
The applicants were competing for about 2,484 units and 5,304 had qualified and 
would have to go through the ballot. If the aspect of eligibility was true, then the 
element of the applicants capacity to fill forms must have been key. Filling forms 
is one skill which remains obscure to a large majority of people, even the most 
educated. Since in UTP there were no interviews, as did happen in DSS, once the 
forms were rejected there was no other forum for making a follow-up. It simply 
meant one had lost 25 or 50 (depending on time of allocation) Kenya shillings, 
which was the application fee and had failed to fall among those to be considered 
for the project. The other four thousand were either above or below the required 
income bracket or duplicates (some people submitted multiple applications). 
Consideration for allocation for those who had complete applications was done 
both manually and by use of computer. The two approaches were to produce lists 
of 'qualified' and not 'qualified'. The two lists would be compared and once there 
was an agreement, the list would be tabled to the project committee and once 
ratified, the computer would then select allottees randomly. The system seemed 
so well designed that one would expect it to work very impartially but the 
practice was not as clean as planned. In the implementation agreement between 
NCC and USAID signed in 1975,, the allocation adopted by NCC was to be 
approved by USAID; but the city authorities were the first ones to try and jump 
it. NCC authorities attempted to have 25% of the UTP units allocated to NCC 
staff. In this endeavour, they had to go through USAID who rejected the request, 
noting that; 
'I am sure that the council, as we have seen, will continue to be, subject to 
many powerful pressures to allocate houses to specific worthwhile lower income family groups. We are completely convinced that it is not 
appropriate to start making exceptions to the procedures established by the 
council' (USAID, 1979 p. 103). 
180 
Ibe request to jump the regulations was only the tip' of the iceberg. ' Once the 
computer procedure of selecting allottees for the first group of houses was over, 
NCC 'refused' (as USAID's evaluation puts it) to make allocations and yet 
immediate allocation was necessary to 'roll-over' the money invested in them into 
others units still to be developed. The main problem was the Councillors who 
were threatening to disobey the allocation procedures set forth in the 
implementation agreement for UTP, disregard the municipal officers and make 
their own allocations. This was partially a protest at their turned down request to 
have special preferences on allocation. They had to back off after an indication 
by USAID that any breach of the contract relating to the allocation agreement 
would lead to no further funds being disbursed. 
Ilie request to allocate UTP units to staff of NCC without necessarily going 
through allocation procedures and the threat of Councillors to go against the 
procedures are only examples of open activities which can be averted and need 
not be dangerous to the project. Ibe most detrimental to project implementation 
are the type of activities which may not necessarily surface but are bottlenecks to 
the goals and objectives. For example, when the US General Accounting Office 
attempted to review the Umoja applicants through a random selection after 
allocation had been done,, applicant 007679, ballot position 383, and applicant 
020857, ballot position 439 revealed that the incomes were revised (by NCC 
officials) following a second scrutiny of forms (USAID, 1979). Such cases are 
normally hidden in the allocation process and can be very difficult to expose since 
they remain an outcome of internal networks which safeguards its own survival. 
The above may'explain the amount of reallocations which took place between 
1976 and 1977 questioned by USAID, but were successfully defended by the 
project director in collusion with councillors, later charged for corrupt practises 
relating to tendering and allocations. 'Organised repossessions' are not unheard of. 
For example, in DSS allottees' who were in arrears (the normal limit being six 
months), had their plots repossessed and sold on to other individuals in league 
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with councillors and others (UNCHS, 1987). During 1979 strong representations 
had been made on repossessed plots and after consultations the affected 
tenants/allottees were reinstated. Whereas rules are supposed to apply to all, there 
are often exceptions involving political manuovers which outweigh rational laid 
down bureaucratic procedures. 
It was clear that in UTP, among those allocated units there were a number who 
should have been disqualified but, because they either knew their way through the 
council and managed to give false information on their application forms or had 
backing from powerful individuals, qualified for houses. Such cases sometimes 
involved individuals managing to get false pay slips in order to qualify, whereas 
others with influence waited for plots being reallocated under suspicious 
circumstances. During the field survey, it was revealed that a number of plots 
within the inner core had been allocated to councillors and influential individuals, 
who twelve years later could not remember the details they gave2. Such cases 
accounted for some 'ghost' allottees who NCC failed to trace when the project 
was 'resuscitated' in 1992. 
The desire to access low income housing projects by wrong groups often result 
into understating income, and applying irregular means. This happens in situations 
where the respondents are aware of the gains involved. A monitoring study on 
DSS showed that people understated their incomes in order to be eligible 
(Mazingira Institute, 1983). Whereas phase one of DSS had a higher percentage 
of the target group, the other phases which had interference from councillors had 
lower percentages. Hoek-Smit's (1989) evaluation of UmqJa 11 indicates that 80% 
of those interviewed in her sample earned less than Kenya shillings 3000 but 
2During the allocation of plots within the inner core, most councillors allocated themselves several 
plots using different names. some of which were family members, relatives, friends and in some cases 
ghost names. The dissolution of the council in 1983, followed up with different commissions until the 
multi-party politics of 1992, disrupted the existing network of the councillors and when most of the 
councillors dismissed in 1983 were nominated as commissioners in 1992 with the aim of the then single 
ruling party being to win their votes, revelations of what had happened with the inner core plots came out. 
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notes that the response should be considered tentative. The reason being that those 
interviewed were aware of the income limit and gave responses suitable to the 
situation, while in reality the case may be different. 
5.5.0 Conclusion 
The problems experienced during the implementation of UTP are associated with 
the lack of efficient project conceptualisation, planning and inability by the NCC 
to respect project Agreement. A consequence further complicated by the 
establishment of the PMU without a clear portfolio, leaving a number of issues 
to be handled as project implementation progressed. 7bus, exposing the project 
to rampant politics dominated by councillors, in collusion with the PMU director. 
'Merefore, it is argued that although there were a number of intervening variables 
which affected the project implementation, the creation of PMU accelerated the 
problems. Its creation without going into details on how it would operate within 
the City Engineer's Department, became the centre of implementation problems. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
UMOJA TENANT PURCHASE IN THE 1990s 
6.0.0 Introduction 
This Chapter discusses the main findings of the field survey of UTP. The first 
part includes a socio-economic profile of the respondents and a discussion of the 
provision and management of services. These issues are analyzed in respect of 
both the tenants and the resident landlords. An analysis of issues affecting each 
of the two groups such as; the relationships between tenants and their landlords, 
how tenants located their houses, rents paid and attitudes on rent-related issues is 
undertaken. Finally, the position of the resident landlords and their views on home 
ownership is discussed. Included are the allocation process and the development 
of the units to completion as well as the extension of the units beyond the original 
plans. This empirical analysis of what was planned and what is in place is done 
in order to abridge the two and prepare ground for analyzing the intricate issues 
of this research in the following chapter. 
6.1.0 Socio-Economic Prorile of Respondents 
Socio-Economic characteristics of the urban residents has been an important 
variable used by planners, administrators and policy makers while designing 
housing programmes. Whereas this takes into consideration the characteristics of 
the target beneficiaries for housing programmes, little remains known on the 
characteristics of those who actually benefit from such programmes. To some 
extent, this is because the actual beneficiaries, are often not the target 
beneficiaries. The few who happen to be the actual beneficiaries, hardly stay 
within such projects and hence the difficulty in knowing their socio-economic 
profile. In the case of UTP, the findings show that the socio-econon-dc 
characteristics of the actual beneficiaries are quite different from that planned for 
the project (ref: chap. 5.3.0). 
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6.1.1 Employment and Household Income 
Residents of UTP were found to be professionals with various backgrounds 
employed mainly within the formal sector of the -economy. Education, accounting, 
management, sales and marketing professions don-dnated the list'. This is unlike 
most low income areas, where residents are often involved in informal 
employment. For example, in a study conducted in one of the real low income 
areas of Nairobi, Pumwani Majengo, it was found that 61.5% of the residents 
were employed whereas 38.4% were not. Of those employed, 19.3% were in 
casual and temporary employment, 45.3% self employed and the remaining 35.4% 
were permanently employed in either the public or private sectors of the economy 
(Kiamba, et al. 1988). 
As opposed to the Purnwani Majengo finding, households in UTP scheme were 
employed in both public and private sectors with a low percentage undertaking 
self employment. Among the tenants 42.8%, 48.5% and 8.7% of the valid cases 
interviewed were employed in the public, private and self employed respectively. 
Whereas among the sample of landlords 55.4%, 29.2% and 15.4% were 
employed in the public, private sector and self employed, respectively. A total of 
18.6% of landlords interviewed were self employed whereas 1.4% were both self 
employed and employed with only 10A being unemployed. Among the tenants 
only 9% of the valid cases were self employed with 0.8% being both self 
employed and employed and 4.5% unemployed. The few unemployed were either 
landlords earning rent income, individuals who had resigned awaiting other 
appointments or seeking appointments. There were very few, who were basically 
jobless and not in the process of getting any form of employment. 
Research findings show that between November 1992 and April 1993, UTP was 
occupied by households which may be referred to as falling mostly within and/or 
1 The dominance of particular professions can be explained by the methods used in locating 
accommodation which was mainly through friends. 
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above the middle income group. An assessment of incomes during the field 
survey showed that about 71.4% of the tenants were earning between Kenya 
shillings 2000 and 8000. Among this percentage, 29% earned between 5000 and 
8000. A significant sample size of 11.8% earned above Kenya Shillings 11,000. 
On the other hand, the resident landlords seem to earn slightly lower incomes 
with 67.1% earning between Kenya shillings 2000 and 8000. Among this 
percentage, 20% earned between Kenya Shillings 5000 and 8000 whereas 11.4% 
earned above 11,000 Kenya Shillings as shown in figure 6.12. 
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Figure 6.12: Income Levels of Tenants & Landlords 
Field Survey, 1992 
As reflected in figure 6.12, the incomes of the two groups are not far apart, 
although the tenants seem to earn better incomes on a comparative basis. The 
above findings are similar to the findings of HRDU (1989) in their case studies 
of Third Urban Projects in Kenya which included both upgrading and the site and 
service schemes. HRDU's findings show that most houses were occupied by 
higher income groups, falling outside the original project document targets. In one 
of the projects (Race Track), 65% of the occupants were earning above Kenya 
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Shillings 2000 with about 32% earning above 8000. Both UTP's and HRDU's 
findings contrasts sharply from findings of Kiarnba et al (1988) which showed 
that the average income of Pumwani Ma engo, residents was only Kenya Shillings i 
1,060, with 14% of the households earning less than Kenya Shillings 500 and 
only 11 % earning Kenya Shillings 2000 or more (Kiamba, et al. 1988). 
In UTP, the case of higher income encroachment is high; a significant percentage 
of 11.8% and 11.4% of tenants and landlords respectively, were earning more than 
11,000 Kenya Shillings, falling on the higher level of high income category. Only 
5.7% of the tenants and 7.1% of landlords were found to be earning less than 
Kenya Shillings 2,000, thereby falling within the policy target. The fact that more 
landlords earn less than 2.000 Kenya shillings as compared to the tenants seems 
positive, implying closeness to the stated target beneficiaries. This can further be 
elaborated by the fact that the resident landlords are less speculative than the 
absentee landlords and may have needed the units first and foremost as their 
residential homes. 
6.1.2 Age, Marital Status and Education 
Variables such as age, marital status and education are important in planning and 
developing appropriate housing policies. In UTP, the landlords were older than 
the tenants and had less years of education as displayed on Figure 6.13. The mean 
age for landlords was 39.27 with a standard deviation of 6.83 with the minimum 
and maximum age being 25 and 55 years respectively. Whereas that of tenants 
was 31.33 with a standard deviation of 5.69. The minimum and the maximum was 
the same as that of the landlords. The higher mean in the age of the landlords is 
logical, especially when the issue of accumulated savings for housing is taken into 
consideration. 
The majority in both samples were married and had families. 92.9% of landlords 
were marne w th only 7.1% being single, whereas 75.1%, 22.9%, 0.8%, 0.8% 
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Figure 6.13: Age Structure of Tenants & Landlords 
Field Survey, 1"2 
and 0.4% of tenants were married, single, widowed, separated and divorced, 
respectively. The average number of children for the landlords was 3.83 with a 
standard deviation of 1.70, whereas that of the tenants was 3.85 with a standard 
deviation of 2.55. Both had a minimum of I and maximum of 9 children. There 
were cases where the whole family was not staying together in UTP. In such 
cases, the other members of the family were staying in the rural areas or in other 
towns. 
The tenants educational background was concentrated in upper secondary and 
university, whereas that of the landlords was concentrated in lower secondary with 
only 24.3% and 7.1% respectively having upper secondary and university 
education (figure 6.14). 'Ibis is in contrast to the educational status of most low 
income households who are mostly engaged in small scale enterprises. A survey 
conducted in 1986 of such activities showed that 23.5% had no education, 63% 
had primary education, 25% secondary and only 2.7% completed secondary, post 
secondary or university (Ritter et. al. 1986). 
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Figure 6.14: Education Level of Tenants & Landlords 
Field Survey, 1"2 
6.1.3 Accommodation Networks and Period of Stay Within the City 
The length of stay within the urban areas and how migrants are accommodated 
has been of interests, especially to sociologists, and is currently becoming 
important to planners, administrators and policy makers. Arguments have often 
been raised over the transient nature of migrants, thereby dismissing serious 
efforts of planning with them in mind. Despite this, most African cities experience 
large movements of population into the urban areas, which the authorities have 
failed to cater for in terms of services. This has resulted in the development of 
informal networks, aimed at filling the gap. 
In UTP, both the landlords and the tenants did not only stay with their families 
but other kinsmen. For the tenants, the average number staying in each household 
interviewed was 4.68, with a standard deviation of 1.99, a minimum of I and 
maximum of 8. On the other hand, means for the landlords was 5.39 with a 
standard deviation of 1.85, a minimum of I and maximum of 9. The number of 
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people staying in a household varied with time and hence the importance of using 
the average number staying in each household. 
In Kiamba et al's (1988) study of Pumwam Majengo, the occupancy rate was 4 
persons per room of average size 100 fO. This is quite distinct from the UTP case, 
where the mean for rooms was 3.03 with a standard deviation of . 95 for landlords 
and 2.61 with a standard deviation of 0.68 for tenants. The minimum number of 
rooms 2 for both tenants and landlords was 1 whereas the maximum was 5 and 
7 respectively. Most households interviewed had three rooms. 
A probe into whether the respondents stayed on their own or were accommodated 
in their first areas of residence within Nairobi showed that over 50% were 
accommodated. Whereas the remaining percentage accommodated themselves. 
Among the tenants, 51.6% were accommodated whereas 48.4% accommodated 
themselves, and for the landlords, 57.1 % and 42.9% were self accommodated and 
accommodated respectively. This demonstrates the informal network support 
system existing for housing the new urbanites. Although the difference between 
the length of accommodation for landlords and tenants is minimal with that of the 
landlords being higher, it could imply a reduction of chances of being 
accommodated for new arrivals. Partly explained by economic pressures and the 
continued deterioration of kinship ties as society becomes more secular. 
An examination of the areas in which the respondents had been first 
accommodated shows a predominance of low income areas. Accommodation had 
been mainly offered by relatives and to a marginal extent friends. As shown in 
the average number of persons per household, the residents are perpetuating the 
trend by accommodating others who are not yet able to accommodate themselves, 
especially during the early days, months or years in the city. 
21r, considering the number of rooms in a unit, all rooms (including seating room) were considered 
except the kitchen, bathroom and toilet. The outcome of more than three rooms for some households in 
the survey is explained by the development of extensions which enabled some households to rent both the 
main house and the extensions or parts of the extensions. 
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The research also revealed that the length of stay within the city is becoming 
higher with a high percentage of the landlords and tenants having lived in the city 
for over ten years as reflected on figure 6.15. 
Figure 6.15: Year of Arrival In Nairobi 
Field Survey, 1"2 
Additionally, 11.8% and 5.7% of tenants and landlords respectively indicated they 
were born in Nairobi. The predominance for a longer period of stay and birth 
within the city has implications for planning which are worth noting. Field data 
shows that 11.8% of the tenants were born in Nairobi with 47.7% having come 
to the city during the 80s. This comes to a total of 59.5% of the tenants having 
lived in the city for over ten years. This implies a non transient population as 
opposed to the theories of urbanisation which dominated urban development in 
Africa during the Sixties and the Seventies. 
6.1.4 Factors Influencing Choice of accommodation 
Planners had designed UTP with all the hope that it will be a good place to reside 
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in but this intention has mixed response from the respondents with more landlords 
preferring to live in the estate than the tenants. 70.6% of landlords preferred to 
live within the project whereas 29.4% did not prefer living within it. 'Me main 
reason for preference to live was given as home ownership (29.4%) followed by 
good environment (23.5%). 
A combination of affordable housing unit, security, proximity to work place, 
adequate services, good environment and location came third (20.6%) followed 
by good housing unit and affordable unit (5.9%, 5.9%) and adequate services 
(2.9%). The remaining combinations' scored 1.5%. In the case of tenants, a 
combination of affordable rent, security, adequate services, good housing unit, 
environment and location dominated (20.6%), followed by good environment 
(15.1 %), affordable rent (14.7%), adequate services (9.5%) and good housing unit 
(8.3%). IMe remaining variables and their combinations scored less than 3.4%, 
while the remaining percentage had no response. 
A further probe into the factors respondents normally consider when looking for 
a house showed a predominance of a combination of factors among both landlords 
and tenants. The combinations included; affordable house, security, adequate 
services, good housing unit and environment with the scores of 76% and 90.2% 
among landlords and tenants respectively. Apart from security and adequate 
services, which scored 1.4% and 4.3% respectively there were no other variables 
considered in isolation among the landlords. Among the tenants only 0.4% and 
1.2% respectively considered affordable rent and adequate services in isolation to 
all other variables when looking for accommodation within the city. This 
observation in the sample shows an element of an upper class interest as 
compared to the cadre the project was meant for, a group that often consider only 
rent and to some extent proximity to their places of empl oyment. 
3 The variables used for preference included; rent, mortgage, security, proximity to work place, 
proximity to city centre, adequate services, good housing unit, good environment, home ownership, and location of the estate. 
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6.1.5 Household Expenditure 
In the implementation of most housing programmes, income is often used as a 
determinant of ability to afford housing. A debateable position which runs 
throughout this study. In most cases households spend more than they claim to 
earn. This has made expenditure an important variable for assessing how much 
income circulates within a given household. There are cases where expenditure 
Tenants Landlords 
ITEM M SD MIN MAX M SD MIN MAX 
EXP1 2,742 1,311 0 7,000 3.059 1,473 600 
1 1 7,500 
EXP2 763 888 0 6,000 924 996 0 
5,000 
EXP3 247 463 0 3,400 444 1,821 0 1500 
1 0 
EXP4 1,626 2,822 0 23000 2,246 3 300 0 2000 
0 
EXP5 169 240 0 3,261 234 229 45 
1 1,500 
EXP6 165 114 0 800 245 331 0 
2,000 
EXP7 476 718 0 4,000 189 396 0 
2,000 
EXP8 2,192 576 500 4,000 363 543 0 1 
2,500 
EXP9f 565 831 0 5,000 385 594 0 
2,000 
EXP. 203 611 0 4,990 194 493 0 
10 2,5500 
KEY: M= Mean SD = Standard Deviation MAX = Maximum MIN = Minimum EXP = Expenditure. I family subsistence; 2 personal transport; 3 dependant's transport; 4 dependant's education; 5 electricity; 6 water; 7 saving; 8 rent; 9 entertainment and 10 miscellaneous. 
Table 6.8: Expenditure of Respondents 
Field Survey, 1992 
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is used as a proxy for income. In UTP, household expenditure was, high with 
subsistence taking the highest percentage of income as reflected in table 6.8. 
Subsistence is an outstanding item of expenditure which most households do not 
only have to budget for, but spend on. Although in most cases it is not easy to 
determine exactly how much a household spends, it has been noted to take a 
higher percentage of income across income groups. For example, among the very 
low income groups in the Pumwani Ma engo study (Kiamba et al, 1988) it took 
42.9% of monthly income. 
The second highest household expenditure in UT? was rent followed by 
dependants' education. With the implementation of IMF/World Bank Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), the three items of expenditure are becoming 
almost unaffordable to both the middle and high income groups as the low income 
groups move into informal settlements, reduce their daily family subsistence 
requirements and struggle to educate their dependants. 
6.2.0 UTP: Provision and Management of Services 
The provision of essential infrastructure and services to settlements is, next to 
land, the most important obstacle to meeting the shelter demand for all income 
groups (Van Huyck, 1987). Due to pressing economic conditions, most public 
institutions have had problems of providing adequate and efficient services and 
during the last decade there has been a move to "contract out' services. Although 
this is still minimal in Africa and has often covered mainly the areas of education, 
health, communication, urban transport, water and sewage (Roth, 1987), it is 
becoming increasingly common in USA and Western Europe (Ascher, 1987). 
Although arguments have been raised that most urban residents are more than 
willing to pay market rate for adequate services (for example, Stren, 1989), for 
most African cities only an insignificant percentage of urban residents fall into 
this category. Infrastructure and services are an important aspect of housing and 
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should normally be planned and provided concurrently. However, this has not 
always been the case. At the smne time, in cases where provision is done, it is 
often inadequate and insufficient as reflected in the case of UTP. 
6.2.1 Rating of Services and an Assesement of their Management 
Provision of services and their management has been a major problem to most 
cities in Africa as indicated in chapter four. Despite this, services are never given 
serious consideration during the planning of housing projects. In cases where they 
are planned and provided they are neither adequate or sufficient. As reflected in 
Chapter Five, services were the last to be provided long after settlement had 
occurred in UTP. 
In the second phase of UTP, when the project faced cost overruns, the level of 
community facilities to be constructed was scaled down and the finalization of the 
originally proposed plans made contingent upon the availability of funds. Thirteen 
years after project completion, services and their management still seem to be a 
problem and the residents are not satisfied with them. Most services were rated 
as average or below average (see figure 6.16a and 6.16b), revealing the middle 
class oriented views. A clear indication of the implication of lowering standards 
for a wrong group which prefers higher standards. 
Figures 6.16a and 6.16b reveals the low level of satisfaction with services. Refuse 
removal ranked lowest among both tenants and landlords whereas transport and 
security had low rating. The poor rating of refuse removal seem to be a 
predominant outcome which would be expected in most city residential areas. In 
the neighbouring UTP phase two, a study (Hoek-Smit, 1989) carried out indicated 
that the most serious concern was drainage and lack of garbage collection among 
others things. 
An overall assessment of the project showed more preference by the landlords as 
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Figure 6.16a: Rating of Services by Tenants 
Field Survey, 1992 
opposed to tenants. The majority of the tenants felt that the project was below 
average or unsatisfactory, whereas the landlords felt it was average or above 
average as reflected on figure 6.17a and 6.17b. 
The attitude of the tenants compares favourably to a study undertaken in 
Metropolitan Lagos (Festival Town), aimed at assessing attitudes of users towards 
public housing estates constructed between 1970 and 1980. In this study, 69.6% 
had low level of satisfaction in relation to the location of the project. Response 
to services and management showed that 50.3% had low level, 37.9% moderate 
and 11.8% high level of satisfaction (Awotona, 1990). The poor state of the 
housing estate was blamed on the city authorities with many respondents pointing 
out that the city authorities play absolutely no role in managing the estate. 
Among the landlord respondents 32.9% indicated that NCC plays no role whereas 
8.6% did not know. Another 37.1 %, and 20% indicated that the city authorities 
manage the environment and services respectively, whereas 1.4% of the sample 
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Figure 6.16b: Rating of Services by Landlords 
Field Survey, 1992 
had no answer. Among the tenants, 57.6%, 25.7%, 10.6% and 0.8% indicated that 
NCC provide services, play no role, manage environment and evict tenants 
respectively. The rest did not know (3.5%), had no answer (1.4%) or other 
variables (0.4). 
Despite noting the inefficiency of NCC, the majority of the residents still felt that 
they should be responsible for service provision and management, whereas others 
felt it should be a joint effort of residents, NCC, NGOs and government. A 
percentage of; 41.2,18.4,11.4 and 11.4 indicated that NCC; a combination of 
residents and NCC; a combination of NCC and government; NCC, residents, 
government and NGOs should manage the estate, respectively. The remaining 
tenant response which were not dominant included 5.3%, 4.1%, 3.3%, 2.4%, 
0.8%, 0.4% and 0.3% opted for a combination of residents, NCC, government, 
and NGOs; NGOs; residents; government; NCC and NGOs; NCC, government & 
NGOs; government & NGOs and no answer, respectively. 
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On the other hand, among the landlords, 51.4%, 22.9%, 8.6%, 7.1%, 2.9%, 2.9%, 
1.4%, and 1.4% indicated that NCC; NCC & residents; residence, NCC & 
Government; Government; NCC & Government; NGOs; residents & NGOs should 
manage services; whereas 1.4% had no answer. I'his scenario displays the inherent 
view that residential areas should be managed by public authorities such as NCC 
or the government. As reflected above, only 5.3% of the tenant respondents and 
8.6% of landlords held the current trend of thought that services should be 
managed by a combination of agencies with the residents themselves taking a 
central role. 
Figure 6.17a: Overall Assesement by Tenants 
Field Survey, 1992 
6.2.2 Community Participation in Provision and Management of Services 
The view that public agencies should provide and manage services was very much 
influenced by the introduction of service charge by LAs in 1989. A charge which 
most city residents detest because it is not reflected in the services provided. Since 
its introduction, there has been no significant change in the management of 
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services and yet it provides additional income of about Kenya shillings twenty 
million to the NCC treasury every month. Further discussion with the residents 
showed that the service charge had reduced their willingness to effectively 
participate in managing the estate. In view of the economic difficulties facing 
most cities, one would expect the beneficiaries of public housing to consider 
options of managing the services and environment. However, as the data from 
UTP reflects, this does not seem to be forth coming, except on the area of 
security. Of the tenants interviewed, 57.6%, 21.2%, 11% and 1.2% respectively 
indicated that the resident community played no role, security, protected the 
environment, ensure security and protection of the environment, whereas 9% of 
the sample did not know, gave other variables or had no answer. A large majority 
(67.1%) of the landlord respondents noted that the residents played no role. 
Security, environmental protection, and ensure security and protection of the 
environment scored 18.6%, 2.9% and 1.4% respectively. Whereas 8.6% did not 
know and 1.4% had no answer. 
The above reflects the potential of urban residents to participate in aspects of 
services which directly affect them and does not need technical approaches. For 
example, security which was the key unifying variable as far as services and 
management was concerned was partly being handled jointly. A good percentage 
had formed small security associations based on about twenty households. Their 
main functions were hiring a watch man, especially during the night to guard 
against possible burglary. In the area of sanitation, a number of residents either 
individually or in small groups clean up areas around their houses. 
They dispose the refuse either by burning or dumping by the road sides, as 
opposed to the desire of the city authorities. Apart from these small beginnings 
residents have no organisation as such. Not even in phase two of UTP, where 
planners went ahead to plan for condominium associations, does one find active 
involvement of the resident communities. 
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Figure 6.17b: Overall Assesement by Landlords 
Field Survey, l"2 
It has been difficult to actively involve communities to participate in the provision 
and management of services. In many cases community participation is designed 
and controlled by public agencies and sometimes NGOs. Gilbert and Ward (1985) 
in their case studies of cities of Bogota, Mexico City and Valencia point out that 
the State has developed highly effective methods of channelling and controlling 
participation in the sense of growing control by the poor people over the resources 
and institutions that determine the quality of life. 'Meir study has doubts whether 
class solidarity can develop around neighbourhood servicing issues. 
The lack of effective community participation in low income settlements has also 
been associated with the different interests involved in such settlements (Saunders, 
1979; Edwards, 1982). For example, the interests of tenants and that of the 
landlords are quite different and it is not easy to get common grounds of rallying 
them into community participation. There are also a number of functions that the 
residents are just not able to perform. Taking an example of refuse removal, 
assessed by the residents as the worst managed, one finds that there are 
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prerequisites to be met by NCC, before the residents can participate. 
NCC insists on household refuse being disposed through bins which they should 
provide to each household but in most cases they do not. In cases where they 
provide the bins still the collection is hardly done and both households with and 
without bins resort to a very rational behaviour - dumping refuse on the road side. 
A practise which the city authorities detest in many cases by putting up posters 
indicating no dumping but dumping continues to cover the posters not as a 
disobedience but for lack of appropriate alternative. 
Although Garbage removal has often been given a very low priority by NCC, it 
is a key ingredient of health. It is clear that removal of garbage would minimise 
the quantity of dangerous pollutants or pathogens in the environment and 
contribute to good health. Although hardly any research has been done in Nairobi 
to show the extent of exposure of large numbers of people to pathogens and toxic 
substances, such as household and industrial wastes being dumped in open spaces 
within and near residential areas, its hazards are well documented elsewhere. 
6.2.3 The Role of NGOs in Service Provision and Management 
NGOs have been known to be contributing a lot to urban development, especially 
in the area of welfare services. In most cases they are active among the 
marginalised low income groups operating mostly within the informal sector and 
at the same time living in informal settlements. Ibis partially explains why there 
are less NGOs working with communities in UTP. In planned low income areas 
such as UTP, there are cases whereby the residents are not able to separate public 
services and that of NGOs; except where the NGOs are working through 
churches. 
The role played by the NGOs was marginally acknowledged in UTP, especially 
in the area of welfare services. The sample size of tenants had less recognition of 
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the role NGOs play than the landlords with 80.5% indicating that they play no 
role. Only 7.3% and 6.5% indicated that they provide welfare services and 
counselling. The rest of the sample said they assist in the area of education and 
environmental management with others having no response. Among the landlords, 
54.3% said NGOs play no role and 15.7% did not know. Another 15.7% indicated 
that they provide welfare services. The rest of the, sample indicated that they 
provide education, manage environment, provide welfare and counselling. 
6.3.0 Tenure Status of Respondents. 
The nature of tenure is important in determining the prevailing interests in public 
housing and how to plan and manage services. In the case of UTP, planning was 
done with home ownership in mind. However, as indicated earlier, only 22% of 
the residents are home owners, while 78% are renters. It therefore suffices to 
examine the condition of this predominant group before analyzing that of the few 
resident home owners. The discussion on tenants include their relationship with 
their landlords, methods of locating their housing units, rent paid and related 
issues as well as the type of tenure preferred. In the case of the resident landlords, 
the issues in question revolve around the allocation process and the development 
of housing unit to completion. Included are the views of the landlords on NCCs 
planning regulations and whether they followed them as they developed 
extensions after completing the original planned expandable house. 
As shown earlier, the resident home owners had no better impression of the 
project than the tenants. This partly explains why, even in cases where the 
expandable house had been completed and an additional extension developed in 
what the planners thought would serve as open space cam garden, the landlords 
still did not reside within the units. 
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6.3.1 Tenancy 
Renting by comparatively better off groups has been noted to be dominant in 
subsidised public housing. This was demonstrated in UT? where the majority of 
residents were tenants paying comparatively high rents. Rents varied according 
to the type of house and the time it was occupied. This demonstrates the level of 
commodification of housing which has been noted to be prevalent in Kenya 
(MacoOloo, 1989) and specially Nairobi (Amis, 1983). It has not only affected 
public housing but also private (formal and informal) as shown in the case of 
Pumwani Majengo, where 78% of the residents were tenants, 15% sub-tenants and 
only 7% resident landlords (Kiamba et al, 1988). 
A positive aspect of commodification of housing was the good relationship 
between tenants and their landlords. 95.1% personally knew their landlords, 87.3% 
paid their rents directly to the landlord and 86.6% reported any maintenance 
(maint. ) problem directly to the landlord as shown on figure 6.18. The good 
relationship was expounded by 79.2% respondents indicating that they have not 
had any problems with their landlords. However, 20.4% of the respondents had 
experienced problems. The problems were mainly lack of maintenance and 
increase of rent. Some of them had also experienced eviction by either NCC or 
landlord and disconnection of services such as water and electricity. 
Although only 20% had experienced any problem, considering the nature of the 
problems and the inconvenience and impact they have on the tenants, they are 
worth discussing. Evictions and disconnection of services often affect the tenants 
although they are aimed at the landlords who are the allottees and have a contract 
with NCC. Due to the earlier requirement that allottees should stay in their units, 
most of them have water and electricity bills mailed through their addresses. 
Subsequently, they hand them over to their tenants, while others get the money 
from tenants and pay the bills themselves. Another percentage of landlords 
integrate the water and electricity bills in rent. All these approaches drastically 
affect tenants who are never sure whether the bills are paid or not until they 
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Figure 6.18: Rent Receiver and Maintenance 
Field Survey, 1992 
experience either eviction or disconnection of services. In cases where landlords 
have accumulated arrears and the house has to be repossessed the tenants suffer 
without recourse since they have no contract with NCC. In many cases they also 
have no contract with the landlords. This exposes them to the mercy of the 
landlords, depending on whether the landlords make their tenant purchase 
payments and are at the same time not planning to throw them out whenever they 
wish. 
Although most of the tenants knew their landlords, they did not go through them 
in locating the houses. The majority (65.8%) of the tenants located their houses 
through friends with only 7.4% having gone through the landlords. Going through 
relatives ranked second (12.3%) as method of locating a house. Few respondents 
had used housing agents (6.6%) and the daily media (4.9%) whereas 2.9% applied 
other methods. 
Rents in UTP have been rising rapidly, among the respondents 62.7% had 
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experienced rent increase within the last three years with some respondents having 
experienced more than one increment. In 1991 the mean rent was Kenya shillings 
1,991.03 with a standard deviation of 531.37, the mirýimum was 750 and 
maximum 3000. Most respondents (63.1 %) felt that the rents being charged were 
exorbitant. Although majority (72.5%) felt the rents should be lower than those 
being charged and knew existence of the Rent Restriction and Tribunal (RRT), 
very few (5.1 %) had reported their rent problem to RRT as shown on figure 6.19. 
There were few (9.8%) cases of rent sharing, especiafly among young people 
without families. In some cases, a family would be sharing rent with a single 
person subletting one of the rooms in the house. Among the sample interviewed, 
no case was found of families sharing a house or rent. 
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Figure 6.19: Reported and Decided Cases by RRT 
Field Survey, 1992 
A probe into whether the tenants had complained about the high rents had almost 
an equal response with 53.4% having complained and 46.6% not having 
complained. An explanation of their response showed varied responses ranging 
from fear of eviction, lack of response from the landlord to the acceptance that 
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rents in the city are generally high and it is worthless complaining. Accumulative 
percent of 86.1 felt that the rent in 1992 should be 1,800. 
RRT does minimal services to those with problems relating to rent. Basically, the 
tribunal was established to resolve disputes between tenants and landlords residing 
in premises whose rent was Ksh. 2,500 or below. Prior to 1981, it covered only 
premises whose rents were Ksh. 800 and below. Its performance has been very 
poor due to poor staffing, extreme shortage of housing, leaving tenants in a poor 
bargaining position and increased housing costs which puts investors off investing 
in rent collabomtive premises. Discussion (Wainganjo, 1992ý during the field 
survey showed that the institution lacks relevant resources required to perform its 
tasks. To operate effectively, it needs inspectors to conduct on the spot checks and 
investigation of cases which require action; the former rarely happens, while the 
latter is unsuccessfully carried out. 
RRT has no criminal jurisdiction and cannot punish offenders. Its inspectorate and 
valuation officers are not appointed and gazetted as public prosecutors and this 
leaves them with the option of passing the cases, such as those of unnecessary 
eviction to the police who have the criminal jurisdiction. Transportation has been 
a limitation to the various premises which need action. 71be impact of these 
difficulties is reflected in the number of households who bother to get involved 
with RRT as reflected in figure 6.19. 
Figure 6.19 shows that very few cases are ever reported to the RRT. For example, 
in Nairobi there are normally numerous cases of rent problems and yet in the 
three years shown, the reported cases are hardly 2000. Rents have generally been 
high and in tune with the inflationary rates, rising interest rates which are 
currently decontrolled as well as high prices of land and building materials. The 
high rents also reflect high demand and commercialisation of housing. Hence high 
4 Mr. Waingajo had worked with the RRT as an administration officer for over two years and at the 
time of the interview was in charge of the Nairobi office. 
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displacement of tenants from formal housing to informal settlements. 
Many landlords do exploit the housing shortage and thereby overcharge, as the 
tenants fear of possible eviction limit their ability to file cases against their 
landlords. Ibis implies that rent control is a contradiction when other aspects 
which go with it such as land values, interest rates and building materials are 
decontrolled. This partly explains why RRT has only been effective in business 
and commercial premises leaving the residential premises unattended. Tbus, it is 
noted that rent should be directly linked to the policies being pursued and the 
subsequent number of units produced, otherwise it does not make sense to control 
rent. In any case, such controls are not effective and hence the failure of 
households to report cases. 
The impact of rent control manifest itself in the deteriorating housing stock within 
the city. Most Las have kept rents for their housing stock much below the market 
rates and their attempt to increase rent has often been reprimanded by the Central 
Government. Any increase of rents, especially that of NCC and other Las has to 
be approved by the Ministry of Local Government. NCC had been trying to 
increase rent for its housing stock since 1987 but only succeeded in July 1992, 
with the increases ranging between 50 and 100 percent (Field Survey, 1992). 
Although the increase statistically seem high, it should be noted that most NCC 
housing stock are rented much below market rates. Central Government has in 
many cases blamed them for lack of maintenance, not taking into consideration 
the fact that the rents charged are not even sufficient for management. It is 
therefore out of step to expect NCC to maintain the available housing stock unless 
they are able to mobilise resources or get assistance from the Government and/or 
other agencies. 
The desire and intention of owning a home in an urban area was predominant 
among the UTP tenants with 2.5% of the sample finding owning houses elsewhere 
in Nairobi. A search to find out whether the respondents wished to own houses 
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in Nairobi gave a positive response of 98.4%, whereas an assessment on whether 
the respondents have ever applied for any government aided scheme such as UTP 
showed that 44.6% had done so, whereas 55.4% had not. This shows that there 
is an effective demand of home ownership among the residents of UTP and 
policies of home ownership aimed at this group may have chances of succeeding. 
Additionally, the majority of the respondents were formally employed and had 
regular quantifiable income, aspects which have been requirements for accessing 
low income housing but not operational among the real low income groups. 
Housing finance has been said to be a major bottleneck in accessing housing. An 
investigation into where the respondents would seek financial support indicated 
that 32.7% and 43.7% respectively would seek support from the public and 
private sectors. 8.6% pointed out that they would use informal networks in their 
search for financial support whereas 13.5% did not know with 1.5% having no 
response. The fact that the ma ority of the respondents did not opt for the public 
sector seems to be an indication of disillusionment with the performance of the 
public sector. A sector whose performance has been deteriorating with only few 
benefiting. 
In order to give a further assessment of Government intentions and/or policies, 
respondents were asked to comment on the government policy of housing the low 
income groups. A total of 62.1 % felt the policy was good whereas 37.9% felt it 
was not appropriate. A request for an elaboration of the above outcome got a 
negative response with 65.7% opting not to give reasons for their stand on policy. 
Ile positive responses included; low income groups cannot afford the houses 
developed (19.6% very few benefit from such schemes (1.2% the process of 
access is tedious (0.4), makes home ownership possible (11.8%); whereas 1.2% 
gave other reasons or did not know. 
Lack of access has been a major problem in most public funded housing projects. 
A search aimed at finding out the problems the UTP respondents faced in their 
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attempt to access government aided schemes was carried out among those who 
gave a positive response. It showed that 15.1% failed due to their income bracket, 
implying that they were either above or below the bracket. Others indicated 
inability to get application forms (4.9%), failure to raise deposit (0.4%) and 
irregularity in application procedures (6.9%). The latter included corrupt practices 
where one had to pay a token before being given a form and with a promise that 
the form will be given some preference during processing of applications. 
Most low income public housing programmes undertaken since 1972 assumed that 
low income households prefer to own houses. However, the real low income 
groups do not have the relevant requirements perpetuated for home ownership. 
Contrary to this, the middle and upper income groups who occupy houses meant 
for them have the desire for home ownership. A question asking the tenant 
respondents of UTP the type of an urban house they would prefer indicated that 
65.7% and 27.4% respectively prefer tenant purchase and a plot to develop their 
own houses. Only 4.1% indicated they would prefer rental housing while 1.2% 
preferred buying with cash as opposed to getting involved with loans. 1.6% of the 
sample had no response. 
A further probe among those who opted for tenant purchase in order to find out 
whether they would prefer to rent out or sublet revealed that 53% preferred not 
to sublet whereas only 7.8% preferred subletting in order to be able to make the 
loan repayments. The 53% gave reasons such as self satisfaction and ability to 
maintain the house better as well as being able to earn owner/occupier house 
allowance from their employers. These responses reflect the interests of middle 
. and upper 
income groups who in many cases do not prefer rental housing or 
subletting accommodation. 'Mey only opt for such alternatives in cases where 
their financial capacity does not allow them to take the preferred choice, which 
is often home ownership. 
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6.3.2 Home Ownership 
Home ownership has been argued for the urban poor in the third world countries 
to be the final stage in a long process, whereby they move from being sheltered 
or accommodated individuals into being sub-renter then a renter and finally the 
owner of a home (Malik, 1992). In Kenya, home ownership has been perpetuated 
since the Vasey report of 1950. It is therefore important to assess some of its 
advantages and disadvantages for those who have experienced the move, using the 
case of UTP. Apart from owning units in UTP, 9.9% of those interviewed had 
other houses in other areas of the city, an outcome which the city authority 
requirements attempted to avoid during allocation. The requirement was that 
applicants should not own any other house in Nairobi and, as expected if the 
target beneficiaries were to be drawn from the most needy, the element of 
multiple ownership would be greatly reduced or not be there at all. An assesement 
of the houses the individuals owned before UTP showed that they were not 
subsidized, exposing the problematic nature of directing subsidies to the right 
group. 
In the sample of respondents interviewed, there was a significant percentage of 
non-original buyers. Ibis illustrates the rate at which publicly funded housing 
schemes aimed at the low income groups change hands. The HRDU (1989) study 
has also indicated how plots change hands in low income planned housing 
schemes using the case of secondary towns. An outcome known to be 
predominant in many developing countries. In Kenya, housing units meant for low 
income groups have been known to start changing hands immediately after 
allocation. In Nairobi, the situation is worse due to speculation based on high 
rates of return on housing investment. 
Most (71.8%) of those interviewed had been tenants before, while 26.8% had 
never been tenants. Ibis implies that they either came to Nairobi after having 
accumulated enough resources to enable them be home owners or they stayed 
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with other people until they moved into their own houses. The latter is not 
prevalent except in cases where next of kin has inherited the property and in the 
sample only 5.8% acquired their units through inheritance. The rest of the sample 
(94.2%) had either bought or were buying. The majority of the landlords stopped 
being tenants when they were allocated units in UTP, as reflected by the 71.2% 
who started purchasing their units between 1976 and 1982 as shown on figure 
6.20. 
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Figure 610: Year of Unit Purchase 
Field Survey, 1992 
The cluster on figure 6.20 is unique; it does not synchronise with the time 
allocations were done as such. If cumulative percentages are considered, one 
finds that only about 60% fall among the initial allottees whereas the remaining 
40% would be assumed to be second buyers with a few who may have inherited 
the units. However, in a more direct question asking respondents whether they 
were the original allottees or they bought from somebody else, only 21.2% 
indicated they had bought from somebody else whereas 78.8% said they were 
original buyers. Ibis outcome had been anticipated during the pilot survey and 
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hence the question asking allottees to specify the year they started buying their 
units. 
The case of UTP demonstrates the extent of commodification of the units which 
has taken place since the initial allocations. The high rate of no response on this 
question relating to the year of purchase partially explains some cover up the 
landlords would like to make, especially those who may have got the units after 
repossessions or under suspicious circumstances. For example, in a neighbouring 
site and service scheme (Kayole), where the period of sale of the units has not 
expired, a number of individuals have bought plots from the original allottees by 
simply signing affidavits. Such individuals in many cases are not willing to 
discuss many details of their investment and in any case, it is difficult to locate 
them, for in all the legal documents they act in the name of the original allottees 
until the 'no sale' period expires. 
6.3.3 The Home Ownership Process. 
As noted, home ownership has been advocated for solving the housing problems 
of the low income groups, but findings of this study shows that the process is 
tedious and expensive for low income households. Among the landlords in UTP, 
the process was found to integrate a number of issues relating to the 
admimistrative, financial and self sacrifices the landlords had to deal with before 
finally occupying their houses. Before the allocation of the units or buying for 
those who were not original allottees, individuals had to deal with a number of 
institutions which mainly included NCC and in some cases their employers, or 
cooperative societies. 
Asked to point out some of the administrative difficulties they faced in dealing 
with NCC's bureaucracy, a significant percentage (42.9%) indicated they had no 
problem whereas the second largest percentage (24.3) experienced some problems, 
which included; difficulty in getting application forms, short time for raising 
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required deposit and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, as reflected on figure 
6.21. Corrupt practices are often pin-pointed in the newspapers as rampant in the 
administrative structure of NCC as discussed in Chapter Five. Although it did not 
come out as a predominant factor in the sample interviewed, this study notes its 
importance as a variable. The not applicable cases refers mainly to those who did 
not go through NCC who at the same time fall among the second buyers. As 
indicated earlier, most of them went through either their employers or cooperative 
societies, aspects which are out of scope for this study. 
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The sources of housing finance have been key in housing studies. Renaud (1988) 
argues that in the developing countries, concern has been more on how resources 
can be made available for low income housing, leaving out the development of 
effective financial systems and/or intermediaries. Neither has the concern been on 
the constraints financial institutions face and which may contribute to the inability 
to provide the type of loans which policy makers say they should provide. It has 
been difficult for most countries to solve the three conflicting issues in housing 
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finance, namely; affordability for households, viability for the financial institutions 
and resource mobilisation for the expansion of the sector at national level. Thus 
in the developing countries, housing finance has been left, largely to the market 
forces, cooperatives and informal networks. 
The above is demonstrated in UTP where most respondents got financial support 
in form of loans either from their employers or cooperative societies; institutions 
known to have suitable access procedures to their clients. On the other hand, their 
sources of finance for the down payment were mainly cooperatives and individual 
savings with some not having had to raise the deposit, as shown on figure 6.22. 
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Savings and cooperatives seem to be the most common methods of accumulating 
money for housing investment. The 31.4% who did not have to raise the deposit 
fall among those who bought their units with cash through their employers or 
cooperatives. There are possibilities of individuals who could have accumulated 
adequate finance to be able to purchase their units on a cash basis. However, such 
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cases would definitely be way above the required target group at the planning 
stage as was reflected by the number (39.7%) of those who had already paid off 
their units. As for those who were still paying mortgage, there was a cumulative 
percentage of 70.3 paying Kenya shillings 750 or below. The lowest mortgage 
payment was 400 and the highest 2,800. 
Most respondents were paying their mortgages to NCC (35.7%) or a cooperative 
society (11.4%) with the higher rates being mainly payments to cooperatives 
and/or employers. The problems of paying mortgage and the difficult process of 
home ownership came out clearly when the home owners were requested at the 
end of each interview to give advice to potential home owners. Whereas 32.9% 
only mentioned it was a worthwhile endeavour, 34.2% indicated that it was 
financially more viable to buy a plot and develop a house or save and buy cash. 
They were opposed to getting involved with tenant purchase or any type of 
mortgage payments. Another 21.4% Jelt there was need for getting all the 
necessary advice before one got into schemes such as UTP because they need a 
lot of sacrifice on the part of the home owner. 7.1 % had other reasons while 4.3 % 
of the sample gave no response. 
A search into the project finance, office showed poor repayment records as 
reflected in table 6.9 
Year Ksh. 
1991/92 38,741,361.20 
1990/91 43,768,362.25 
1989/90 32,427,596.95 
1988/89 23,797,269.70 
Table 6.9: UTP Arrears, 1988 to 1992 
Source: Compiled from Summary of Accounts as per ledger, NCC UTP Project Office. 
Discussions with the officer in charge (Mr. Kinani) indicated that very few 
allottees were regular as far as. tenant purchase repayments were concerned. The 
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dismal scenario in tenant purchase repayment records was linked to 
administrative, political and economic variables. As per NCC regulations, allottees 
who accumulate arrears amounting to six months should be evicted and as 
discussed earlier, this eviction often falls on tenants. According to Mr. Kinani, 
accumulation of arrears has to be handled with caution and has no standard format 
for those affected. Each case has to be handled taking into consideration the 
factors contributing to lack of repayment. 
Mr. Kinani noted that sometimes there are genuine cases where households have 
lost their employment or have fallen into some financial crisis. In such situation, 
the Umoja Finance Office probes the case and appropriate repayment methods are 
set. However, this method was found not to be very acceptable to the NCC 
authorities, especially HDD. Notwithstanding, it seems the right approach for 
those who are most needy, for as noted during the interview, eviction and 
subsequent repossession is a great loss that no household would wish to fall into, 
unless they have absolutely no alternative. Additionally, the politics of 
repossession has it that the repossessed units are often sold to NCC staff or their 
close associates at throw away prices. Inferring that the low income groups have 
higher chances of making an exit than other income groups. 
The interviews also revealed that those who had bought their units through 
cooperative societies or employers were more conversant with the Tenant 
Purchase conditions and other payment aspects such as land rate, rent and 
insurance than those who had bought from NCC. Some of those paying Tenant 
Purchase fees to NCC were ignorant of a number of important issues such as 
interest rates and balance of payment. They noted the lack of clarity as relates to 
mortgage payment whose balance kept increasing as interest kept rising. 
Subsequently, they suggested that NCC should be giving an annual statement of 
the accounts and the rates of payment should be made stable with some 
suggesting that the government should support such efforts. Ibis demonstrates the 
traditional perception of the government as a provider of public goods and the 
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ignorance relating to publicly funded low income housing development 
programmes. 
Interviews with NCC authorities dealing with the project indicated that they had 
limits to how far they can go in satisfying the allottees as far as Tenant Purchase 
repayment issues and information are concerned. In connection with annual 
statements on their accounts, the city official interviewed indicated that they only 
give such statements to those who request them due to the administrative costs 
involved. This seems an appropriate approach when the cost of management is 
taken into consideration. However, NCC's shortcoming is their inability to provide 
relevant information to the allottees, a task at times complicated by the 
unauthorized change over of ownership. 
A question relating to whether respondents had problems completing their units, 
showed that, among the valid cases, 41% had problems whereas 58.8% did not 
have any problems. 'Me problems indicated were financial, dumping ground for 
excavated soil and lack of cooperation from NCC. Of these problems, dumping 
ground seemed to have been a major bottleneck and it is demonstrated to date by 
the extent of excavated soil blocking the foot paths and some times spilling on to 
the roads. Transporting excavated soil away from the project site is an expensive 
endeavour which increases the cost of development. In UTP, this was further 
complicated by the prevalence of black cotton soil requiring excessively deep 
foundation. For the few who could afford to dump excavated soil elsewhere, there 
was no specified dumping site and they took options convenient to them. 
6.3.4 Home Owners and Transformation of UTP 
The overdevelopment (extensions) of planned public housing has become an issue 
of concern with the debate revolving around their acceptability and how best to 
accommodate them. In many cases they totally transform residential areas from 
the original plans. They fall under what has recently became an area of concern 
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to students and scholars of housing studies; referred to as 'transformation studies'. 
The few studies done (for example Graham et al, 1991 and Oxman et al, 1986) 
have mostly concentrated on planned housing occupied by owners or tenants of 
public institutions. 7bey have argued that extensions are efficient providers of 
extra housing and inherent extra rooms for households at little or no public 
expense, and have economic potential. Subsequently, they contend that they 
should be catered for in planning to enable households to alter and/or extend their 
homes, so long as safety is ensured. 
As opposed to the above argument, in a case such as that of UTP, where the 
majority of the residents are neither owners nor public tenants, the case may be 
different. UT? is occupied mostly by tenants who make no decisions relating to 
the types of developments going on in their neighbourhood or within the very 
units they rent. In this case, the extensions in UTP have nothing to do with user 
satisfaction but commodification of housing, serving dual purposes of investment 
and additional housing stock. The home owners who mostly do not stay in the 
area have undertaken several moves relating to the development of the area 
beyond the original plan and intentions of planners. An overview of the area 
shows several different house plans (figures 6.23,6.24,6.25, and 6.26) with a 
reasonable percentage of flats which were never planned. The most visual aspect 
of extension and re-planning are the additional development which have taken 
place within the same plots - popularly known as 'extensions' (as illustrated in 
figures 6.23 - 6.26). The . extensions are homes to a number of households'and 
their monthly rentals are not significantly different from those of the main house 
based mostly on the original plan. , 
Extensions are a reflection of the housing problem leading to over development 
of the existing planned areas. They occupy areas left by planners as open space 
in the back and front yard with others developing flats based on the original plan 
design. In the original plan, open spaces were provided with an intention that they 
will be used merely as open spaces for different purposes; for example kitchen 
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Figures 6.23 and 6.24: Samples of Extensions 
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Figure 6.26: Sample of Extension 
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Figure 6.27: Sample of Extension 
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Figure 6.27 and 6.28: UTP Front View Units with Original Design Plan 
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gardening or flower gardens for improving the environment. So far very few units 
have retained the original or model close to the original plans. As opposed to the 
neighbouring middle income housing scheme, Buru Buru (figures 6.27 and 6.28), 
funded by CDC where a tree was planted in the open space within the front yard 
of each unit as part of the project, UTP had only space left. The assumption being 
that the allottees would utilise them as open space and/or kitchen cam flower 
gardens. However, the theory of commodification of housing seem to have 
worked among the home owners who have mostly opted to use the plots as 
business grounds. There are also a number of houses which have their parts (or 
whole) converted for other purposes, mainly small scale businesses such as hair 
saloons, retail shops and health clinics. 
Commodification of housing has been rampant in Nairobi and in most cases does 
not take the interests of the users into consideration. For example, in phase two 
of UTP, where condominiums were planned with an enclosed court yard and 
additional open space at the back yard, nearly all owners, residents as wen as 
absentee landlords, mentioned that they would like to extend their units into the 
open space if they were allowed to (Hoek-Smit, 1989). 
The above exposes the contradiction between people's concept of space and its use 
value and that of the planners, whose objective is to define and control space. In 
UTP, among those interviewed, 61.4% had extended their units beyond the 
original plan whereas only 38.6% had not. Since this is a practice seen by NCC 
as illegal, the field survey probed how the home owners sorted it out. Among 
those who had extended their units, 56.1 % attempted to get authority from NCC 
while 43.9% did not bother to seek any authority. Among those who sought 
authority only 18.6% got it, whereas the rest'had their applications ignored or 
rejected. This did not stop home owners from developing their extensions. An 
overview of the whole project portrays extensive capital investment. As reflected 
in the samples of extensions, there are a number of high rise buildings coming up 
in the area which are so commercially oriented that they distort the whole 
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Figure 6.29 and 6.30: UTP Units in Relation to Buru Buru Middle Income Housing Scheme 
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environment. What remains unclear is whether NCC allows such developments 
or not and the criteria applied in ratifying them. 
The development of extensions contradicts the stringent building regulations set 
by NCC. Among the resident home owners interviewed, 51.4% were aware of 
NCC's planning requirements, 30% were not, whereas 18.6% decided not to 
answer the question. An outcome suspected to have been influenced by their guilt 
over development without NCC's authority. Among those who were aware, the 
majority (35.3%) felt they were normal NCC requirements whereas a significant 
percentage felt they were too strict and limiting (16.2%). For the remaining 
sample of 48.5%, the question did not apply. 
The question asking whether UTP had solved the problem of housing low income 
groups got a negative answer of 65.7% and a positive answer of 22.9% with 
11.4% reserving their response. Those with negative responses pointed out that 
the low income earners who reside mostly in informal settlements cannot afford 
to reside or pay for schemes such as UTP. It came out quite clearly from them 
that they placed themselves in a distinct group as compared to the low income 
groups. They were sure of the fact that they were not low income and had even 
an aspiration of purchasing houses in more prime areas of the city. 
6.4.0 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented and discussed the conditions of both the tenants and 
resident home owners in a scheme planned and subsidized with a goal of reaching 
the low income groups. The socio-economic characteristics of the residents show 
their comparatively better life standards than the real low income groups, 
implying that they should not be the beneficiaries of a subsidised scheme. Due to 
their high expectations, supposedly linked to their high income and standards of 
living, their assesement of their living environment was average or below average. 
An outcome which further demonstrates the inherent problems of subsidising the 
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wrong groups who visualize themselves as deserving higher quality of housing, 
infrastructure and services. At the same time they were sceptical on the ability of 
low income groups to access housing schemes such as UTP, thereby clearly 
isolating themselves from the low income groups, as they were wrongfully 
claimed to be. 
Notwithstanding, the analysis of the resident landlords exhibit the problems 
households face in their quest for home ownership which are mainly financial and 
administrative bottlenecks linked to the institutions they have to deal with. 
Housing finance in terms of mortgages and Tenant Purchase Payments are often 
arranged in public housing, but as this study shows the element of down payment 
or deposit has been an obstacle to a significant percentage of potential home 
owners. Most individuals have to rely on their personal savings or cooperatives. 
In Kenya, most cooperatives are based on formal institutions which are often out 
of reach for the low income groups. Subsequently, the low income groups seem 
to have hardly any options for raising required down payment, for they are also 
known to have very limited personal savings. 
The inability of the low income groups to access UTP, as planned for them, was 
demonstrated by the overdevelopment of the area, showing extensive capital 
investment involved. NCC has been unable to control the developments taking 
place and it was not possible to come to conclusions on the criteria used for 
ratifying the various types of developments, especially among those who got 
authority to overdevelop their units. If extensions were able to house some low 
income households, their development would be seen as positive to the project 
goals, but their rents are not significantly different from the originally planned 
expandable unit. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE POLITICS OF UTP IMPLEMENTATION. 
7.0.0 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the problems encountered during the implementation of 
UTP by examining the Kenya Government's low income housing policy basis and 
its institutional framework of implementation. The unrelated policy emphasis on 
the low income groups as their condition deteriorate is presented and the politics 
of policy implementation -set within NCC bureaucracy analyzed. The limitations 
of the institutional framework highlighting the lack of adoptive regulations, 
management structure and inherent personality conflicts, institutional requirements 
of access and the role of financial resources in institutional performance are 
addressed. 
7.1.0 Policy Biases 
After examining the Kenya Government's stated policy objective of housing the 
low income groups, this study maintains that the policy goals have not been 
achieved. The problem being the policy itself partly due to its focus on home 
ownership and a reliance on quantifiable regular income as a method of pre- 
qualification; and the institutions charged with implementation due to their 
inability to set the right strategies and how best to achieve them. The failure of 
the policy was clearly brought out in almost all interviews carried out among 
senior government officials, examination of various policy documents and the case 
study. 
Some of the catch phrases used by Government officials in responding to the 
question asking whether the policy was successful or not included, 'undue 
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emphasis on home ownership but has not worked' (Njau, 1992)1; 'low cost 
housing is an illusion'(Njora, 1992)2 and 'they claim to have a policy of 
upgrading but no successful projects are known". Comments of this nature from 
individuals who have been in touch with the situation for over two decades give 
a pointer of the inherent difficulties. Similar views were also held by the resident 
landlords in UTP who noted that it is almost impossible for the low income 
groups to own or rent houses in UTP. 
The debates surrounding the lack of success in achieving government objectives 
of housing the low income groups has often blamed the implementing institutions 
for being ineffective. However, it should be noted that although the institutional 
framework has its share of blame, as will be discussed, it is often exposed to 
impossible situations when the policies are unclear and/or not feasible. As the 
argument runs in this study, policy is a process and setting distinct levels between 
policy and its implementation is not only difficult but unrealistic. Notwithstanding, 
in examining the Kenya government's policy focus on the low income groups, this 
study partially isolates those actions, statements, decrees and stated objectives of 
housing the low income groups by the Central Government Ministries vis a vis 
those of Local Government and other institutions charged with implementation as 
distinct levels of the policy process. At these two levels, the key policy issues 
relating to planning and development of low income housing are discussed using 
the case of UTP, this section being dedicated to the Central Government. 
'Gilbert Njau worked with NCC for over twenty years and was the director of HDD before being 
transferred to the housing department within the Ministry of Lands and Housing. At the time of interview 
(April, 1992), he had retired from civil service and was actively involved in development research and 
evaluation. 
2John Njora had also worked for NCC for over twenty years in different positions rising to the position 
of deputy Town Clerk. At the time of interview (April, 1992) he had been transferred to act as the Town 
Clerk of Nyeri Municipal Council. 
3MonicaMutuku worked for NCC for over twenty years as a Community Development Officer rising 
to the position of head of Community Development Division within HDD before an early retirement. At 
the time of the interview (May, 1992), she was in-charge of UNICEF Kenya programme on Urban Basic 
Services. 
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The case of UTP shows that as opposed to policy statements and documents 
which focus on the low income groups, only an insignificant percentage of the 
low income groups benefit. Thus the Kenyan Government's intention of housing 
the low income groups has not been demonstrated in UTP. The main reason being 
the inappropriate policy instrument of housing the low income groups through 
home ownership, the lack of clearly outlined targets at policy level, how to 
identify them and a subsequent lack of consensus among political and 
administrative officials, as will be discussed later. 
In order to come to terms with the Kenya government's rhetoric of housing the 
low income groups, it is appropriate to understand the environment within which 
it operates and the ideology which sustains it as discussed in Chapter Two. The 
nature of housing urban dwellers is closely linked to the prevailing ideological 
orientation of the State. In Kenya, the State perpetuates peripheral market 
ideology in spite of rhetoric of housing the low income groups. In this respect, 
both market ideology and government regulation protect the private economic 
sector rather than meeting housing needs. The inherent assumption being that the 
private economic sector is more efficient and accountable than the public sector. 
Peripheral capitalist econornies such as Kenya, often have no choice but to 
respond flexibly to the market by internal changes even if it is pernicious to 
citizens. As opposed to this, the advanced capitalist states are better insulated 
from international economic shocks and are often tempted instead to seek to 
change the rules of international economic life. State power depends, at least in 
part, upon the intelligence, nimbleness and skill of political actors - if social 
actors are given particular cards much depends upon the way they play them 
(Ikenburry, 1986). 
In view of the above, the state should work with and ensure coordination among 
the various participating institutions and/or individuals setting strategies before 
coming up with policies which remain relevant to only those who participated in 
their formulation. During the field survey a question aimed at finding out the level 
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of coordination among the various institutions participating in housing 
development showed a poor record of coordination. Implying that efforts aimed 
at achieving goals are not integrated; an outcome which results in duplication of 
efforts and waste of resources. A response from a former senior Planning Officer 
within Ministry of Local Government, Mr. Ornwando, sununarises the situation, 
'there are no links in things happening v4 . 
ne above response was among the twelve responses based on a score of five 
(very strong, strong, less strong, weak, very weak), given by senior government 
officers on the question asking them to indicate the degree of coordination among 
the various institutions participating in housing development. Among the twelve, 
seven indicated very weak, three indicated weak, while two respondents indicated 
less strong and strong respectively. The lack of co-ordination leaves each 
institution focusing on whatever it deems right or nothing. A scenario exhibited 
in NCC where there is currently no housing strategy but reception and 
implementation of projects funded by International Finance. 
On a comparative basis, the housing sector has been poor in coordinating its 
activities. Habitat (1991) observes that housing requires co-ordinated action at the 
highest National level on a considerably broad range of issues than simple public 
housing production. Both the Ministries of Lands and Housing and Local 
Government are supposed to be central movers of housing activities, a role which 
they have failed to effectively perform. An officer of the Ministry of Lands and 
Housing interviewed indicated that 'there has been lack of clear focus on low 
income groups but pronouncements". He associated the lack of serious 
commitment on housing policy to the inability to isolate it as a priority, indicating 
'Mr. 7-P. Omwando worked with both the Ministries of planning and National Development and Local 
Government as a senior economist planner and actively participated in the structuring of a number of low 
income housing programmes during his assigrunent as the head of planning section within the Ministry 
of Local Government. At the time of interview (April, 1992). he had retired from civil service and was 
employed as a senior consultant with the Erbert Foundation. 
sInterview with Mr. E. M. Onyango, housing officer, Ministry of Lands and Housing. 
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that it does not feature well in govemment budgets. 
The inability to isolate housing as a priority is closely related to the different 
interests involved in its production and consumption. In Kenya, the state has 
relied on the application of rhetoric to appease the low income households, while 
at the same time leaving important aspects of housing production and 
consumption to the market forces. This partly explains why there has been a 
constant reduction of the Gross National Financial Allocation to Ministry of Lands 
& Housing for public housing development programmes as shown on table 7.10 
Financial 
Year 
Gross Dev'. 
Estimate 
(Ksh) 
Gross All 
-cation7 
Actual 
Gross Nat. 
Dev. Budgg 
(Ksh) 
% Of Actu- 
-al All to 
Nat. Dev. Bu' 
1984/85 15,665,000 12,161,943 343,430,327 3.4 
1985/86 15,100,000 8,550,000 338,771,293 2.2 
1986/87 10,740,000 8,275,000 488,910,115 1.7 
1987/88 8,417,800 6,167,150 613,665,344 1.0 
1988/89 12,576,590 18,048,442 806,144,409 2.2 
0 10,414,000 11,180,000 922,079,201 1.2 
1990/91 7,259,000 9,167,000 1 898,632,482 1.0 
Table 7.10: Gross National Financial Allocation to housing. 
Source: Extracted From Government Development Estimates. 
The Kenya government has been pursuing and reinforcing the notion of home 
ownership among the needy urban dwellers without coming up with local 
strategies of identifying them. The operating assumption in this trend is that 
6 Gross Development 
7 Gross Allocation 
8 Gross National Development Budget 
9 Actual Budget Allocated to Building 
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popularisation of home ownership makes people become bonded to the dominant 
values of society, as articulated by the market. This theory applies more to the 
developed capitalist economies where its authenticity is currently being 
questioned. For example, in Britain, the approach was pursued by the Thatcher 
government and led to an increase in the percentage of home owners who the 
government viewed as potential supporters of the conservative government. 
However, the whole process started backfiring just before the demise of the 
lbatcher government. A high percentage of home owners were faced with 
repossessions which continued as the global recession hit Britain. This paints a 
gloomy picture for a peripheral capitalist economy such as Kenya, where incomes 
are low, rental tenure dominant and the relevant institutions are either not fully 
established or ineffective. 
It is almost out of step to perpetuate home ownership as a key approach of 
housing the poor who are merely struggling for basic survival. Most urban 
households are renters with irregular incomes and it makes sense to focus on the 
renting market which is currently dominated with inadequate and insufficient 
housing. Their key problem being lack of infrastructure and services and to some 
extent the housing units. To the Government, such housing should be improved 
and/or demolished. Whereas some improvements have been going on through 
upgrading, its premise has been on home ownership and hence its failure 
demonstrated by proliferation of such areas. To this study, the improvement of the 
so-called 'unacceptable' housing should not be tied to home ownership but to 
improving and adding housing stock. 
So far, the experience of basing housing policy on home ownership has been 
detrimental to low income groups. Although analysts may argue that in Kenya 
housing policies are in place as compared to other African countries, the focus on 
low income groups is far from being achieved. Although the government 
promotes home ownership probably due to lack of resources for other types of 
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housing provision such as rental schemes, it does not support or facilitate the 
private sector developing the type of rental housing which house the low income 
groups. Most of the needy fall under provision currently-being made by the 
private informal sector, with NCC's old rental stock supplementing them. To a 
large extent, the rental market (formal and informal), has been providing housing 
but it has lacked government support and hence is expensive (formal) or 
inadequate (informal) for the most needy. For the units within the formal market 
which may be affordable to the needy, the government insists on controlling rents 
and thereby killing incentives of replication by the providers. 
The outcome of government policy has been an increase of publicly aided housing 
stock as the low income groups continue to reside in what the state views as 
'inadequate' housing. In the policy approaches of reaching the poor, the higher 
income groups have been over subsidized for what they can afford. For the few 
low income groups who get to the schemes, the level of exit is high as they get 
bought off in order to channel gained resources in other priority areas of survival. 
In the case of UTP, about 40% of landlords fell among none original allottees. If 
the assumption of appropriate initial allocation is adopted, then one can argue that 
about 40% of the low income group have made an exit, thereby defeating policy 
goal. 
An assesement by this study shows that to a large extent the nature of adopting 
low income housing programmes is not different from that of any consumer 
products; whereby the identification of a potential market is mainly done by the 
investor based on profits anticipated. In the case of housing, Kenya has witnessed 
financial agencies such as USAID and the World Bank, as discussed later in this 
chapter, presenting housing schemes ready packaged. Since the government has 
failed to mobilise local resources for welfare related services such as low income 
housing, it is often tempted to accept packages which may not necessarily be 
appropriate within the local context or in their definition of policy focus. Ibus 
'there is very little evidence that housing policy failure can be attributed to lack 
233 
of commitment on the part of governments, for policies not conceived cannot be 
deemed to fail' (Adedokun, 1989). Adedokun argues further that, even countries 
where government statutes and laws do not cover housing, governments still act 
in a manner which suggest that they consider housing to be an essential part of 
human economic development. 
A look at most of the low income housing schemes adopted by the Kenya 
government shows enormous outside intervention. As reflected in the case of 
UTP, this included the conceptualization of who the low income groups are, 
which section of the low income groups should be the focus and finally which 
sector or group should get government subsidies. In most cases the international 
agencies do not encourage subsidies and even if they do, governments often 
cannot afford them. To sort out this and ensure that profits are not lost, the 
international agencies usually adapt cost recovery principle from the beneficiaries 
of housing and related infrastructure. In this scenario, the role of government is 
questionable. The rules of investment states that any rational investor has to 
ensure that the environment is conducive before investing. In this case, hardly any 
blame can directly be laid on international finance, except when they lead the 
band wagon claiming to house the low income groups within a context where 
identifying the low income groups using regular quantifiable wage income as a 
variable does not work. 
Since the mid Eighties, pressure to change development approaches not based on 
the market solution has been coming from international financial agencies who 
fund most African States and are after ensuring that their investment is safe. 'Ibus, 
in the name of SAPs, most African States are now caught up in a situation 
whereby the rhetoric of doing things for, the people has to change into enabling 
people to do things for themselves in order to be in tune with the global political 
economy. Indeed, a difficult task for a Peripheral Capitalist State which still needs 
not only to enable but in some cases provide for. A more sensible option seem 
to be a mixture of both, since it . is, only where everything is in place that 
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governments may have the option of taking a back stage role. Moreover this 
vision has not come from the African context but the International World, a fact 
which limits its ability to be transformed into action. 
The enablement role as presented by UN agencies and International Finance and 
adopted by the Kenya Government implies a re-examination of housing policy and 
the institutions dealing with housing. On a practical note, it means strengthening 
some institutions which have the potential of reaching the low income groups but 
have not done so in the past. Such institutions include NACHU and probably the 
cooperative bank of Kenya, whereas the typical private sector institutions are left 
to cater for the higher income groups who have the requirements needed for 
market participation. The private sector in Kenya has the potential of serving 
those able to participate in the open market but to focus on the poor the 
Government has to intervene, especially in relation to giving incentives to the 
relevant actors in the housing sector. 
The very nature of the low income groups, characterised by irregular incomes 
within the informal sector of the economy, has worked to their disadvantage. The 
key requirement in almost all the policy instruments is that the low income groups 
should have a regular income over a period of time in order to qualify for 
consideration. Almost 80% of the so called low income households are 
disqualified by this requirement. This leaves about 20% who may qualify but the 
procedures inherent in accessing the schemes through the allocation process 
drastically reduce their access. 
As shown in Chapter Five, no consideration on the constitution of the low income 
groups was given by NCC before submitting their funding request to USAID. The 
only catch-word used was 'low income; its character, nature and how it will be 
identified remained unknown. Meanwhile, USAID was using idioms such as 
income percentiles and brackets, concepts which at that moment were foreign to 
NCC and Kenya in general. As argued in the theoretical chapter, the interest of 
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capital lies in activities and individuals which enhance capital accumulation. In 
this respect, - the percentage of low income group considered in the USAID 
funding was that cadre that was relevant to capital accumulation and had nothing 
to do with the low income per se. This intention was clarified by USAID by 
pointing out that their, focus was on the 'regularly employed'. A group which 
obviously does not fall within the local context of the most needy - no wonder the 
concept 'poor' hardly appears in USAID documentation and yet it may be most 
appropriate for the local context. 
The definition by USAID of what constituted the low income group did not 
contribute to the right policy focus. It only went further to prove the 
ineffectiveness of regular income as a yard of measure. It was hardly one year 
after occupation of UTP that an evaluation of USAID showed that the incomes 
of households occupying the scheme were higher than anticipated (ref. - table 5.6). 
This is in addition to the fact that those who were considered as qualified 
composed an insignificant percentage of the real low income group. 
The contention of the Kenya Government since the 1950 Vasey report has been 
that home ownership leads to a stable population able to provide the needed 
labour for capital accumulation. This contention may have been right during the 
Fifties but its current validity is questionable. The peripheral nature of capital 
development in Kenya has created a big pool of surplus labour in the urban areas. 
Subsequently, the promotion of home ownership within such a context has to 
justify the existence of such population, a task which the government has not 
considered. As opposed to the government, international financial agencies such 
as USAID are clear on the portion of the urban dwellers they want to support. 
This study has found that home ownership is not appropriate for the low income 
group because only a very small percentage benefit. In fact in most projects the 
policy goal of having households staying in their houses has not been achieved, 
instead such houses have turned out to be good investments to those with higher 
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incomes. In the case of UTP, two thirds of the units are rented out to those with 
higher incomes. Hoek-Smit (1989), in her study of Umoja two notes that within 
the context of low income housing market it is unrealistic to expect a high level 
of owner occupancy, when approximately 80% of the urban households are 
renters. This study acknowledges Hoek-Smit's perception that a single focus on 
owner occupied housing without the support for other tenure among the low 
income groups may not be the right policy option for Kenya. It is even 
questionable how the government arrived at the emphasis on home ownership, 
whereas the majority of urban residents are staying in rental housing which lack 
basic services and infrastructure. At the peak of the popularization of home 
ownership in 1983 only 115 of residents in Nairobi, owned their houses, 
demonstrating that it was not a dominant tenure and thus not a State priority .A 
correct policy emphasis should start with what is available, be it on standards or 
developing additional housing stock. 
To the low income groups whose first home is often seen as the rural home and 
the urban unit as a second home, the idea of home ownership in an urban context 
seem far from being achieved. This has left the low income groups who have 
been pushed off the market to be content mostly with being tenants within the 
informal housing sector. While programmes meant for them, such as UTP, are 
occupied by households with comparatively higher income and who do not prefer 
the units or the services provided. At the same time, the low income housing 
programmes have become desirable investment and speculative moves by higher 
income groups have contributed to their being inaccessible to the real low income 
groups. 
7.2.0 Limitations of institutional framework 
Development failures and frustrations have often been explained by the absence 
of institutions capable of formulating and implementing appropriate policies and 
plans (UNCHS, 1987b). This observation has become more representative since 
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the beginning of the Eighties, when failures of most institutions has led to a re- 
examination of development approaches, after disillusionment with creation of 
% new' institutions. In the implementation of UTP, the creation of PMU and the 
ensuing disagreement based on lines of authority retarded the implementation with 
some aspects being completely abandoned. 
Kenya has a number of institutions dealing with housing but their efficiency has 
been questionable. As for NCC, the failure has been remarkable to the extent that 
the council had to be dissolved for inefficiency in 1983 and it was not reinstated 
until the multi-party elections of December 1992. The most puzzling aspect being 
that the alternative management created by the government between 1983 and 
1992 made no difference and scholars of local government were left wondering 
what could be done to make the system work. A Local Authority such as NCC 
has numerous powers of authority to cope with and in many cases it is difficult 
to know who determines key events, activities and policy. More so, policy is a 
product of political decisions made by both identifiable and unidentifiable actors, 
the latter being largely applicable to Kenya. Despite this, blame on inefficiency 
is often directed to the city authorities. The 1989/93 Development Plan notes that; 
'the problems faced by local authorities have mainly stemmed from their 
inability to manage available resources efficiently, their failure to follow laid 
down procedures in staff recruitment, discipline, dismissals and the shortage 
of qualified staff in technical areas such as management, accounting, 
engineering, etc. The ministry of Local Government and Physical Planning 
also lacks adequate technical staff to provide the requisite guidance and 
coordination' (Government of Kenya, 1989, p. 231). 
The above quotation gives a good summary of what the Government perceives as 
the problems facing Local Authorities in Kenya but it does not explain why laid 
down procedures are not followed and the inherent lack of discipline. At the same 
time it is not useful in explaining why projects which have all the above elements 
238 
catered for do fail to achieve their goals. A number of government documents and 
scholars have criticised LAs but have failed to identify the key problem. To a 
large extent, this is because the Central Government shares the blame and in 
some instances has triggered the problems leading to inefficient management. 
Kasfir (1983), in discussing the decline of Local Government in Tropical Africa, 
notes that 'top government officials took authority away from Local Governments 
under the illusion that they were thereby acquiring more power. They discovered 
instead that they had gained the negatiye power to prevent other political actors 
from taking independent initiatives, but not positive power to implement policies 
that would improve social welfare'. 
The withering away of Local Government has been witnessed in Africa with some 
countries, such as Tanzania actually abolishing the institution during part of the 
1970s. In other countries such as Nigeria, Municipal governments saw many of 
their functions taken over by parastatals and Central Governments Ministries. 
Even Kenya, which maintained a comn-dtment to Local Authority, curtailed some 
traditional sources of revenue as new responsibilities were added to them. Ibe 
negative intervention of the Kenya government has been clearly demonstrated by 
the unnecessary management changes which take place in most LAs. For example, 
the capital city has been subjected to several such changes, especially the period 
between the dissolution of the council in 1983 and the Multi-Party elections of 
December 1992 as reflected on table 7.10. 
Most of the Town Clerks take such short periods in the office that it is difficult 
to assess their success and failures. An assesement by this study shows that during 
the implementation of UTP, politics seemed to have overshadowed professional 
staff at NCC with councillors determining most of what was going on. It is also 
the impression of this study that the several management teams which the city has 
been subjected to, have been merely political games and had very little to do with 
improving management. An alternative explanation would be the inability of 
Central Government to ratify employment of individuals with adequate 
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Name , Petiod in office 
Mr. Kimani Waiyaki 
(B. A., M. A) 1964-1965 
1990-1992 
Mr. D. M. Whiteside 
(Solicitor) 1965- 1967 temporary appointment on expatriate 
terms before a local town clerk could be 
located 
Mr. J. P. Mbugua 
(B. A., M. A. ) 1967- 1976 The longest serving town clerk. Resigned 
as political pressure was mounting in the 
council 
Mr. S. J. Gitonga 
(B. A., LLB) 1976- 1980 Dismissed due to political pressure from 
the mayor and the councillors. 
Mr. G. Wanjie 
(Advocate) 1980- 1983 Dismissed at the dissolution of the 
council by the government for 
incompetence and malpractice 
Mr. S. T. Gitonga 
(B. A, LLB) 1984- 1987 Dismissed in a big sweep of chief 
officers from city hall for inefficiency 
Mr. J. N. Mbugua 1987- 1987 
Mr. Musyoka-Annan 
(LLB, Advocate) 1988- 1989 
Mr. S. K. Kariuki 
(LLB) 1989-1990 
Mr. J. N. Thairu 
Mrs Z. Wandera 
(LLB) 
Reason for exit 
dismissed through political 
pressure from the mayor and councillors, 
council dissolved 
Removed along with other senior officers 
with no clear reasons 
Removal along with other senior officers 
with no clear reasons 
Seconded to NCC from Ministry of 
Local Government 
Removed without clear reasons 
]February 1992 To Date 
Table 7.10: Turn Over Rate of Town Clerks in NCC 
Source: Compiled from Ngaine, 1989 and Field Survey Interviews, 1992. 
capacity for management and/or influence the employment of individuals without 
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adequate ability. The latter seem predominant within NCC where the interplay of 
interests of both the Central Government and NCC itself has been contradictory, 
thereby retarding effective management. 
Whereas manpower is a key resource to any institution, it brings into an 
institution the complexities of human beings, each with their own mind, emotions, 
potentials and capabilities which are not necessarily compatible but differ from 
individual to individual (Ngaine, 1989). The rapid changes therefore contribute to 
lack of continuity, especially on projects under way. It may be feasible to 
implement a development programme under one leader as opposed to several as 
has been within the city of Nairobi. During the field survey the legal officer of 
the Ministry of Local Government'O pointed out that the problem of NCC has 
been more political than administrative. She noted that the different officers 
circulating within the council as commissioners or chief officers were not 
committed to management but personal benefits. Asked to comment on the 
efficiency of elected councillors and Government nominated commissioners, she 
noted that, whereas councillors are answerable to the electorate, the 
commissioners are answerable to 'god fathers' and in many cases do not have the 
problems of the city at heart. In some cases they are outsiders who do not reside 
within the city and are thereby not qualified to act on behalf of the city residents. 
During the 1970s most scholars believed that problems of LAs were basically lack 
of financial resources, and adequate qualified manpower but this view has 
changed tremendously. This change has come with the failure to successfully 
implement programmes which have been fully budgeted for and aspects such as 
qualified skilled personnel sorted out. The common practise being the hiring of 
additional staff with qualification at times better than those of the existing staff. 
Whereas this study does not object to the financial and manpower difficulties 
most LAs face in managing development programmes, it argues that a high 
loMiss M. W. Thairo, Legal Officer, Ministry Of Local Govenunent. Interview, 12/1/93. 
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percentage of the problems can be solved without necessarily pumping in more 
funds and hiring more staff as has been reflected in projects funded by 
International Finance. This view was also found to be predominant among ex- 
officials of NCC which include Mbugua (op. cit) among others. The implication 
of this being that there is substantial unutilized and misdirected energies within 
LAs in Kenya which, if well used and managed would realise some goal 
achievement. 
The misdirection of energies has been demonstrated in a number of areas of 
which allocation of plots, houses, business premises and recruitment of staff have 
been major. It has been noted that the fight among city officials seem to be a pre- 
occupation with who gets what plot rather than the question of planning and 
reserving land for development. It is not unusual to find public land for social 
amenities such as schools, health centres, road reserves and playing fields 
allocated to individuals and pressing needs of public interest ignored. At the same 
time recruitment within NCC is seen in terms of getting a person a job in the city 
rather than the creation of an environment which generates employment (Mbugua, 
1992). This could explain the fact that between 1976 and 1983, the city's labour 
force rose by 42%, from a total staff of 12,000 to 17,000. Ibis increase had very 
little to do with efficient management, and during the same period services 
deteriorated as gross mismanagement continued, leading to the dissolution of the 
council in March 1983. 
Mbugua (1992), in discussing LAs using the case of Nairobi, points out that what 
is required is not an overhaul of legislature but improvement in the mode of 
operations and implementation obligations under the law. Mbugua's observation 
is that LAs in Kenya have often operated on extreme ends. Either they make 
themselves slaves to the law or completely ignore them. However, Mbugua notes 
that members of the councils or commissioners and the senior officials must 
themselves bear responsibility for failure or success of the institution of Local 
Government. 
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The case of housing provision is worse with the few stock owned by NCC being 
handled contrary to public interest, as their condition deteriorates due to lack of 
proper management. Besides, NCC has almost stopped planning for housing 
development since the intervention of International Finance, as each financier 
intervenes with pre-packed housing approaches. Exposing NCC to adopt particular 
packages without going into details; just to find that appropriate implementation 
cannot occur due to a number of shortcomings which ought to have been dealt 
with before adopting a particular programme. An evaluation study of Umoja Two 
(Hoek-Smit, 1989) indicates that there has hardly been any strategic planning for 
housing within the city and no other projects or activities are planned after 
completion of the on-going World Bank and USAID housing programmes. It 
relates this to a lack of planning capacity within HDD, a point which this study 
does not subscribe to. The capacity exists but it is either not utilized appropriately 
or not utilized at all. In any case, many projects have failed even when the 
capacity has been assessed to be available and all requirements for goal realisation 
put into place, as did happen in UTP. 
The case of UTP demonstrates some of the administrative problems highlighted 
above. Unlike most other low income housing programmes NCC had undertaken, 
NCC was the sole implementing agency of UTP. This makes it difficult to 
apportion blame to other agencies, except the funding agency (USAID) which had 
to intervene on several occasions and may share some blame as will be analyzed. 
The failure of NCC to successfully implement development programmes, more 
so housing, can be assessed at three levels using the case of UTP, namely; lack 
of adoptive regulations, management structure and inherent personality conflicts, 
requirements of access and contributions of financial resources. As presented in 
chapter five, these four variables greatly influenced the actual implementation of 
the UTP and partly contributed to its failure. 
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7.2.1 Lack of Adoptive Regulations 
Regulations or standards in housing are normally focused on infrastructure, plot 
size, density and layout, building and plot coverage, physical and social 
environment, security, public transport, social institutions and facilities. The 
concern for these aspects, especial the design standards has been an important 
factor in the development of low income housing, leading to heated debates 
among contending views. UNCHS (1987b), notes that high standards are mostly 
advocated by politicians ostensibly to provide decent homes. Whereas low 
standards are sometimes advocated by foreign organisations and many technicians, 
apparently to ensure affordable houses. NCC, like other LAs, still adhere to the 
colonial regulations which have long outlived their use. This is reflected in 
unrealistic restrictive regulations and standards which the LAs cannot even ensure 
but are bottleneck as far as the provision of affordable housing is concerned. 
Often NCC views housing accommodating the low income groups as 
% unacceptable' but they have failed to come up with practical alternatives as those 
currently accommodating the low income groups. 
The development and/or review of regulations in Kenya is undertaken by many 
institutions as already indicated (ref: chap 3; 4.7.0). 'I'lie many institutions 
involved infers a complicated network needing good co-ordination among 
participating agencies. However, this has not been the case, findings of this study 
points out that there is very weak co-ordination among agencies dealing with 
housing. In the case of by-laws the experience has been lack of consensus over 
how low the standards should be. 'Me Ministry of Health has often been the 
problem since its position is stricter when it comes to lowering health standards. 
The standards and regulations within the city were found not to be in harmony 
with the developments taking place. This is despite several efforts aimed at 
making them feasible. For example, over the last ten years the Ministry concerned 
(Lands & Housing) has used a lot of resources in reviewing the standards but no 
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tangible results seem to have come out and they are still far from having an 
impact on LAs. In 1980 the ministry completed a study on 'provision of low 
income housing by-laws'. In 1983 an inter-ministerial steering committee was 
formed to implement the recommendations of the above mentioned study. By 
1986 revised By-Laws was already completed and forwarded for legislation 
procedures. At the time of field work it had not gone through and another task 
force had been formed to steer the legislation procedures and any necessary 
amendments relevant for legislation". A USAID official 12 commented on the 
long period it has taken the Government to review and amend the relevant 
legislations; arguing that so long as the Government is not ready to reduce 
planning and building standards, housing for low income groups will be not 
realised. 
The complicated network of institutions involved and inherent weak co-ordination 
contributes to lack of speedy action. An example was given during the field 
survey of the inability of the Attorney General's Chambers to advise the task force 
on legislation procedures whenever the sessions are on. It was noted that the 
Attorney General's chambers had no adequate staff to assign on a full time basis 
to the task force on legislation procedures, especially when it is on full time 
session. Another problem has been the ministry of Local Government which is 
often short of legal personnel and therefore cannot assist the LAs adequately. At 
the time of the survey, the Ministry had one legal officer who could hardly cope 
with the legal issues involved. An interview with the Legal Officer 13 revealed 
the difficulty in coping with her assignment involving advice and support to all 
the 135 LAs in the country. She noted that whereas there were many councils, she 
worked single handed and at times has to informally request assistance from the 
Attorney Generals Chambers. The need for a Legal Department within the 
"Interview with Mr. E. M. Onyango. op. cit. 
12 Howard Sumka. Interview 26/1/93 
13NESS M. W. Thairu. Legal Officer, NUnistry of Local Govenunent. Interview 12/1/93 
245 
Ministry had been acknowledged by the Department of Personnel Management 
but the Kenyan Treasury rejected it due to lack of funds. 
Within NCC, the Planning Department has been the most difficult in ensuring 
revision of adoptive regulations. The department is very conservative and did 
cause delays in the implementation of the DSS scheme. The contradictions is that 
the same department has failed to control development within the city to their 
required standards and those developing the so-called 'unacceptable' housing do 
not follow the department's requirements. Further contradiction exist in NCC as 
an institution. NCC has not come out openly on acceptable limits for low cost 
housing, at the same there is silence on a number of unacceptable activities, 
implying lack of policy. Instead, a project- based approach which limits benefits, 
of relaxed standards to only project beneficiaries has been applied. In this case, 
individuals who are keen on developing low cost housing have no policy to go 
by. A trend which leaves them with no option but to develop housing using their 
own standards as shown in the case of extensions in UTP. 
Field data presented in Chapter Six shows how 61.4% of the sample size of home 
owners have re-planned their units by developing extensions without necessarily 
going through the city authorities. Although 38.6% of the units still maintained 
original plans, extensive development was going on and the number of units 
retauiuing the original plan is bound to decrease. The rapid development without 
taking city regulations into consideration is closely linked to the incapacity of 
NCC to revise, and ensure that the regulations are followed. The general public, 
with an interest in housing as a good, has learnt that NCC cannot revise or 
enforce the regulations. In some cases the very officials go against the regulations 
or condone it and this creates a culture of disobedience and indiscipline in relation 
to regulations. In UTP, among the 56.1% of the resident landlords who sought 
authority to develop extensions, only 18.6% got authority. The basis of this could 
not be found and it can only be assumed that there are no set requirements for 
aspects not officially ratified by NCC. 
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Revised by-laws could mean a compromise of some aspect of health and the built 
environment as well as low initial investment but high maintenance cost. 
Nevertheless, the fact that over 52% of households already live in units whose 
standards are much below what the reviews would come up with, weakens the 
above arguments. NCC has to come up with an approach which does not exclude 
over 52% of the city households, but integrates them into the overall development 
of the city. According to Mr. Njau, a former director of HDD, the by-laws are not 
the key problem but the officers dealing with them. He argues that the relevant 
officers are often not willing to use their discretion at making rational decisions 
which they can then push for council approval under adoptive by-laws. He notes 
that in cases where some officers have done this, positive results have been 
achieved. Examples were given on the area of adopted roads where planning 
regulations have not been followed to the letter and have been accepted by the 
council (interview, April 1992). 
Reduced, standards may entice private developers who seem not to be willing to 
invest where the returns are low due to inhibitive by-laws. It has been argued that 
the capital returns are higher and faster in low income housing and if regulations 
were right, investors would focus on the sector. An architect developer 
interviewed argued that if one invests 3 million Kenya shillings in high income 
housing, the capital is recovered after 16 years if rent of 15,000 Kenya shillings 
is charged per month. On the other hand, an investment of fifty thousand Kenya 
shillings can be recovered in 7 years if a rent of between Kenya shillings 600 and 
1,200 is charged per month". Currently, those who opt for the latter investment 
are the small scale informal developers who invest in informal settlements. This 
is mainly possible because they operate outside all regulations and are not subject 
to any taxation. In this case, their investment contributes positively to low income 
housing, especially to the urban poor. Whether such individuals will firid revised 
standards relevant or will be pushed off the market is a question for research. 
14 MUMO Mwendwa, Architect. Interview, 2/2/93 
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7.2.2 Management Structure and Personality Conflicts 
The management structure which implemented UTP was not efficient and this was 
not due to lack of adequate skilled man power as is often alleged for the 
developing countries. The question of manpower and the management structure 
was compromised before signing loan agreements. Thus, the institutional failure 
of NCC to implement UTP successfully cannot merely be explained by lack of 
adequate skilled staff. The staff assigned the implementation of UTP had been 
assessed before implementation started and inadequacies seen corrected by hiring 
more staff headed by a director whose appointment was ratified by USAID. This 
was done in the name of strengthening the existing institution to perform better. 
There seems to be explanations beyond the availability of a management structure 
equipped with qualified personnel. Adequate management structure in terms of 
personnel was in place and still several aspects of the project went so wrong that 
thirteen years later, some components which ought to have been completed are 
still under consideration. The worst aspect being the creation of PMU which was 
expected to improve project management but became the key problem of 
implementation, raising a number of questions relating to the establishment of 
% new' institutions. 
PMU was established under the influence of the USAID to -facilitate project 
implementation but its creation became the spring board of most problems related 
to implementation. Its establishment brought both management and structural 
problems, based at times on personal conflicts, which could never be solved and 
finally resulted, first in the engineer being pushed out of the managed team, 
subsequently being imprisoned and later, the dismissal of the director as he faced 
corruption charges. The establishment of the unit was not an idea from NCC but 
that of USAID aimed at by-passing bureaucratic levels and procedures. In 
USAID's conception its creation would first and foremost ensure that AID's funds 
were used appropriately and cost- recovery achieved. Subsequently, it would 
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facilitate the implementation and improve the level of success. AID's interest may 
have been ensured but project success was never achieved, a fact also 
acknowledged by USAID (USAID, 1979). 
The Government of Kenya's 1989/93 Development Plan point out the inability to 
follow laid down procedures as a key problem in LAs. On the other hand; 
restrictive laid down procedures, when followed to the letter, become a bottleneck 
to development and this is the dilemma which the LAs are caught up in. When 
it comes to implementation of programmes funded by international finance, the 
situation is more complex, since the LAs have to strike a compromise between 
following procedures to the letter and flouting them in order to satisfy the 
demands of the funding agency. In this move, one is bound to have numerous 
problems since not all parties involved in implementation will have the same 
values attached to the compromise. This explains the major split in NCC as 
implementation of UTP continued under PMU with the engineer divorced from 
the project. 
Whereas it is possible to note that PMU had a number of problems, it is most 
difficult to pin point the nature of the problem and its source. For example, in 
examining both the PMU and the City Engineers Department one is left 
wondering who to blame for most of the problems. It is not the task of this study 
to judge which department or unit was right or wrong but to present an analysis 
of the shortcon-dngs which contributed to the problems; leaving the judgement to 
the reader. As noted in Chapter Five, the establishment of PMU was not given an 
adequate consideration by NCC and a number of issues, especially relating to the 
lines of authority, which is often the core of bureaucracy, were left hanging. This 
was as opposed to ethics of bureaucracy which most LAs have to go by, except 
in exceptional cases. In the projects funded by international finance the practice 
seem to be a deviation from the norm since there are no clarified procedures and 
system of dealing with them. A situation complicated by each international 
funding agency having its own requirements on management structure and lines 
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of authority. 
A survey of NCC during the field work and discussion with ex-officials-'who, 
participated in the implementation of UTP failed to reach a conclusion on how the 
idea of PMU was developed and adopted. However, an assesement shows that the 
idea was not given adequate consideration by NCC. This could have - been 
intentional or an oversight. It is not clear why NCC did not clarify how PMU and 
the City Engineer's Department would relate to each other. The only indication 
was that the director of PMU would fall under the Engineers Department. This 
could imply either total autonomy or semi-autonomy depending on how one 
interprets it. Ibis fluid approach was applied as suitable to the various interests 
involved, until the divorce of the City Engineer from the project, and subsequently 
the dismissal of the project director as he faced court charges of corruption. 
The fluid approach created a situation whereby issues which ought to have been 
clarified before implementation got clarified as implementation proceeded. This 
does not infer that all the details ought to have been clarified since, argued 
throughout this thesis, policy is a process and keeps on shaping itself until 
completion of its goal. Notwithstanding, issues relating to lines of authority have 
to be clarified when dealing with big bureaucracies such as that of NCC- For 
example, how does one compromise the fact that the City Engineer was thrown 
out of management of a project that directly falls under his department? Did this 
imply that UTP was being implemented outside the normal city regulation or did 
it imply that the role of the City Engineer had been taken by both the PMU and 
the town clerk's office? Whichever the answer, something had gone very wrong 
to warrant the action and the city engineer put it very clearly in his report; 'the 
scheme was no longer going to achieve the goal it was planned for'. 
Personality Conflicts 
Personality conflicts based on protective interests of individuals and their wish to 
250 
remain in their official positions is noted to be a major problem in managing LAs 
in Kenya. 'LAs need more than help and one big problem for NCC is 
personalised projects - fame of the person who did it as opposed to 
professionalism and objectivity"'. Basically, this is the element of money, 
projects and public image which has penetrated even Central Government. Some 
scholars refer to this as personal interests but this seem to isolate the individual 
from the institution and the overall structure of development which is often not 
the case. For example, Tony Judge (1981), in reflecting on his position as the 
Chairman of the Housing Management Committee of the greater London council 
between 1974 and 1977, points out that a vast bureaucracy is concerned more 
with self perpetuation than with either efficiency or humanity. This is a comment 
directed at bureaucracy within a developed economy, where the expectation of 
efficiency is higher than that of the comparatively less developed economies. 
Within the NCC bureaucracy, it is almost impossible to identify the meeting and 
breaking point of personal and institutional interests. The analysis of UTP shows 
that if an officer is able to rally majority support of the contending forces within 
a Local Authority, the chances of achieving their goal and that of the institution, 
be it right or wrong, is enhanced. Ibe problem in this approach is that in most 
cases the personal goals are presented in such a way that they manifest as that of 
the institution. Whenever there are in fights such as that experienced between the 
PMU director and the City Engineer, each party presents the case as that of the 
institution. How then does one separate the protective personal interests from that 
of the institution and how does one ensure that the personal drive does not by- 
pass the institutional drive? These are the dilemmas of most bureaucracies, 
especially those operating within an environment of scarcity as is the case in 
Africa. 
In assessing projects funded through international finance one would expect a 
15Mumo Mwendwa, architect. Interview 2/2/93 
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reduction of personal drive due to the availability of the required resources but 
this is not always the case. An explanation of this is thought to still lie in the 
scarcity theory which has created the culture of mismanagement, exposing the 
council to competition among contending forces. It is the contention of this study 
that in an institution where clear policies are in place, strategies have been set, 
required resources are available and the officers are well paid, the levels of 
protective personal interest reduce and subsequently efficiency may be enhanced. 
Implementation problems of the UTP scheme started with a mere disagreement 
on the progress of the project and the number of supervisory staff required. Three 
months from beginning of works of the first two contracts, a meeting to review 
the progress of implementation showed a great rift between the newly created 
PMU and the City Engineer's Department. In assessing the progress of project 
implementation, the City Engineer felt that it was good and the contractor needed 
to be given credit. This view was not shared by other parties which included the 
project director and USAID. Ibis early disagreement on the performance of the 
project seemed basic, but it was the beginning of what became a long bitter battle 
costing individuals warnings, court summonses and even dismissal. To project 
implementation, it was disastrous with some aspects of it totally being abandoned. 
The disagreement on the progress of the project arose over the number of 
supervisory staff required at the site. Whereas the PMU director and USAID 
wanted a total of 75 staff, the City Engineer thought otherwise and insisted on 
retaining the total number of 59, as indicated in the Project Agreement 
Documents. This included one project director, two assistant architects, one 
project engineer, two quantity surveyors, six assistant quantity surveyors, four 
resident engineers, twelve inspectors of works, thirty works supervisors and one 
accountant (USAID, 1979; p. 81). 
The option taken by USAID and the director of PMU was to go straight to the 
Town Clerk who ratified the request and recruitment of the required extra staff 
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took place without the involvement of the Engineer. This seemed a bad 
precedence and should have been avoided. It contributed to problems of 
management, especially the budgetary aspect. A USAID project monitoring team 
from Washington visited the project and registered doubts about the recruitment. 
The team felt that it was a heavy burden on the project (Weekly Review, 1976). 
This gave support to the Engineer's position and thus intensified the disagreement. 
From this incident, the Engineer's Department and PMU lost amicable working 
relationship and the potential to operate as an implementation unit. While the 
Town Clerk's Department continued to ratify the decisions and actions of both the 
PMU and USAID, without taking a neutral assessment. 
If one was to go by the planned goals, it would seem the engineer was right in 
his rejection, but the fact that USAID's local office also ratified the move makes 
it more complicated. Further more, a supervisory USAID team from Washington 
shared the position of the City Engineer thereby strengthening the premise. 
Whereas it is not possible to give a clear cut position on this issue of 
disagreement, at least one shortcoming can easily be identified - the inability of 
both the PMU director and USAID to compromise with the City Engineer on 
issues of disagreement. 'Meir option of avoiding the City Engineer and using the 
Town Clerk's office for ratifying decisions was not healthy for the bureaucracy 
in its project implementation. It set a poor precedent which became a source of 
many other problems of which the rider statements (ref: chap. 5.4.2) of both the 
engineer Cconstruction of this tender is not recommended') and the UCC ('should 
there be any surcharge on this sub-contract the engineer should be personally held 
responsible') demonstrated the extent of personality and/or interest rift. 
In both cases of the rider statements, implementation went ahead but was 
subjected to individuals and not the institution as such. Under nonnal 
circumstances the Engineer has to ratify all tenders of works before they are 
presented to the relevant committee and whether they are ratified or not, blame 
goes to the department and not to the engineer as an individual. As reflected in 
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the rider statement relating to the Engineer, he was personally going to be held 
responsible and it becomes difficult to assess whether these were individual or 
institutional interests being pursued and punished. The rift finally led to the City 
Engineer as a person being divorced from the implementation of UTP but not his 
department. The project implementation team still had to deal with the City 
Engineers Department but through junior officers. 
The rift produced a management contradiction which was not healthy for the 
project. It was quite inconsistent to divorce the City Engineer from the 
implementation of a key housing project which his department was implementing, 
and at the same time retain him as the head of the Department. It became a 
blessing in disguise when the Engineer fought with the project director and ended 
up in jail, thereby making an exit. With such type of wrangling, one expects to 
find a number of daily activities and/or development goals either going wrong or 
not well conceptualised. It is therefore not strange that NCC has had problems of 
conceptualising a number of issues intricate to housing the low income groups, 
notwithstanding, its inability to have a strategy for housing and identify who the 
low income groups are within the city. 
Assessing the above situation, the element of professionalism, vis a vis none 
professionalism, is exhibited. According to Chiuri", the director of UT? was 
neither a technical nor professional person but a politician from Pakistan who 
closely colluded with councillors in doing wrong things. He noted the case of the 
development of the 170 additional units and the allocation of the core units to 
'ghost names' which the survey found out that the councillors could not remember 
ten years later, as they got reinstated as commissioners to give support to the 
ruling party as multi-party elections advanced. Essentially, councillors had a lot 
to gain from the director of PMU as opposed to the engineer who was answerable 
16Mr. C. M. Chiuri was employed (1976) by NCC and posted to the City Engineer's Department when 
the implementation of UTP was about to begin. He worked within the Department until July 1992 when 
he was promoted to head HDD, as the director, Mr. Mugo, got promotion to head the Housing Department 
within the Ministry of Housing and Lands. Interview 3t2/93. 
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to the council and had to defend the interests of a Department which was not 
temporary as was PMU. The shortcomings of UTP are demonstrated to-date and 
the Engineer's Department inherited them and has to cope with the situation which 
could have been avoided. 
7.2.3. Institutional Requirements of Access. 
Access to urban resources and services is a problem for the majority of low 
income households and despite the goal of most governments to improve the 
situation, it remains problematic. Although most governments have the goal of 
providing adequate services to their citizens written down on policy papers, it has 
been difficult to practice within environments dominated by scarcity of resources. 
The hardest hit are often individuals who have no influence which is closely 
linked to ability to wield power which in turn is achieved by having access to 
resources. Implied is the fact that low income groups and/or individuals lack 
resources and subsequently have no power or influence. How then, are they 
expected to have access or is it a zero sum game? This study cannot compromise 
this situation and this section only presents some salient issues which ought to be 
taken into consideration when dealing with access to housing by low income 
groups. 
Most governments perpetuate a position that all citizens should live in "acceptable' 
housing defined by set standards which are often unrelated to the capacity of 
those who need housing. Most of such definitions never go into details on how 
housing produced through such standards can be accessed, especially by the low 
income groups. Nor do they appreciate the fact that problems of access to urban 
land and shelter in most African cities is ultimately linked to the whole question 
of processes, standards of urban planning (HRDU, 1989) and income. 
Kenya is among the countries which have over the years been concerned (at least 
on paper) with the 'right' amount of resources to be, allocated to housing to 
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provide all households with 'decent' homes in the right location at all times. A 
correct policy direction if resources are mobilised and allocated to housing but as 
indicated earlier, this goal has remained a rhetoric as the GDP allocated to 
housing dwindle. Statistics from the Ministry of Lands and Housing budget on 
housing show a tremendous decrease since 1988/89. During this budget period the 
budget was Kenya pounds 30,000 and during the following budget (89/90) it was 
23,000, falling to only 15,000 during the 1990/91 (GOK, 1992). These figures 
imply a reduced access rate for those in need of housing, not necessarily the low 
income groups. 
The Kenya Government, in the goal of reaching the low income groups, operate 
on some assumptions which are of concern to this study. One of them is that most 
urban households have regular quantifiable income and are conversant with the 
concepts inherent in housing provision. Often this is not the case, a large number 
of households have no access to what is claimed by government to be accessible 
to them. For some who may -qualify as per income, raising the required down 
payment has been a bottleneck. In this sub section the case of UTP is used to 
demonstrate the problems of access. At the same time, the limitations of analyzing 
problems of access using centrally planned Government low income housing 
programmes is also acknowledged and the fact that most of the programmes 
exclude the most needy noted. As opposed to the rural areas where there may still 
be possibilities of getting building materials and labour without incurring any cost; 
in the urban areas, cost has to always be incurred except in cases where those 
who have arrived are still being accommodated as they look for income 
generating activities. Thus, unless one is still accommodated (ref 6.1.3), one has 
to either be paying rent or mortgage. The exception being those who have 
completed their mortgage payments, bought cash or inherited housing units. To 
pay mortgage or rent, income has to be available and hence the rationale of the 
income requirement. A fact which this study does not dispute. However, the 
aspect of regular and quantifiable income which most low income households in 
the cities of developing countries do not have, is disputed. - 
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In many cities of the developing countries, a large proportion of urban households 
rely on the informal sector for both income generation and provision of services. 
Whereas the sector has been appraised as providing employment and services, its 
opportunities are still extensively irregular with incomes being almost impossible 
to predict over a given period of time. In Kenya, especially Nairobi, it has been 
noted that about 52% rely on the informal sector. This is more explicit in the area 
of housing where it is estimated that the population residing in informal 
settlements range from 600,000 to 1.2 million (USAID, 1991). In tI-ds case, any 
appropriate planning should plan and design strategies which accommodate such 
households, but this has not been the case. All low income housing strategies are 
designed with the assumption of regular and quantifiable wage income over a 
given period, which in many cases exceeds twenty years. An approach which not 
only excludes those in the informal sector but also a significant percentage of 
those formally employed. 
An analysis of data from UTP shows that among the tenants residing in UTP, 
44.6% had attempted to access at least a centrally planned Government aided low 
income housing scheme without success, whereas 55.4% had not. The general 
feeling of the sample was that low income households cannot access low income 
housing programmes. A response shared by both tenants and the resident home 
owners. 'Me 44.6% of tenants who had applied indicated various reasons for 
failure of access, which included; failure to qualify due to income bracket (which 
could have been higher or lower but the survey did not probe this detail), failure 
to get application forms, raise deposit and irregularity in application procedures. 
Problems of access are not only experienced during pre-qualification as the 
tenants experienced but also after qualification as the case of the resident 
landlords demonstrate. They noted the problems of access they faced on their road 
to home ownership. This insinuates that even in cases where one has managed to 
go through the income qualification and 
- 
other requirements,, there are still a 
number of difficulties (ref: figure 6.21) and drop out rates continue to be 
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experienced. Down payment for tenant purchase and cases of corrupt practices 
was noted by UTP resident home owners. Although the latter did not score high 
points it has been a significant variable, however, many respondents often are not 
willing to discuss it. In total, 58.8% of resident home owners interviewed pointed 
out that they had difficult in raising the required deposit. 
Taking the situation of the low income groups into consideration, this study notes 
that raising required deposit is even more problematic. They may be able to 
afford mortgage payments but in'many cases cannot raise the required lump-sum 
for down payment. In UTP, savings and cooperative were key sources for down 
payment. The low income groups who mostly operate within the informal sector, 
have been known to have very limited savings or none (Mitullah, 1991). Often 
they allocate most of their income to subsistence. In this case, strategies have to 
be designed for handling the down-payment which in recent years has also 
become a problem among higher income groups. 
The positive side of availability of down payment is demonstrated in UTP through 
resident home owners who raised their deposits by accessing financial assistance 
through co-operatives, employers and financial institutions (ref: figure 6.22). 
These sources of funding can only be operational to those who are steadily 
employed or have significant savings. This leaves out a high percentage of low 
income groups who have to resort to both family support and informal networks 
which are often limited. In the case of UTP the two sources only contributed to 
8%. Moreover, housing requires long term funding which the unsteady incomes 
of none wage low income groups cannot satisfy. Thus, the issue of access to 
housing should not merely be reduced to having an ability to pay mortgage or 
tenant purchase but should also concern itself with the down payment. 
Unique aspects of access have also been found among those who have qualified 
and managed to raise the down payment. The HRDU (1989) study gives 
explanation of limitations of access to low income housing after basic 
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qualification as per income and other related processes. It argues that if the 
developers charge highly for -development, profit and risk undertaking, 
development costs go up and those in residence have to have comparatively 
higher incomes than the planned target. Alternatively, if repayments of recovery 
costs appear too high even before property is developed, the tendency will be that 
those who cannot afford will sell. Hence, the position of the study is that in 
determining affordability criteria, it is not only the cost of land servicing that 
should be considered but also included should be the cost of a basic room which 
the beneficiaries would be expected to occupy wl-dle developing other rooms. To 
this study, if the focus on low income groups has to rely on home ownership then 
the issues of down payment and escalating interest rates have to be taken into 
consideration. As demonstrated in the case of UTP; 40% of the original allottees 
had already made an exit. Although the reasons for exit could not be assessed, 
chances are high that the majority who have had to sell belong to comparatively 
low income groups and could have had other financial priorities. 
7.2.4 Financial Resources & Institutional Performance 
The availability of required financial resources is basic if an institution such as 
NCC has to perform. However, mobilisation of resources has not been efficiently 
done with poor collection of taxes, fees and cost recovery of projects being 
predominant. This has left the council with heavy reliance on International 
Finance with all its inherent problems. The housing sector is one area which has 
been subjected to almost a total reliance on such funding. This study notes that 
this outcome has not been positive for local mobilisation of required resources for 
housing development. A reflection of this is seen in the reduced rate of low 
income housing production using local financial resources, as over reliance on 
International Finance continues. This is demonstrated by the fact that, the last 
housing development (Huruma and Kariobagi South) undertaken by NCC using 
local funds was in 1979. 
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Housing finance is a major variable in determining the trend of housing provision. 
Renaud (1987) acknowledges that 'there has been a trend to explain the current 
condition of housing finance system by factors such as the literacy level, the 
income level, savings rates and the availability of managerial skills in providing 
financial services, but points out that the actual structure and performance of 
housing finance institutions is more directly shaped by three immediate and 
decisive causes: the past and current financial policies followed by a country, its 
housing policies, and the functioning of its economy. Whereas this study is not 
on housing finance, which has been well covered elsewhere (for example, World 
Bank, 1990; Renaud, 1988), the above observation applies to most of the 
developing countries where macro issues of the housing sector are often hardly 
tackled as Governments adopt micro project approaches through International 
Finance. 
As argued throughout this study, housing has many aspects which fall mainly 
under three categories; consumption, production and investment. The three do at 
times overlap but in the case of the low income groups, the overlap is rare, except 
in cases where the house is also used as a production base. Most low income 
groups, need housing basically for shelter and in some cases opt to undertake 
income generating activities around or within the home. In this respect, the low 
income groups rarely use housing as a commodity as most higher income groups 
do. Subsequently, an approach with an emphasis and/or motive of investment may 
have limitations of reaching the low income groups as has been experienced in 
most of the developing countries. 
The role of international finance in housing development in the developing 
countries has been key since the beginning of the Seventies and needs a special 
mention. Most International Funding Agencies have presented their entry into 
housing development as a move towards changing the conditions of the urban 
poor. However, their desire to penetrate what they refer to as a 'low income 
housing market' has been noted and has very little to do with changing the 
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conditions of such households. International financial agencies often come out 
clearly on their explicit goal of investment, whereas the development aspect 
remain more of a political rhetoric. Despite this, the contribution of international 
finance in housing development, especially as relates to increasing stock has to 
be acknowledged. In most LAs, financial resources are limited and majority of 
them have failed to mobilise local resources and have heavily depended on 
international financial systems. Since the beginning of the Seventies; these 
agencies have greatly contributed to capital development in housing within major 
towns of Kenya. 71irough their funding, improvement of available housing stock 
and additional housing development has occurred. In turn, access to housing by 
various income groups has been enhanced. Notwithstanding, the initial goal of 
reaching the low income groups is far from being achieved. 
In Kenya, like most other developing countries, housing development has been 
dominated by both the World Bank and USAID. Both DSS and KTP formed entry 
points for the World Bank and USAID, respectively. During their initial entry into 
housing development they placed'emphasis on their goal of reaching the low 
income groups,, specifically in Nairobi, where the first projects were located. The 
Bank (World Bank, 1986) noted that the broad goal of DSS was to demonstrate 
the feasibility of providing affordable housing services to the lower income groups 
in Nairobi on a large scale and at lower costs than those of previous projects 
implemented by the Government and NCC. The programme included provision 
of trunk sewer infrastructure and an inherent technical assistance aimed at 
improving Governments's project implementation capabilities and helping 
formulate future shelter policies and programmes. 
In recent years, the Bank's emphasis has shifted from isolated micro projects to 
macro National and city-wide scale necessary to influence the broad policies and 
the institutions that govern the performance of the urban economy. In doing this, 
the Bank aims to address broader objectives of economic development and macro- 
economic performance (Mayo, 1991). On the other hand, USAID intervention in 
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Kenya started with KTP Scheme with a stated objective of encouraging the 
Government of Kenya to implement its policy for low income families but the 
very project was converted to middle income. The project was to act as a pilot 
demonstration of a home ownership programme for NCC which had in the past 
been developing mostly rental housing. 
As reflected above, both these two key agencies have had the objective of 
improving housing provision with the aim of reaching the urban low income 
groups for over twenty years and it is the concern of this Section to try and 
explain why there has not been any major change in the housing conditions of the 
low income urban dwellers. Additionally, an attempt is made to bring out some 
of the contradictions and inconsistencies in their policies and funding behaviour 
and the inherent failure of both Central and Local Governments to change the 
situation. One aspect noted is the fact that in all the key housing policy 
approaches undertaken by the Kenya Government, International Finance has had 
on extensive influence. UNCHS (1987b) in discussing housing in Kenya notes that 
by 1980 the World Bank had not only persuaded the Kenya Government to allow 
squatter settlements in place but had in fact committed the Government to 
improve them. Subsequently, whether they have been moves towards the right 
direction or not, the funding agencies share responsibility and the current situation 
under the SAPs, which lays total blame on Governments, is not quite 
representative. 
Under the SAPs, the contention is that development within countries such as 
Kenya prior to SAPs (mostly before mid 1980s) was rooted in development 
strategies that ignored economic efficiency and international competitiveness, and 
that drew finance from abroad while distorting the domestic financial system 
(Bartone et al, 1990). Indeed, a correct observation, especially in the area of 
housing development. Notwithstanding, it is the same international financial 
agencies that supported the past - approaches who are currently making these 
observations which may have been obvious when they were conceived but due to 
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the nature of the global political economy were pursued. 
The problematic nature of International Finance, especially that of the World 
Bank was highly criticized during the 1970s. Whereas prior to 1973, the Bank had 
mostly focused its attention on power and transportation loans, the Nairobi speech 
of 1973, by the Banks's president, Robert McNamara, was a land mark in the 
Bank's activities. McNamara highlighted the dimensions of world poverty, and the 
little done in the previous two decades to increase productivity in the poor 
countries (McNamara, 1973). McNamara's perception on poverty got translated 
into World Bank's policy papers focusing on areas such as rural development, 
basic education, basic health and low cost housing. Ibus begun the emphasis on 
the poor without actually knowing who they were, leading to inability to reach 
them. 
Among the first critiques of International Finance in relation to the focus on the 
poor using the World Bank was Aart Van De Laar. In his analysis, the Bank 
operated under very serious institutional constraints and an emphasis on the poor 
would not be feasible. Strong focus on the 'absolute poor' would imply 
concentrating on a limited group of countries. Only by adding the 'relative pooe 
can a much wider geographical spread be justified, albeit only partially (Aart Van 
De Laar, 1976). Essentially, this argument is opposed to the inherent assumption 
in International Finance or the World Bank/USAID that their activities are capable 
of adopting socialistic approaches capable of changing the conditions of the poor. 
With the emphasis on the private sector as opposed to the public sector, 
International Finance has displayed a number of contradictions. These are 
reflected in what International Finance says should be done, and what it can do 
or does. 
Frances Moore also dismisses the ability of International Finance to change the 
situation of poverty within the developing countries. He maintains that, 
International Finance always aims at expanding private investment and it does not 
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seem feasible that poverty, per se, can be eradicated or improved by use of 
International Finance (Moore, 1982). The history of the developing countries has 
shown that most International Financial agencies do, channel profits from the 
developing countries to their metropolis. At the same time, it only participates in 
activities which enhance capital accumulation and not the reverse. Why then do 
countries such as Kenya expose themselves to this situation? A simple answer lies 
in the nature of global political economy which the developing countries have to 
understand, manoeuvre around and cope with. 
The nature of global political economy is such that no nation escapes its impact 
which in many cases is positive to the developed countries and disastrous to the 
developing countries such as Kenya. The central force in the global political 
economy is the ability to mobilise and have resources within a country's control 
which it can then manipulate in a manner suitable to its economy. Since most of 
the developing countries, especially within the sub-saharan African, have not 
managed to mobilise adequate and sufficient resources, they have become subjects 
of manipulation. In this respect, international funding geared for housing 
development should be understood within the context of the overall global 
political economy. 
Since the 1964 UN study (Bloomberg, et al., 1964) on housing in Kenya, The 
International Funding Agencies have been very active in the housing sector. The 
study had concluded that the housing goals could only be met at that time through 
the assistance of foreign capital. The USAID housing Guaranty Programme was 
specifically recommended. Kenya has thus experienced very active involvement 
of both USAID and World Bank in shelter provision. Their resources have mainly 
been directed at provision of infrastructure and limited services. In recent years, 
USAID funding has expanded to include bus parks, markets and slaughterhouses 
under Kenya Small Towns Shelter and Community Development Project. 
Whereas this dependence has resulted in an increase of the number of units 
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produced it has not solved the plight of the low income groups. According to the 
former director of HDD of NCC, heavy reliance on international funding cannot 
solve the housing problem. However, he noted that great hope lies on the 
mobilisation of local resources. An approach which the department had put to test 
but due to the financial problems of the NCC, the 53 million Kenya shillings 
which had been generated was diverted to other expenditures with the hope of 
recovery (Mugo, 1992). But at the time of field work, there was no indication as 
to when the amount which was intended for a housing fund would be reallocated. 
International financing has been problematic to NCC, mainly due to lack of co- 
ordination among themselves, government ministries and other development 
agencies working in the area of housing. Basically, they have tended to rely on 
consultants often appointed and/or approved by the funding agencies without first 
coming up with a relevant package for their institutions. Subsequently, project 
funds get depleted without relevant project packages. Apart from the fact that such 
consultants may not come up with relevant projects, the approach perpetuates 
dependence and inability to plan and design appropriate housing development 
programmes. An outcome which is not conducive to development, especially 
when the fact that the goals of International Finance are not necessarily those of 
the countries being supported is taken into consideration. Field survey revealed 
that most funding agencies have their origins as their points of reference, making 
it difficult to integrate some relevant local project components as seen by 
implementing institutions. For example, in UTP, the lack of consideration for 
services at the planning stage led to the project starting as a 'half project' - 
planned housing without services. 
Ile inflexible terms of International Financial agencies was noted during the field 
survey. It is often linked to the desire to achieve acceptable cost recovery. 
Discussions with a number of policy makers indicated that it is both positive and 
negative. The positive aspect being that it ensures that project objectives are not 
floated by the relevant officers; whereas the negative aspect is that it does not 
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give officers dealing with the project a leeway to handle objectives in a manner 
suitable to the situation and the inherent institutional framework. 
It seems the LAs have no way out, unless they are able to generate local resources 
for housing development. This step seem feasible and should be considered by 
both Local and Central Government. Although discussions with the majority of 
both LAs and Central Government officials showed that the future of housing 
development would be gloomy without international finance, most of the officers 
felt that there are possibilities of generating funds locally. According to them the 
main area of focus would be joint ventures between the public and private sector. 
Ibis would be supplemented by a co-operative approach. An approach which 
needs relevant government policies in the areas of pension funds, insurance 
policies and building societies. These institutions hold some financial reserves 
which could be pumped into housing, more so with the current situation where 
the government has continued to cut down its GDP allocation to housing. 
Generally, the emphasis of LAs on housing finance has not been quite 
appropriate. Mbugua (1989) argues that over-emphasis on raising additional funds 
for housing has often been done at the expense of an investigation of how 
circulating funds could be recycled much faster. Subsequently, Mbugua notes that 
'in practical terms, recycling of for example, a 25 year external loan (as is often 
the case) five times would very nearly produce five times as many units for the 
same money'. As Mbugua put it, "this must be an easier way to finance more 
houses than to hope for five-fold increase in new funds'. 
Mbugua's contention is realistic but it is not problem free. Housing finance drawn 
from International Finance has many components which may not necessarily result 
into liquid cash. As experience shows, it is often the infrastructure and technical 
assistance whose liquid cash may be actually accessed. Whereas the remaining 
component may be available in the form of deposits paid by allottees and to some 
extent material loans. In this respect, converting the million'Kenya pounds 
266 
provided by International Finance into housing finance for additional housing 
development has a number of prerequisites of which loan recovery from the 
allottees, which has had poor records in most developing countries, is basic. 
Subsequently, it needs a well-coordinated macro policy in the housing sector. 
Another problem of International Finance in relation to institutional performance 
is the new procedures and/or institutions it creates for bureaucracies which are 
already clogged up. Most International Financiers require governments to adopt 
their designed methods of planning and managing projects. A task which requires 
additional inputs in terms of time, personnel and finance; aspects which most 
financiers opt to fund, without giving consideration to its impact. Whenever this 
occurs, the existing institutions face management difficulties which cannot merely 
be resolved by paying the cost of additional inputs as reflected in the case of 
PMU. 
The case of UTP demonstrates what International Finance can do if not weH 
conceptualised. As shown in chapter five, USAID had tremendous influence on 
the project during the planning stage and this continued during and after 
implementation. At the planning stage, USAID insisted on establishment of PMU 
without clarifying its role or assessing what impact it was going to have on the 
existing departments of NCC. 1beir aim being to have a unit which would ensure 
that their objectives are achieved irrespective of the prevailing institutional ethics 
and constraints. It is such a type of approach to project planning and 
implementation, that greatly contributed to problems of implementation. 
7.3.0 Conclusion 
This chapter has brought out the problematic nature of the Kenya Government's 
policy basis of housing the low income groups as well as the inherent obstacles 
in the institutional framework. At policy level, -the Government's intention of 
housing low income groups has not been demonstrated. Instead the Government 
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has been adapting programmes conceptualised by international funding agencies 
without sufficient assesement, thus limiting success. One aspect of this approach 
has been the adoption of the policy instrument of housing the low income groups 
through home ownership; without having clearly outlined targets at policy level, 
how to identify them and the lack of consensus among political and administrative 
officials over the issue. 
Policy outcome was also found to be influenced by the lack of coordination 
among participating agencies, especially Government Ministries and agencies. 
This demonstrates the failure of the State to work through and with other centres 
of power in order to ensure policy success, thus leading to duplication of efforts 
and waste of resources. Subsequently, the problems of policy at Central 
Government level are shifted to the implementing institutions such as NCC, who 
are required to implemented policies which have not been wen conceptualised. 
The institutional problems of implementation revolve around lack of any housing 
strategy within NCC. This has contributed to inability to develop appropriate 
methods of housing the low income groups, reflected in the inability to mobilise 
local resources for the development of low income housing as over-reliance on 
international funding continues. An approach adapted by NCC from the funders 
with hardly any assesement on the appropriateness of its various components; 
especially its focus on home ownership and related methods of identifying the 
target beneficiaries. 
The power interplay which goes on, during the tendering of contracts and 
allocation of housing, conceptualised and funded by international financial 
agencies, has also been problematic. Due to the lack of any institutionalised 
methods of implementing low income housing programmes, the implementation 
of UTP was largely subjected to individuals as opposed to the implementing 
institutions. The implication being lack of continuity, once the individuals were 
out of office, leading to inability to successfully implement the project. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
; SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.0.0 Introduction 
This last chapter gives a thematic summary of the study on State Policy and 
Urban Housing, drawing conclusions and recommendations. The themes include; 
State, housing and development; housing policy, urban growth and management; 
planning and development of UTP, empirical survey of UTP and the politics of 
policy implementation. The conclusions link up the first five chapters of the study 
and the last four, pulling out some emerging trends in the area of low income 
housing. Whereas, the recommendations are made at four levels, namely; areas 
for further research, Central Government, NCC and other actors (individuals, 
communities, groups and NGOs). 
8.1.0 Summary 
The housing problem reflected in the continued development of low income 
housing but without houses for the low income groups is presented and analyzed 
in this study. The introductory chapter states the problem, noting that the mere 
development of additional units in the name of the poor or low income groups has 
not led to the units being accessible to them. This has resulted in a concentration 
of such groups of people in informal settlements. Areas which lack most basic 
services, and since 1974 the Government. has been trying to support without 
success. 
8.1.1 State, Housing and Development 
The conceptual and theoretical issues and debates on housing provision and 
consumption have been discussed in this study. Both formal and informal housing 
are placed within the context of urban housing and the concept of 'unplanned'. in 
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reference to informal settlements dismissed. Rather, the level of service provision 
is seen as a basis of the differences between the two settlements. 71be Abrams's 
and Turner's self help approach to housing based on dwellers controlling their 
homes, which influenced most state planned low cost housing, arguing that the 
state is too bureaucratic to be efficient in providing peoples housing is assessed. 
In order to understand the behaviour of the State in relation to housing provision, 
development ideology in Kenya is discussed. It is noted that, the peripheral 
capitalist nature of Kenya's economy has not evolved to achieve a fun capitalist 
state. 7bus, both typical and none typical capitalist development are prevalent. 
This has implication for housing provision and consumption, since a compromise 
between market forces and welfare needs of those unable to compete in the 
market have to be considered. Whereas, the State claims to ensure this through 
housing programmes geared for lower income groups; this study argues that the 
State has not been focusing on the lower income groups but using them through 
rhetoric to pursue the interests of the -better off groups in order to access 
international financial assistance. 
In order to grasp the State contradictions, the evolution of thinking on 
development and its relevance to housing is analyzed. The classical approach to 
development which views development in terms of economic growth measured 
in GNP is seen as inadequate. Instead, the position of the opposite school of 
thought which perceives development as a multidimensional process is utilised. 
It conceptualises development from 'various perspectives and disciplines; 
underscores the importance of basic needs such as food, shelter, clothing, health 
and education. This is in addition to economic growth and political realisation 
which enhance individual development. 
The definition of development to the disadvantaged rural and urban poor is that 
process which involves promotion of their well being through active participation; 
a dynamic process geared towards maximum utilisation of resources within their 
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reach. Such a type of development is expected to strengthen people's ability to 
move from one quality of existence to another higher level of life. It is this 
definition that those who develop and/or stay in informal settlements in Kenya 
conceptualise as they struggle to house themselves. In this respect this study 
contends that what has taken place in Kenya during the last twenty five years in 
the name of development has ostracized the people from development. Traditional 
societies have been broken up and migration to the urban areas has made people 
dependent on the state and therefore 'unemployed' and unable to access what the 
state refers to as "'adequate housing'. 
Applying the political economy approach to housing provision and consumption, 
the nature of housing production is discussed. It includes the dominant capitalist 
mode, which produces the industrialised form of production and the dependent 
petty commodity form of production which produces manufactured and self built 
forms of housing. These distinctive modes of housing production have been 
subjected to criticism. The main argument being that economic activities should 
be seen in their complexity of linkages between and among production modes. In 
practise, the modes are never fixed or totally distinct, instead their characteristics 
and relationships change over time. Subsequently, both the formal and informal 
modes of production should not be seen in isolation; rather the informal mode 
should be seen as responding to the gaps created by the formal sector and thereby 
being closely related. 
The role of the state is assessed noting how the state over extended itself during 
the first twenty five years of Independence. It undertook comn-dtments and 
responsibilities that it could not fulfil and increasingly could not afford to fund. 
With international intervention through the World Bank/IMF SAPs, the state is 
continually being pushed to change its behaviour, by giving up some 
commitments and responsibilities as well as incorporating other development 
agencies which in the past the state gave marginal recognition. 7bis is seen as a 
corporate approach whereby the state as a representative of capital is in search of 
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any elements of production which may enhance its survival, even if it means 
limiting its own role as is happening in Africa under SAPS. 
8.1.2 Housing Policy, Urban Growth and Management 
Housing is placed within the context of urbanisation by presenting the rapid 
growth of urbanisation and its consequences in the developing countries with an 
emphasis on Africa, specifically Kenya. It notes that the position of urban systems 
in the developing countries are reflections of the role that national states play in 
the international economic system, pointing out the difference between the nature 
of urbanisation in the developed countries and that of the developing countries. 
The depressing economic situation of the African states and that of Kenya 
resulting in deterioration of urban services is discussed, pointing out the several 
approaches indirectly applied to reduce the rate of urbanisation and the integral 
urbanisation problems. The basis of the approaches being accelerated rural 
development aimed at improving the conditions in the rural areas in order to 
retain population. 
It is pointed out that the poor performance of countries such as Kenya is a 
product of multiple variables which include ecological disasters, colonial 
background as well as other external and internal factors. Hence, any attempt to 
explain the problems of development and urbanisation as such using a single 
variable approach is bound to either fail to capture the real situation or end up 
with a distorted perception. 
With specific reference to Kenya, a historical context of urbanisation and urban 
development policies is given. It is noted that except for a few coastal urban 
centres, en-mass urbanisation took place with the onset of colonialism. However, 
the period also witnessed restrictions on movement to urban areas, as a measure 
of curbing population growth. With independence restrictions were waived and 
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massive Rural to Urban movements occurred putting serious pressure on provision 
of urban services. 
In order to reduce population growth in the urban areas, the Kenya Government, 
like most other African countries, first concentrated on policies focusing on rural 
areas with an aim of retaining population in such areas. Policies which this study 
refers to as 'decongestion' and have been assessed to have failed. Since the 
beginning of the Eighties this approach has been supplemented with other 
approaches such as the Rural-Urban balance which aims at looking at both urban 
and rural areas as one system and the development of RTPCs. It is noted that the 
search for policy options in Kenya should be geared first and foremost towards 
policy areas which sustain the existing urban populations within the urban areas, 
with rural based options supplementing such efforts. 
The management of urban growth is presented, pointing out that the policies of 
'decongestion' have not reduced urban growth or solved the problems of service 
provision and management. In Nairobi, NCC continues to be trapped up in a 
vicious circle whereby, due to poor management, revenue collection is poor and 
the Council therefore lacks revenue and thus cannot provide adequate and efficient 
services. - In relation to service provision, this has resulted in the pathetic 
consequences of urbanisation despite many programmes aimed at changing the 
situation, reflected in the proliferation of unserviced informal settlements. The 
problems are partly associated with bureaucratization, adoption of irrelevant 
standards, naive understanding of the housing problem as well as the planning 
biases. These factors have consequently led to unsatisfactory analysis of the 
situation and inherent ineffective arrangements for managing urban growth. 
Housing policy in Kenya is discussed, acknowledging that formulating appropriate 
policies and ensuring that they are implemented remains a global development 
dilemma. In Kenya, well defined policies relating to low income housing hardly 
exist. In cases where policies exist they remain on paper. A contention which is 
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representative if policy objectives are correlated with policy outcome or actual 
programmes on the ground. The study contends that policy should be perceived 
as action, inaction, intention and sometimes all the three. Ibus even reactive 
official decrees, which in many cases have to be implemented haphazardly, are 
also considered as policy. 
A historical context of housing policy is presented by highlighting the colonial 
and post-colonial periods. The reactive colonial period set precedence for poor 
low income housing. The'restrictive colonial housing policies did not take the 
none employed Africans, who lived in urban areas, into consideration. For the 
employed Africans who were considered during plarming, only basic services were 
provided and their housing conditions remained comparatively inadequate. 
71be post-colonial era is periodised into the era of Independence to 1972 and the 
period after. It is noted that prior to 1972, the Government pursued mainly 
restrictive policies with emphasis on appropriate planning coupled with 
demolitions of 'unplanned' settlement. Such policies were not different from those 
pursued by the colonial Government; although rhetorically the Government posed 
to be pursuing policies aimed at improving the conditions of the African 
population which had been disadvantaged during the colonial era. It was not until 
the early Seventies that demolitions of houses for to low income groups was 
stopped under the influence of international financial agencies, as it penetrated the 
low income housing market. This led to the adoption of more positive housing 
policies such as the development of sites and services upgrading schemes as well 
as the commissioning of a number of studies in search of positive policy moves. 
Notwithstanding, the inability to design appropriate programmes and method of 
identifying the low income groups greatly contributed to lack of success. 
8.1.3 Planning and Development of UTP 
The planning and development of UTP is: discussed by first, giving a brief on 
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planning and its technicalities vis a vis the human dimension. It is noted that 
planning and implementation involves much bargaining, accommodation and 
sometimes conflict; hence the need to explore the negative externalities which 
result from attempts to achieve the planned objectives of given projects. The 
background of TJTP follows, indicating the limited role played by NCC during the 
conceptualisation period. Instead USAID did most of initial planning and 
subsequently had to convince both the Government and NCC that the project was 
worth undertaking. The unwillingness of the Government and NCC to accept 
reduced standards for the project and USAID exertion of pressure on them, lest 
the hinding be withdrawn, are noted. The idea of low income was not clear to 
both the Government and NCC and it was only after USAID's pre-investment 
survey and appraisal that an understanding of what it should be, started becoming 
clear. 
USAID's action is viewed in terms of expansion of capital and not necessarily as 
a goal of housing the low income groups as stated. The inability of both USAID 
and NCC to devise appropriate methods of identifying households which fall 
among the real low income groups is a clear demonstration of lack of focus by 
both NCC and USAID. The two institutions could not reach a compromise on the 
number of units to be developed, partly due to USAID's insistence on the 
reduction of the number of high cost units and an increase of the low cost units. 
The lack of consensus on this issue became a problem to the project throughout 
the implementation period. It was also exploited by the project director in liaison 
with councillors by developing an additional 170 units on an inappropriate site. 
At the same time NCC could not provide the relevant services and by the time the 
first lot of houses were ready for occupation, none of the services were in place. 
When services were eventually provided, most of them were of very high quality 
and could not be afforded by the target beneficiaries. Indeed, a signal of many 
aspects of project implementation which were going wrong.. 
Project implementation realised active political activity at the output stage as 
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opposed to the input stage. Reflected in individual and collective demand making, 
representation of interests and the difficulty to resolve conflicts, which dominated 
project implementation. The physical fight between the City Engineer and the 
project director leading to the City Engineer being charged and imprisoned and 
thereby losing his employment, was a climax. This fight is viewed as a problem 
created by the establishment of the PMU without clarifying how it was going to 
relate to the City Engineer's Department. It's establishment did not originate from 
NCC. What NCC had in mind during inception seemed to be more of an 
additional staff members to strengthen the already existing NCC's City Engineer's 
Department, charged with implementation of the project. 
'Ibe establishment of PMU did not assist in building an adequate framework for 
implementation of low income housing. Instead, it destroyed the existing 
framework. With the prevailing problems of the two departments, most aspects 
of the project involving decision making become very difficult to resolve. Of 
particular concern was the tendering and the contracting of the project 
components. PMU rejected the lowest bidder on flimsy grounds based on errors 
on Bill of quantities. To show the level of inconsistency, instead of giving a 
consideration to the second lowest bidder, fresh tenders were invited and PMU's 
favourite bidder turned out, to be the winner. Problems between the two 
institutions did not end until the City Engineer was divorced from the 
administration of the project, with serious consequences to project implementation. 
Another controversial component was the allocation of units. They were not made 
public to daily press and at the same time interviews for target beneficiaries were 
not conducted. Further, the approach of complete and incomplete application 
forms raised eye brows and criticism in the press when NCC came up with 
15,000 out of 24,000 applications as incomplete, ineligible being the main 
problem accounting for 11,000. The NCC councillors intensified the problems and 
suspicion by making a request to USAID to jump the regulations of allocation, 
but this was turned down. Ihis was not a solution but a postponement of the 
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problem, as demonstrated by the councillor's attempt to block the allocation 
process, as a form of protest. 
8.1.4 Empirical Survey of UTP 
The empirical situation of UTP between November 1991 and April 1992 is 
presented and assessed. 71be findings of the study including, socio-economic status 
of UTP residents, service provision and management and issues relating to tenure 
are presented and analyzed. Included are the relationship between tenants and their 
landlords, how tenants located their housing units, rents paid and attitudes on rent 
related issues. In specific reference to the resident landlords, issues associated 
with home ownership such as procedures of allocation, financial commitments and 
sources as well as the development of units are analyzed. 
The tenants residing in UTP were found to be young with a mean age score of 
31, whereas, the resident landlords were older with a mean age of 39. A large 
majority (71%) of the tenants belonged to upper income category with 12% 
earning way above the high income category and 29% falling on the upper levels 
of middle income. Resident landlords earned comparatively lower incomes, with 
67% earning between Kenya shillings 2,000 and 8,000; 20% earning between 
5,000 and 8,000 and 11 % earning above 11,000. These incomes reflect the gap 
between policy objective and outcome, greatly influenced by the, infiltration of 
low income housing by comparatively higher income groups. In UTP, only 6% 
of the tenants and 7% of the resident landlords were earning less than Kenya 
shillings 2,000, thereby falling within the policy targets. 
The residents of UTP are employed in both public and private sectors with a few 
being self employed. Expenditure of the residents was high, with subsistence 
taking the highest percentage as is the case in most low income settlements. Most 
residents did not only stay with their families but relatives ý as well. The average 
number of people per household was ý5 for both tenants and resident landlords. 
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The data also showed that the length of stay within the city was becorning high, 
with a reasonable percentage (12%) of tenants having been bom in the city. 
More resident landlords preferred to live in UTP than tenants, the main reason 
being home ownership. Both the landlords and the tenants rated services as either 
average or below average. Ibereby indicating their level of dissatisfaction with 
the project. A clear indication of the implication of lowering standards for a 
wrong group which prefers higher standards. The inefficiency of NCC was noted 
but the view that NCC should be responsible for provision and management of 
services was held. Ibis shows the inherent view held by most city residents that 
residential areas should be managed by public authorities such as NCC. A view 
currently under question as public management of services collapse in most cities 
of the world. 
In spite of a small percentage feeling that there -should be joint efforts of 
residents, NCC, central government and NGOs in managing services, the only 
joint community effort was found in the area of security. Residents associations 
had been formed to ensure security. On the other hand, NGOs who play key roles 
in providing and managing services in most low income areas were found to play 
a very minimal role in UTP. This was associated with the fact that the area is 
occupied by comparatively better off people and there was limited opportunity to 
attract NGOs, who are known to focus mostly on the disadvantaged groups. 
The study found that the majority (78%) of UTP residents were tenants as 
opposed to the project objectives of home ownership. Most owners opted to 
commodify their units, such that, ý even in cases where the original expandable 
house had been completed and additional extensions developed, most of the 
landlords still did not reside within the unit. Nevertheless, the tenants were found 
to have good relationship with their landlords. Although most tenants did not 
locate their housing units through the, landlords, most of them personally knew 
their landlords and paid rents and reported maintenance problems to them. 
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Most tenants had a desire to own urban homes, with 45% having applied for 
government aided schemes such as UTP without success. Among this sample, 
66% of the tenants preferred tenant purchase schemes, 27% plots to develop their 
own houses, 4% rental schemes, 1% buying cash; whereas 2% had no response. 
They indicated that they would seek financial support from both public and 
private institutions. Out of the sample, 62% felt that the government policy of 
housing low income groups was appropriate, whereas 38% felt it was not. A 
request to elaborate this response had largely a negative response. , 
Discussion on home ownership showed that, the majority (71%) of the resident 
landlords stopped being tenants when they were allocated units in UTP. In the 
data, this is reflected in predominance of the period between 1976 and 1982 as 
the year they started paying for their units. However, some of the years do not 
synchronise with the time allocations were made, and cumulative percentages 
indicate that only 60% fell among the initial allottees, although 40% seem to be 
second buyers. A more direct question probing whether one was an original 
allottee or bought from somebody else showed that only 21% bought from 
somebody else. Ibis leaves 79% as original allottees, a fact not reflected in the 
year the resident landlords started buying the units, and interpreted as a partial 
cover up relating to allocation. 
The home ownership process is discussed pointing out the institutions which the 
landlords had to deal with before getting access. Asked to mention some of the 
administrative difficulties they faced in dealing with NCC bureaucracy, a 
significant percentage (43%) indicated they had no problems. Whereas 24% 
experienced some problems which included; corrupt practices, difficulty in getting 
application fonns, short period of , raising deposit and restrictive and slow 
bureaucracy. As far as raising the deposit and financing housing development wa's 
concerned, co-operatives and individual savings were major sources of finance. 
The data also reveals that those who had bought their units through co-operatives 
or employers were more conversant with mortgage conditions, requirements and 
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other related payments, than those who bought through NCC. 
A reasonable percentage (41%) of the resident landlords had problems developing 
their units. These were mainly financial, the site being used as a dumping ground 
for excavated soil and lack of co-operation from NCC. Among the -above 
problems, the visual problem of dumping ground factor can still be seen on the 
foot paths and road reserves. The development of extensions beyond the original 
planned units has added to the problem. Among the resident landlords 
interviewed, 61% had extended their units beyond the original plan. Out of this 
percentage, 56% attempted to get authority from NCC, while 44% did not bother 
to seek any authority. Among those who sought authority, only 18.6% got it, 
whereas the rest had their applications rejected or ignored. This did not stop them 
from undertaking development. Most landlords felt that, -although the city 
regulations relating to housing development are normal requirements, they are too 
strict and limiting. 
A further search of resident landlords' opinion on the ability of low income groups 
to access schemes such as UTP showed their scepticism of the capacity of the low 
income groups to access such schemes. They clearly isolated themselves from the 
low income groups by indicating that the low income groups who mostly reside 
in informal settlements cannot afford to reside or pay for schemes such as UTP. 
Some of them noted that home ownership through tenant purchase involved great 
sacrifice and it was more viable to buy a plot and develop a house. 
8.1.5 The Politics of Policy Implementation 
The politics of policy implementation is analyzed with an aim of understanding 
the lack of success in the provision of, low income housing in Kenya, using UTP. 
It notes that Kenya Government policy of housing the low income groups has not 
been focused and its instruments have, not been right. In coming up -with 
appropriate policies, the power interplay which'. takeS' place among competing 
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interests often determine which interest group, policy favours. In the case of UTP, 
the low income groups failed to access units planned for them, thereby exposing 
the limitations of policy. 
The policy biases are discussed, showing the limitations of the policy goal of 
housing the low income groups. As shown in the case of UTP, the beneficiaries 
are not necessarily low income households, a fact acknowledged by both the 
residents of UTP and government officials interviewed. The main reasons for lack 
of access for the low income groups is the inappropriate policy instrument of 
housing them through home ownership. This policy assumes that the low income 
households desire and can own homes within the urban areas. In spite of this, the 
policy lacks an appropriate methodology of identifying the target group, thereby 
intensifying the problems. Subsequently, no logic is seen in the State policy's 
single emphasis on home ownership among the low income groups, noting that 
the dual (urban and rural) nature of urban residents should be taken into 
consideration. 
The limitations of the institutional framework through which UTP was 
implemented is analyzed. It is noted that the institutions charged with 
implementation were adequate in terms of personnel and skills but played their 
role inefficiently. In the implementation of UTP, all project aspects had been fully 
catered for and additional personnel hired but success was still limited. Thus three 
factors which retarded the implementation are isolated, namely; lack of adoptive 
regulations, management structure and personality conflicts as well as the 
requirements of access and the nature of financial resources and institutional 
performance. 
The standards and regulations pursued by NCC were found not to be in harmony 
with the developments taking place. The complicated network of institutions 
involved and their inherent weak coordination was assessed as a major bottleneck, 
with NCC taking a large share of the blame. Although NCC was found to have 
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no acceptable limits for low cost housing, it is silent on a number of unacceptable 
activities and hence there is no clear policy. Instead, a project based approach 
which limits beriefits of relaxed standards to only project beneficiaries, not 
necessarily the most needy, has been applied. Thereby leaving individuals who are 
keen on developing low cost housing with no policy to go by, unless they are 
integrated in projects funded through international finance. 
The conflict between the PMU director and the City Engineer are brought out. 
Although they were seen as a reflection of personality conflict, it is noted that in 
countries such as Kenya, it is almost impossible to identify the meeting - or 
brealdng point of personal and institutional interests. The analysis of UTP showed 
that if an officer was able to rally majority support of the contending'forces 
within NCC and USAID, the chances of achieving their goal and that of the 
institution, be it right or wrong, was enhanced. 'Me whole rationale being that 
personal goals are presented in such a way that they manifest as that of the 
institution. 
The issue of institutional requirements of access is also discussed, pointing out 
that the low income groups, who are hardest hit with the problems of housing, 
stand minimal chances in accessing housing units. Partially due their lack of 
resources which make them unable to wield power. Apart from the resource 
obstacle, the requirement for quantifiable income has also been problematic. Most 
low income groups have incomes which are not easily quantifiable. For some who 
may qualify as per income, raising the required down-payment has been a 
limitation. A problem which may be worse in the case of the 'real' low income 
groups. The problems of access were found to occur not only at the initial stage 
of home ownership but throughout the process, making other beneficiaries fall off. 
Interviews with the resident landlords of, UTP, showed that down-payment and 
corrupt practices were problematic in their home ownership process; noting that 
co-operatives, employers and financial institutions formed important sources of 
financial assistance. IýI 
282 
Lastly, an examination of financial resources and institutional performance is 
undertaken. It is noted that NCC, like many other councils, has failed to mobilise 
local financial resources and has largely relied on international finance for 
development of low income housing. Although most of these agencies present 
their entry into low income housing development as a move towards changing the 
conditions of the urban poor, their desire to penetrate, what is referred to as the 
low income housing market, is noted as having very little to do with changing the 
conditions of such households. 
In all the key housing policy approaches undertaken by the Kenya govenunent, 
international finance has had extensive influence. In this respect, the current 
position of international finance under SAPs, which lays all the blame on African 
governments, is not representative. The argument perpetuated by institutions such 
as the USAID and the World Bank is that the development strategies pursued 
before SAPs, were rooted in development strategies that ignored economic 
efficiency and international competitiveness, drawing finance from abroad while 
distorting the domestic financial system. Whereas this may be a correct 
observation, it is the same international financial agencies that supported past 
approaches, and are currently redefining the agenda. 
Criticisms laid on international finance are presented, displaying its inability to 
change the situation and the new procedures and/or institutions it creates for 
bureaucracies which are over-burdened. Although the survey showed that the 
future of housing would be gloomy without international finance, it was felt that 
there are possibilities of generating funds locally. However, this has not been 
successfully done as reflected in the case of the housing fund withdrawn by NCC 
from HDD. The main area of focus seems to be joint ventures between the public 
and private sector, supplemented by the co-operative approach. This needs 
relevant government policies, especially in the areas of; conceptualisation of the 
housing problem, setting strategies and the generation of relevant housing finance, 
especially, for low income housing. So far, this has not been successfully done, 
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and camot be totally dismissed. 
8.2.0 Concluding Remarks 
The Kenya Government policy objectives of housing the low income groups has 
failed and a policy redirection is wan-anted. The main reason for failure being a 
lack of a clear conceptualisation of the housing problem and how best to solve it 
before designing programmes. In most programmes undertaken so far, marginal 
conceptualisation has been done by either the Central Government or the LAs. 
Instead, comprehensive conceptualisation and development of programmes have 
often been undertaken by International Financial agencies, such as USAID and the 
World Bank. A fact reflected in the position currently held by most International 
Financial agencies, that Goveniment controls are affecting production and that 
housing is over-priced due to lack of a broad sector examination. To this study, 
the above contention was known prior to the launching of the previous project 
based policy approaches, currently being discarded. It is therefore viewed merely 
as one of the distortions used by international finance for ensuring capital 
development, which may not be totally beneficial to the local context. 
The scenario in Kenya has been for the State to focus on production of low 
income housing with the support of International Financial agencies but without 
clear policies on the prerequisites of production and consumption. Out of such 
trends came projects such as UTP, aimed at the low income groups but without 
the right method of identifying them or a strategy of providing affordable 
services. Subsequently, it is demonstrated in the case study that the project has 
neither fulfilled its initial objectives of housing the low income groups (target 
beneficiaries) nor satisfied the real beneficiaries, who hardly fall within the target 
group. An examination of the broad housing sector, may benefit the economy in 
general but does not seem to bear hope for the low income who are often side- 
lined. rV 11 
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If Government policy has to focus on the low income groups, the prerequisite is 
to design a method of identifying them and the right form of tenure. This thesis 
maintains that the isolated focus on home ownership tenure based on quantifiable, 
steady income categorisation is inappropriate for the low income groups. Income 
categorisation refers to individuals or people but since the Kenya Government has 
failed to have an appropriate method of focusing on individuals or people but only 
on housing, what is needed is an examination of the existing housing units which 
house low income groups, with a view to improving and adding to their kind. 
Currently, this is being done but within the inadequate single umbrella of home 
ownership. To achieve the policy objective of housing the low income groups, a 
method of identifying them and the appropriate strategies of provision have to be 
designed. Otherwise, both the State and NCC should focus on increasing and 
improving the existing stock and forget about maintaining a policy towards low 
income groups, whom policy has failed to satisfy during the last three decades. 
The failure of the State has also been reflected in the performance of LAs, 
especially NCC. This study revealed that since the intervention of International 
Finance in low income housing, NCC has not developed any housing using local 
resources, or was a housing strategy found within the Council. This has resulted 
into most professional staff mainly within HDD, who should be project developers 
degenerating into administrative roles - merely implementing projects funded by 
international finance. The withdrawal of 54 million Kenya shillings from HDD, 
set aside as an initial housing fund from HDD, further demonstrate the lack of 
commitment. 
Both the failure of the State in Kenya and NCC can only be appreciated if the 
role of the state is considered within the global political economy. As reflected 
in this study, neither the state (in the past) nor NCC has had any housing strategy 
as such. 'Mey have basically been adopting strategies set by International Finance 
in their quest for development capital geared for low income housing. A case 
clearly demonstrated by the inconsistency of policy where the state aims at 
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housing the low income groups, but at the same time allows sporadic destruction 
of units housing them. Through the influential arm of International Finance came 
the SS, UG, TPs and currently the enabling role of the State, whereby the global 
political economy demands that the state only ensures that the market is working, 
infrastructure is in place and property rights are protected. 
It has been a trend in most of the developing countries for international agencies 
to set the parameters for development. Reasons being the lack of local resources 
required for development, leading to dependence on external funding, with its 
insistence on defining the problems and setting strategies. Taking the capital 
interests of international financial agencies, this study notes that the current 
popularization of the enabling role of the State, especially in the area of low 
income housing may be problematic. Most Governments, Kenya included, have 
to still understand what their enabling role entails, since the idea is not born out 
of a review and setting of local strategies. So far, they are responding to their 
required role by starting with the facile option of letting individuals, groups, 
communities and NGOs do what they think is deserving. 
The enabling approach, urging the State to reduce and even avoid direct subsidies 
to those who fail to compete in the market, seems not to bear hope for the low 
income groups. The State under the influence of the global political economy 
seem to be giving up the case of the needs of poor urban households, which has 
been emphasized since Independence. This leaves such households with no option 
but to continue providing housing and services for themselves. This will occur in 
the future under even more strenuous conditions, since they may no longer be 
able to benefit from services offered. ý in, neighbouring residential areas, as 
happened before the SAPs. 
For over two decades the State focus in Kenya was to subsidise the low income 
groups. A task which did not entirely fail because of the availability of subsidies 
but their misdirection to groups who did not necessarily deserve them. Therefore 
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misdirection of subsidies and/or efforts aimed at the low income groups, should 
not infer their rebuke but an examination of why they were misdirected and 
whether there are possibilities of rightful direction. In view of these dilemmas, 
this study isolates some options which both the Central Government, LAs and 
other actors in housing provision and consumption could consider as measures of 
reversing the situation. 
8.3.0 Recommendations 
This study does not claim to have exhausted the issues entailed in the provision 
of low income housing and State policies relating to it. Therefore, it isolates areas 
needing further research, before recommending the roles to be played by different 
agencies participating in the provision of low income housing. In this respect, 
recommendations for this study are made at four levels, namely; Areas for Further 
Research, Role of Central Government, Local Authorities and Other Actors. 
Tberefore, the first stage of recommendations is an isolation of areas needing 
further research. Subsequently, recommendations directly related to the study are 
proposed at three levels; Central Government, Local Authorities, such as NCC and 
Other Actors, including individuals, communities, groups and NGOs. As argued 
throughout this study, policy is a, process and within each institution, it is 
appraised and shaped depending on the environment. In Kenya, this action takes 
place mainly within the Government Ministries and Local Authorities, leaving 
Other Actors on the margin. It is therefore necessary to point out what each of 
these institutions and Other Actors need to undertake to enhance the achievement 
of policy goals. Before this, recommendations for further research are first 
outlined. 
8.3.1 Areas for Further Research 
The broad area referred to as 'the enabling role', of the State in relation to low 
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income housing needs research. Most Governments of the developing countries, 
are currently actively involved in reviewing their policies and approaches in 
housing the low income groups, as a means of enhancing the enabling role. It is 
of concern to housing researchers to look into the details of these reviews and 
strategies, in order to find out whether there are any significant differences with 
the former approaches, and whether there are opportunities for reversing the 
situation discussed in this study. 
Directly related to this study are some issues which could not effectively be 
answered but are linked to an understanding of State policy in relation to low 
income urban housing. They include; 
Appropriate methods of identifying the real low income households. 
Comparison of the socio-economic profile of resident landlords and 
absentee landlords and reasons for these two factors; assessing whether 
the resident landlords fall within the target group at the time of 
allocation. 
The rate at which different types (SS, UG, TPs) of publicly funded low 
income housing schemes, change hands and the reasons for it. 
Additionally, whether TPs reduce the chances of changing hands. 
Whether services such as those provided in UTP would satisfy the real 
low income households, as opposed to the actual beneficiaries. - 
8.3.2 Central Government 
Central Government has been a major problem in relation to policy success. It has 
failed to have clear, well coordinated policies relating to low income housing. 
This has been facilitated by the acceptance of International Finance for low 
income housing without determining the', appr'op'n'ate use of such funds. At the 
same time, the Kenya Government has no Urban Development Policy but 
numerous uncoordinated institutions whose roles are not complimentary. The 
Kenya Govenunent, despite the knowledge that the low income groups cannot be 
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reached through home ownership in isolation, continue to focus on it as per the 
requirements of international finance. Although international funding organisations 
currently argue that subsidized housing reduces the capacity to increase the 
housing stock and at the same time knowing that the approach has failed, this 
study contends that since the target beneficiaries have not been reached, 
ap ropriate measures should be designed for reaching them. Ip 
As argued in the theoretical framework, the State should intervene in sectors less 
profitable to the market forces but necessary for the functioning of economic 
activity and/or appeasement of social conflict. In doing this, the State should 
apply a corporatist approach, Raising with all the relevant actors (as a co- 
ordinator). This implies that the State has to play the role of ensuring that the 
individuals and/or households who cannot access housing through the market are 
catered for, either by subsidising other agencies to do it or the State itself doing 
it. This is as opposed to the current view being perpetuated by the new World 
Bank policies, which discourage the State from playing any direct role. One 
option of avoiding a direct role is for the State to rally the relevant resources and 
actors, with the State concentrating on the aspects they are not able to satisfy. 
Subsequently, the Kenya Government should; 
Establish a National Housing Fund for low cost housing, based on both 
private and public enterprise, with the active participation of NGOs 
working in the area of shelter. 
Assist the NHC in recovering loan arrears owed by LAs in order to 
channel such funds into low cost rental housing. 
Play a central role in the coordination of all agencies providing and 
managing low cost housing. 
Empower LAs to act with greater measure of Independence in relation 
to formulation of housing policies and implementation strategies. '' 
Through NHC and HFCK develop and manage well co-ordinated low 
cost public rental housing, not based on home ownership. 
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0 83.3 Nairobi City Council (NCQ 
Most efforts on housing policy review and/or development have been at Central 
Government level, with pressure mainly coming from UNCHS and International 
Financial Agencies; LAs such as NCC are still to be penetrated. However, there 
are a number of policy moves that the NCC and other LAs' Councils need to 
undertake to facilitate provision of low cost housing. The NCC should; 
Conceive a housing strategy for the city within which different actors 
in housing may operate. This should be designed with the clear 
intention of making city residents actors and not merely target 
beneficiaries. 
Compile into a policy document all relaxed planning and building 
standards allowed for low income housing, in order to be accessible to 
those developing real low income housing, as found within the 
informal settlements. 
Generate resources locally, starting with NCC's existing housing stock 
and funds generated from down payment of housing projects, such as 
SS and TPs, in order to provide low cost rental housing for those 
unable to compete in the market. 
Design a method of assessing low income, rather than waged, regular 
and quantifiable incomes over an appropriate period of time. At best, 
NCC should focus on low cost products as opposed to low income 
families. 
8.3.4 Other Actors (Individuals, Communities, Groups & NGOs) 
Other Actors have continually played a central role in low income housing but 
with marginal recognition from the State. With the current trend requming the 
State to take an enabling role, they are going to take on more responsibilities, 
some of which the State performed in the past. It is therefore relevant to pin point 
some of the tasks which these actors may undertake; since there are other tasks 
such as the provision of infrastructure which they may be less able to install. 
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Most of these actors are already involved in the improvement of the environment 
and provision of shelter, often considered by the State and LAs as sub-standard. 
If the State is to stop providing low income housing, as is currently being 
advocated, its role will have to be taken by some other institution and/or actors. 
This study sees the Other Actors as stated above, to be one possible option and 
in this respect they could; 
Mobilise themselves around the goal of low income housing and 
mobilise the relevant local and external resources required to 
implement such schemes, building on the experience they have already 
obtained. 
Plan and design appropriate funding methods of providing low income 
housing. 
Assist in designing appropriate methods for implementing low income 
housing 
With the support of LAs and the Government, manage the future 
development of low income settlements, by jointly improving the 
infrastructure and settlement facilities, as well as developing and 
installing income generating inputs in the form of small businesses, 
workshops and associated services, such as funding linked to advice 
and training. 
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List of Abbreviations 
AGCs Alternative Growth CentreS 
AID Agency for International Development 
CPD City Planning Department 
CDC Commonwealth Development Cooperation 
DDC District Development Committees 
DFRD District Focus for Rural Development 
DSS Dandora Site and Service 
EARC East Africa Royal Commission 
EEC European Economic Community 
GIS Galvanised Iron Sheet 
GNP Gross National Product 
GOK Government of Kenya 
HDD Housing Development Department 
HFCK Housing Finance Company of Kenya 
HG Housing Guaranty 
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
KTP Kimathi Tenant Purchase 
LAs Local Authorities 
MLG Ministry of Local Government 
MLH Ministry of Lands and Housing 
NACHU National Cooperative Housing Union 
NCC Nairobi City Council 
NGOs Non Governmental Organisations 
NHC National Housing Cooperation 
NMC Nairobi Municipal Council 
NMGS 'Nairobi Metropolitan Growth Strategy 
NUSG Nairobi Urban Study Group 
PHC Public Health Care 
PMU Project Management Unit 
RHUDO Regional Housing and Urban Development Office 
PITAs Parents Teachers Associations 
RTPCs Rural Trade and Production Centres 
RUBS Rural Urban Balance Strategy 
SAPs Structural Adjustment Programmes 
SS Sites and Services 
TP Tenant Purchase 
UG Upgrading 
UCC Umoja Council Committee 
UNICEF United Nations Children Educational Fund 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
USAID, United States Assistance in Development 
UTP, Umoja Tenant Purchase Scheme 
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Appendix 2.1: 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR HOUSEHOLDS IN UMOJA TENANT PURCHASE 
SCHEME (UTP). 
STATE POLICY & URBAN HOUSING: THE CASE OF LOW INCOME 
HOUSING IN NAIROBI, KENYA. 
Introduction - 
This survey is aimed at identifying and understanding the factors which contribute to 
achievement or non achievement of the Kenya Government/Nairobi City 
Commission's policy objective of housing the urban low income groups within the 
City of Nairobi. This would be a basis for effective policy recommendations. 
All information given remain confidential. 
Yours Faithfully, 
Winnie V. Mitullah 
Research Fellow, 
Institute For Development Studies 
University Of Nairobi 
SAMPLE NO. 
PLOT NO: 
NO. OF HOUSEHOLDS 
Years of Residence Number of Households 
123456789 10 11 12 13 14 15 
10-15 
8-10 
6-8 
4-6 
2-4 
0-2 
A. General Information On Housing 
l. - Name of respondent 
2. Sex of respondent 
3. How many rooms are in this unit? 
4. Do you own this house or you are renting? 1) Owning 2 Renting 
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5. Do you own any (other) house elsewhere? 1) Yes 2) No 
6. If yes, where? 1) Nairobi (state area) other urban area (Specify) 
, 3) rural 
7. When did you first come to Nairobi, or are you bom here? Year of arrival 
Bom in Nairobi 
8. If bom in Nairobi. please indicate residential area 
9. Could you please list to date the areas you have stayed in chronologically 
1) 2) 3) 4) 
5) 6) 7) 8) 
9) 10) 11) 12) 
10. Could you please comment on the housing situation in Kenyan urban areas, 
especially Nairobi 
Are you aware of the living conditions in low income informal areas such as 
Kibcra Laini Saba and Kogocho? 1) Yes 2) No 
12. If yes, could you please list in order of importance what you like and dislike in 
such settlements: 
like Dislike 
13. Do you think they are playing an important role in housing provision? 
1) Ycs 2) No 
14. Please explain your answer 
15. Do you think the goverrunent has any role to play in assisting those developing 
such units? 1) Yes 2) No 
16. If yes, could you please list in order of importance the type of assistance which 
could improve such type of housing provision 
1) 2) 3) 4) 
17. Please list three factors in order of importance which you think mostly contribute 
to lack of appropriate housing in Nairobi 
1) 2) 3) 
18. Could you please Suggest how the housing problem could be arrested in order of 
importance 1) 2) 3) 
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B: GENERAL QUESTIONS ON UMOJA TENANT PURCHASE (UTP) 
19. Do you know how this estate was developed? 1) Yes 2) No 
20. If yes, could you please give a brief history of who the developers were and their 
intentions 
21. Do you think their intentions have been achieved? 1) Yes 2) No 
22. Could you please list in order of importance what you like and dislike in this 
estate 
like Dislike 
23. Could you comment on the level of provision of services: 
Services very good good average below average bad 
Health 
Water Supply 
Schools 
Sewage 
Refuse Removal 
Transport 
Shopping Facilities 
Security 
Other, Specify 
24. Could you please assess the overall habitability of the estate using the variables 
listed below; 
Excellent Satisfactory Acceptable Unsatisfactory 
Location 
Services and Management 
Dwelling Unit 
Estate 
25. Could you suggest how improvements could be achieved through resident 
community, Nairobi City commission (NCC) and other development agencies 
(NGOs) 
Community 
NCC 
Other Development Agencies (NGOs) 
26. Who do you think should be responsible for the general management of this 
estate? 1) Resident Community 
2) Nairobi City Commission 
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3) Government 
4) Other Development Agencies 
5) Combinations 
6) other, specify 
27. What should the communities who live in this estate do to improve their living 
conditions? 
28. What role do you think the Nairobi City Commission should play in its 
management? 
29. Do you prefcr to live here? 1) Yes 2) No 
30. Please give any key factors which influence your response. 
31. Could you please list the aspects you normally consider when looking for a house in 
order of importance 
2) 3) 
4) 5) 6) 
7) 8) 9) 
Tenants only 
32. How did you locate this house? 
(1) through a friend, (2) landlord (3) relative (4) housing agent (5) newspaper 
advertisement (6) other (specify) 
33. Do you share rent? 1) Yes 2)No 
34. If yes, How much does each contribute? respondent ý other 
35. Has the rent been increased since you occupied the house (1) Yes (2) No 
36. If yes, when was this done? 
37. How much were you paying before the increase? Kenya Shillings 
38. Do you think the rent is fair for the accommodation you are having? 
1) Yes 2) No 
39. If no, have you ever complained 1) Yes 2)No 
40. Please elaborate your answer 
41. Could you suggest what you think would be fair rent for this house? 
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42. Has any development of the house been undertaken since you occupied it 
(1) Yes (2) No 
43. If ycs, pleasc spccify 
44. Do you know your landlord? I)Yes 2) No 
45. If yes, could you please give his: address 
46. To whom do you pay rent? 
1) Landlord 
2) Estate agent 
3) Relative Of Landlord 
4) Friend Of Landlord 
5) Representative Of Landlord 
6) Other (Specify) 
47. Who among the above do you report to in cases of maintenance problems? 
48. Have you ever experienced any problem with your landlord/representative 
1) Yes 2) No 
49. If yes, please elaborate the nature of the problem 
50. Did you report the problem to any authority? 1) Yes 2) No 
51. If yes, indicate who you reported to 
52. Are you aware of the existence of the rent tribunal? 1) Yes 2) No 
53. If ycs, please point out its main role 
54. Have you ever been involved with them in any way? 1) Yes 2) No 
55. Please elaborate your answer 
56. Would you wish to own a house in an urban area such as Nairobi? 1) Yes 2) No 
57. Please explain your answer 
58. Have you ever applied for any government aided scheme (site and 
service/upgrading or tenant purchase)? (1) Yes (2) No 
59. Please elaborate your answer 
60. What type of an urban house would you prefer given a choice? 
(1) Rental (2) Owner Occupied (3) Other, Specify 
61. If the answer is owner occupied, would you prefer to; 
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a) live in it , 
b) Rent it out 
c) Rent part of it 
d) Other (Specify) 
62. Please elaborate your answer 
Landlords 
63. Please indicate how you acquired this house? 
1) bought 2) Built 3) Legacy 4) Other, Specify 
64. Year/ & Date started: 1) buying - 2) Building 
65. If buyer, were you the original buyer or you bought it from somebody else? 
1) original 2) Somebody else 
66. What was the total cost? Ksh. 
67. Did you pay all the cost at once? (1) Yes (2) No 
68. If yes, what was the source of your funding? 
69. If no, how much was the down payment Ksh. 
70. What was the source of your down payment 
71. Do you repay any mortgage relating to this house? (1) Yes (2) No 
72. If yes, how much per month? Ksh. 
73. To whom? 
74. What are/were the conditions of the mortgage? 
75. Did you/do you have any problems of paying the mortgage? 
1) Yes 2) No 
76. If yes, could you mention the problems and suggest possible solutions in order of 
importance. 
Problems Solutions 
Questions on this section applied only to the resident landlords of UTP. During 
the administration of the questionnaire, it formed an independent questionnaire 
composed of A, D and E. 
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77. Could you please explain how you developed your unit to completion, specifying 
aspects such as type, source and cost of labour and materials. 
78. Did you have any problems when developing the unit? 1) Yes 2) No 
79. If yes, could you please indicate three most serious problems you experienced; 
1) 2) 3) 
80. If you were to develop another unit, how would you wish to be assisted in relation 
to the problems listed above? 
Type of Problem Assistance Required 
i 
81. Do you pay any taxes on land/house? (1) Yes (2) No 
82. If yes, how much? 
83. Do you get any tax rebates at the end of the year for owning a house? 
(1) Yes (2) No 
84. If yes, averagely how much? Ksh. 
85. Have you extended your unit beyond the plan which was provided initially? 
1) Yes 2) No 
86. If yes, did you go through any authority? 1) Yes 2) No 
87. If yes, which authority/individual did you go through? 
88. Could you explain the outcome of your action 
89. Please explain the factors which influenced your decision to go through the 
authority/individu 
90. Are you aware of the planning requirements of such developments? 
1) Yes 2) No 
91. If yes, what do you think of them? 
92. Do you think this housing project has solved part of the housing problem of the low income groups such as those who stay within the informal settlements such as Kibera Laini Saba and Korogocho? 1) Yes 2) No 
93. Please, explain your answer 
94. Have you ever been a tenant?, (1) Yes (2) No 
316 
95. If yes, when did you stop being a tenant? 
96. How long were you a tenant? 
97. In which area did you first own a house? 
98. Could you please list some of the key problems you encountered during your 
move from being a tenant to a landlord 
99. What advice would give to other urban dwellers planning/wishing to own their own 
houses 
. Personal Information 
100. Home District of respondent 
101. Age: 
102. Marital status: 1) Single 2) Married 3) Divorced 4) Widowed 5) Separated 
103. If married, do have any children? 1) Yes 2) No 
104. If Yes, how many? 
105. How many stay with you in this house? 
106. In total how many people normally stay in this house? 
107. Education Level 
108. Are you employed? 1) Yes 2) No 
109. If yes, which type of work do you have? 
I 10. How much do you earn per month? 
112. If no to employment, could you please explain how you satisfy your basic needs? 
113. Does any member of your household work? 1) Yes 2) No 
114. If yes, what type of work do they do? 
115. Do they assist you financially? 1) Yes 2) No 
116. If yes, roughly how much do they give you per month 
2 During the administration of the questionnaires, personal information as 
appears in this section was asked after all other issues had been discussed. 
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117. Do you get any other assistance from anybody ( wife/husband child, relative, 
friend etc)? (1) Yes (2) No 
118. If yes, please indicate the type of assistance 
119. Apart from your job, are you involved in any other income generating activity? 
1) Yes 2) No 
120. If yes, please specify 
121. Could you please indicate how much you spend per month on the following 
items: 
Item 
Family Subsistence 
Personal Transport 
Dependants Transport 
Dependants Education 
Electricity 
Water 
Saving 
Rent 
Other (specify) 
Ksh. 
Total 
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Appendix 2.2 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NAIROBI CITY COMMISSION 
STATE POLICY & URBAN HOUSING: THE CASE OF LOW INCOME 
HOUSING IN NAIROBI, KENYA. 
This is a survey aimed at identifying and understanding the problems of urban housing 
in Nairobi City. Also, to find out why previous housing projects have not been 
successful. This would be a good basis for effective policy recommendations. All 
information given remain confidential. 
Yours Faithfully, 
Winnie V. Mitullah 
Research Fellow 
Institute For Development Studies 
University Of Nairobi. 
Name & Designation Of Respondent 
Department 
Section/ Unit 
Age 
A. General Questions On Housing 
1. How long have you been working with NCC? 
2. Have you been working in the same position (1) Yes (2) No 
3. If no, could you please indicate whether there is any link between the 
assigmnent you had before and this one 
4. Could you please comment on the housing situation in Kenyan urban areas, 
pen-Anliv Mn; rnh; a- ________________________________________________ 
5. Please list three factors in order of importance which you think mostly contribute 
to lack of appropriate housing in Nairobi 
1) 2) 3) 
6. Could you please Suggest how the housing problem could be arrested in order 
of importance. 1) 2) 3) 
7. Are you aware of the living conditions in low income informal areas such as Kibera Laini Saba and Kogocho? 1) Yes 2) No 
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8. If yes, could you please list in order of importance what you like and dislike in 
such settlements: 
Like Dislike 
9. Do you think they are playing an important role in housing provision? 
1) Yes 2) No 
10. Please exp am your answer 
11. Do you think the government or NCC has any role to play in assisting those 
developing such units? 1) Yes 2) No 
12. If yes, could you please list in order of importance the type of assistance which 
could improve such type of housing provision 
1) 1 2) 3) 4) 
13. Could you please briefly point out how your institution is involved in the task of 
housing provision for low income groups 
14. Could you please list some factors which influence the development of low 
Janoullir. Iluubuir, 
15. Do you coordinate with other agencies such as government ministries, 
parastatals, private sector and NGOs when developing housing for low income 
groups? 1) Yes 2) No 
16. If yes, how would you describe the degree of co-ordination among the agencies 
developing low income housing 7 
(1) Very Strong 
(2) Strong 
(3) Less Strong 
(4) Weak 
(5) Very Weak 
(6) Other, Specify 
17. How do you monitor whether your planned objectives are being achieved? 
18. Please point out your sources of relevant data when planning for low income 
housing 
19. Could you please mention factors (in order of importance) which often determine 
whether planned objectives will be achieved 
1) 2) 3) 4) 
5) 6) 7) 8) 
20. Please elaborate the contribution of each factor mentioned 
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21. Do you think the rents charged by landlords in Nairobi are fair? 1) Yes 2) No 
22. Please elaborate your answer 
23. Point out the different types of housing provision within the city of Nairobi 
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 
6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 
24. Could you please indicate the types of tenure (in percentages) existing within the 
city of Nairobi 
25. Please give the percentage of home owners and renters in Nairobi. 
1) % renters: 2) % Tenants: 
26. Please indicate the trend of change in tenure within the city over the last decade 
27. Could you please comment on the government focus on home ownership 
28. Could you please mention the type of subsidies the government provides to 
different types of housing provision you have mentioned above. 
Type of Tenure Type of Subsidy 
B. Low Income Housing 
29. Do you have any staff given the responsibility of handling issues relating to low 
income housing (1) Yes (2) No 
30. Please elaborate whichever answer you give 
31. Could you please specify your institutions' policy relating to low income 
housing 
32. What is your institution's policy regarding the proliferation of 'unplanned' 
settlements? 
33. Does your institution play any role in their development/management? 
(1) Yes -(2) No 
34. Please elaborate your answer 
35. Could you please comment on the role 'unplanned' settlements play in arresting 
the urban housing problem 
36. Do you think the individuals developing such areas should be supported 
(1) Yes (2) No 
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37. If yes, could you list the types of support which you think may be relevant 
38. If no, could you please indicate the reasons for your answer 
39. Please list factors in order of importance which you think mostly contribute to 
lack of appropriate housing in Nairobi 
40. Who do you think should be responsible for the general management of the 
informal areas? 
(1) Resident Community 
(2) Nairobi City Commission 
(3) Government 
(4) Other Development Agencies 
(5) Combinations (list) 
(6) Cooperatives 
(7) Other, Specify 
41. List major roles which you think are best suited for government to play in the 
development and/or management of informal settlements 
42. What should the communities who live in such areas do to improve their 
conditions? 
43. What would you say explains the few demolitions which Kenya has experienced 
since the government stopped this approach to housing in 1974 
C. Finance & Low Income Housing 
44. Do you allocate any budget to low income housing (1) Yes (2) No 
45. If yes, please indicate the budget allocation for the last three years 
(1)1990/91 1989/90 , 1988/89 
46. Please comment on the role of international financial agencies supporting housing 
development 
47. Do you think their role has been key in improving the housing situation in the 
urban areas (1) Yes (2) No 
48. Please elaborate your answer 
49. Do you think NCC can do without the support of international agencies as 
relates to housing development for the low income groups? (1) Yes (2) No 
50. Please elaborate your answer 
322 
51. 'Since the intervention of international finance has NCC developed any low income 
housing without their support? 1) Yes 2) No 
52. If yes, please list the schemes developed, indicating the year they were begun and 
completed. 
Schemes Year Started YearCompIeted 
53. Please point out some options which you think would be worth considering if 
international finance contribution is to be excluded in housing development for 
low income groups 
E. Housing Regulations & Standards 
54. Could you please briefly discuss the development of housing regulations and 
standards over the last ten years 
55. Housing regulations and standards have been noted to be a key bottleneck as 
relates to housing low income groups, could you please indicate some bottlenecks 
you have faced in reviewing them in order to suit the current development within 
the city 
56. Do you think they have reduced the general capacity of your institution or other 
institutions in relation to housing low income groups? (1) Yes (2) No 
57. Please elaborate your answer 
58. Could you please list other institutions which have a role in their development 
and/or review 1) 2) 3) 
4) 5) 6) 
F. Rent Control 
59. Does your institution have anything to do with rents within the city 
(1) Yes (2) No 
60. If yes, please specify 
61. Are you aware whether there is any public institution dealing with rent control 
(1) Yes (2) No 
62. If yes, please enumerate its functions and comment on its performance 
63. Do you think the rents charged by landlords in Nairobi are fair (1) Yes (2) No 
64. Please elaborate your answer 
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D. Umoja Tenant Purchase (UTP) 
65. Your institution was the key implementing agency in UT? scheme, would you 
please clearly state the role you played in the following areas, indicating the 
problems you encountered at each stage: - 
Role Problems Encountered 
Conceptualisation 
Initiation 
Implementation 
Management 
66. What were the main objectives of the project 
67. Were the objectives achieved? (1) Yes (2) No 
68. Please elaborate your answer 
69. Do you think that the project fulfilled its objective of housing the low income 
groups? (1) Yes (2) No 
70. Please elaborate whichever answer you give, pointing out the factors leading to 
fulfilment or non fulfilment 
71. Could you please list the various institutions which played a role in the 
implementation of the project 1) 2) 
3) 4) 5) 6) 
7) 8) 
72. Please specify the stated role and the actual contribution of each agency mentioned 
Agency stated role Actual Contribution 
73. How would describe the level of coordination between your institution and the 
above listed agencies? 
(1) Very Strong 
. (2) 
Strong 
(3) Less Strong 
(4) Weak 
(5) Very weak 
(6) Other, Specify 
74. Could you please comment on the role of the funding agency (USAID)? 
75. Which type of funds do you find easy to administer, external such as those of USAID and World Bank or internal? 
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76. Please elaborate your answer 
77. Were any staff hired specifically for the project (1) Yes (2) No 
78. If Yes, please specify the type of staff 
79. Who initiated the hiring of staff? 
80. Could you please comment on extra developments (extensions) which have taken 
place, contrary to the original plan 
81. In your opinion are the extra developments a positive or negative aspect of the 
estate (1) Positive (2) Negative 
82. Please elaborate whichever answer you give 
83. Do you think the government should still concentrate on the development of low 
income housing through both site and service and upgrading schemes 
(1) yes (2)No 
84. Please elaborate your answer 
85. It is currently the opinion of a number of international development agencies, that 
the government should not concern itself with provision of housing but rather avail 
land and infrastructure and allow private initiatives such as those developing the 
% unplanned' settlements to provide housing; could you please comment on this 
position 
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Appendix 2.3 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SELECTED GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 
STATE POLICY & URBAN HOUSING: THE CASE OF LOW INCOME 
HOUSING IN NAIROBI, KENYA. 
This is a survey aimed at identifying and understanding the problems of urban housing 
in Nairobi City. Also, to find out why previous housing projects have not been 
successful. This would be a good basis for effective policy recommendations. All 
information given remain confidential. 
Yours Faithfully, 
Winnie V. Mitullah 
Research Fellow 
Institute For Development Studies 
University Of Nairobi. 
Sample No. 
A. INFORMATION ON RESPONDENT 
Designation Of Respondent 
Department 
Section/ Unit 
Age 
Sex 
1. How long have you been working with this institution 
2. Have you been working in the same position (1) Yes (2) No 
If no, could you please indicate whether there is any link between the assignment 
you had before and this one 
B. HOUSING SITUATION IN KENYA 
4. Could you 'please comment on the housing situation in Kenyan urban areas, 
ALIrw-f-I-AIIII vnlvv%1ý1 Al &4&t %JL. 11 - 
5. Please list three factors in order of importance which you think mostly contribute 
to lack of appropriate housing in Nairobi 
1) 2) 3) 
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6. Could you please Suggest how the housing problem could be arrested in order 
of importance 1) 2) 3) 
7. Could you please comment on the programs the Kenya Government has 
undertaken for low income groups (for example site and service, upgrading 
schemes and tenant). 
8. Could you please briefly point out how your institution is involved in the task of 
housing provision for low income groups 
9. Could you please specify your institutions' policy on low income housing 
10. Could you please list some factors which influence the development of low 
income housing 
1. Do you coordinate with other agencies such as government ministries (other), 
parastatals, private sector and NGOs when developing housing for low income 
groups? 
1) Yes 2) No 
12. If yes, how would you describe the degree of co-ordination among the agencies 
developing low income housing 2 
(1) Very Strong 
(2) Strong 
(3) Less Strong 
(4) Weak 
(5) Very Weak 
(6) Other, Specify 
13. How do you monitor whether your planned objectives are being achieved? 
14. Please point out your sources of relevant data when planning for low income 
housing. 
15. Could you please mention factors (in order of importance) which often determine 
whether planned objectives will be achieved 
1) 2) 3) 4) 
5) 6) 7) 8) 
16. Please elaborate the contribution of each factor mentioned 
C. Low Income Housing 
17. Do you have any staff given the responsibility of handling issues relating to 
low income housing (1) Yes (2) No 
18. Please elaborate whichever answer you give 
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19. List major roles which you think are best suited for government to play in the 
development and/or management of low income housing. 
20. What role do you think the communities in such areas should play 
21. What would you say explains the few demolitions which Kenya has experienced 
since the government stopped this approach to housing in 1974 
22. Could you please indicate how your institution supports those developing low 
income housing. 
23. Have you involved the private sector in any way in developing low income 
housing? (1) Yes (2) No 
24. If yes, explain 
D. Rent & Tenure 
25. Do you think the rents charged by landlords in Nairobi are fair? 
1) Yes 2) No 
26. Please elaborate your answer 
27. Does your institution have anything to do with rents within the city 
(1) Yes (2) No 
28. If yes, please specify 
29. Are you aware whether there is any public institution dealing with rent control 
(1) Yes (2) No 
30. If yes, please enumerate its functions and comment on its performance 
31. Point out the different types of housing provision within the city of Nairobi 
1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 
6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 
32. Could you please indicate the types of tenure (in percentages) existing within the 
city of Nairobi 
33. Please give the percentage of home owners and renters in Nairobi. 
1) % Owners , 2) % Tenants: 
34. Please indicate the trend of change in tenure within the city over the last decade. 
35. Could you please comment on the government focus on home ownership 
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36'. Could you please mention the type of subsidies the government provides to 
different types of housing provision you have mentioned above 
Type Of Tenure Type Of Subsidy 
E. Finance: Local & International 
37. Do you allocate any budget to low income housing (1) Yes (2) No 
38. If yes, please indicate the budget allocation for the last three years 
M1990/91 1989/90- , 1988/89- 
39. Please comment on the role of international financial agencies supporting housing 
development 
40. Do you think their role has been key to improving the housing situation in the 
urban areas (1) Yes (2) No 
41. Please elaborate your answer 
42. Since the en-mass intervention of international finance during the early seventies, 
has your institution supported any program or related issues on low income 
housing without their support? 1) Yes 2) No 
43. If yes, please point out the type of program or issue 
Programme/issue Period Started PeriodCo rn pIeted 
44. Please point out some options which you think would be worth considering if 
international finance contribution is to be excluded in housing development for 
low income groups. 
F. Regulations & Standards 
45. Could you please briefly discuss the development of housing regulations and 
standards in your institution over the last ten years 
46. Housing regulations and standards have been noted to be a key bottleneck as 
relates to housing low income groups, could you please indicate some bottlenecks 
you have faced in reviewing them in order to suit the current development within 
the your institution. 
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47. Do you think they have reduced the general capacity of your institution or other 
institutions in relation to housing low income groups? (1) Yes (2 
No 
48. Please elaborate your answer 
49. Could you please list other institutions which have a role in their development 
and/or review 1) 2) 3) 
4) 5) 6) 
50. Please comment on their performance 
51. Does your institution cooperate with Local Authorities in their task of housing low 
income groups? 1) Yes 2) No 
52. If yes, please explain the nature of cooperation, pointing out any problems 
faced 
53. Has your institution had any cooperation with USAID as relates to housing 
development? 1) Yes 2) No 
54. If yes, please explain the nature of cooperation, pointing out any problems faced. 
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Appendix 2.5 
Map of Nairobi: Population Distribution and Density by Wards 
/ 
.. 
_- \. / 
( 
/ 
I 
) 
-f 
(: D 
I 
I 
I 
/ 
/ 
1 ýf > 
-i -ý 2ýýý: ýý 2, «,, ý >. 2. Zý7ý7, Z.. (ý ZZXX., 4 
0 
Z 02 > 
c> 
w22:: 
-- 
300000000 
\% 
.., r , -I 
7Z 
Iz ol 
e4 210§ 
I Ell 
09 
SHMOS. 
20 .0 ýo ?. 2-j L ------ L, .. - 
I \_® 
c; L. _/ 
/ 
? >- ' 
\ -. 
-I 
0 
) 
/ 
c 
. 
/ 
'I 
Of 
\ 
\ 
\ 
S 
I, 
( 
/ 
C; 
l 
332 
E-4 
E-4 
N 
e 
z 
0 ý-4 
0 P4 
PQ 
rX4 
0 
w 
u 
z 
w 
L) 
P4 
z 
E-4 
>4 
w 
Wo 
, r4 C) 0 
co 
., 4 C7% 
L) 
0 r. 
44 Ln 0 0 ý4 
w Q) a) %D 
a) > P4 ON 
0 r-4 
:j 44 
z0 
$4 
a) 
> 
00C 
co 
44 $4 m 
0 4) r-4 
P4 
En 
W0 
-ri 0C 
Ai 0 %D 
ON 
r-4 
W 
Q) 
., 4 
00 
L) ON 
P-4 
41 
ri) 
a) 
cu 
0-4 
. 3: flý 0 00 
r. OD 
Q) m 
u r4 
ý4 
00 
to 41 Ln 
00 %D 
$4 ON 
Q) r-4 
<4 
4) 
bo fl% 
tv r. co 
0 C)N 
-ý4 -4 
u00 
44 9ý, 1ý0 
00 0*, 
U) P4 P-4 
_4 
r-4 100 r-i 00 r-4 0 C4 r-4 I r-4 C14 v-4 (: ) 
r-4 10000000 C14 0100000 
C14 CY) 100 -1 o0 --t o cy) r, 10 00 r- 0 r-4 %D C14 Cf) Lr) m 00 -zr Lr) %D 
r- 01 CD 000000 cn 01000000 
rq Ln 
C'4 m1 "-d 1 %0 %0 't (: CY% rý 10 Ln rý. 11 ýt P-4 %D .t cn LM M ri cn m Co cn LA %D 
r, 1111 %0 0 r, m. 1 00 01 rý Ln 011 r_ C, 4 C, 4 -: t r_ rq ci M CY) c9 -e Ln 
<ý lý 1 12 lý rý '-9 cý 'lý ý %ý rý rý -: %ý cý aý 9 en r, - 00 le) m r- -t -t %0 r- en t %0 u) ýe oo r, Ln r, 
Pý cý cý rý lý lý 90c 
'm Co -t en r- r- N 't %0 Ln ri 00 
-, t ON r4 00 r- %D Ln r-4 Zr 0 00 CN M -T C4 C*4 ON 04 rl% 
Ir en C14 %T %, T -, t ýT (n %T v-4 -. T N Cn C14 r-4 T %D 
00 v-4 --T Lr) C14 ý, D t- -t M 0'% 7-4 00 9-4 04 %D Ch %D 04 %D cn P-4 r-4 04 M C14 -T C4 v-4 N C14 C14 
T4 
04 0 
0> 
zw ý-4 
0 P-4 - 
04 
z ze z E-4 0z 1-4 to 1-4 ý4 H C) Z Zz0 Or! PC) F-4 cn m pq 
z E-4 
.1E, 
<4 , =) ;4H 1-4 PQ PA 
Iw 
LO) uww0uu 
333 
., 4 C) 
41 0 00 
., 4 .M 
U0 ri) ý4 
00 
44 Lf) 0 
0w 
wPC 
0) Q) %0 
Q) > P4 m 
.a0 V-4 E 
:j 44 
z0 
> 
144 $4 
0 
M 
41 
4 
m 
Q) 
ÖD 
1.4 
00 
(L) a) 1 
bo Ai LM 
Z cu ce %D 
> 
9 
ZD tu r. Co 
P-4 0 
u0 Co 
P-f 4-4 c3. %0 
0 0 cy, ' 
0 924 r-1 
0-% 
10 
41 r3 
"0 
0 --1 001 CN C) r-4 C) .4 C) 4 C) r-, 4 C. 4 ý4 -4 
00 v-4 00 C14 000000(: ) -4 04 C) 
0 %0 C) CD 0 ei 0 Co 0 Lr) 0 --A 0000 C-4 00 Ln 
0 
ci Ln 00 in Im m in cm u-i ri ci U) 
0 
00 CY*% 
P-4 
0C0 C) %M CD cq 00C (D 000 -t P-4 rq -t r-4 
0 
%0 
CY% 
P-4 
Cy% %D -2 CY% %0 cm P-4 r- 1 Lri r_ ý4 't 000 rq 00 LM CD P-4 rrl C%i cyl clq OD ri 9--4 mt ri cn in %, m en Lri c, 4 cn Ln 
0 
00 (Ylt 
P-4 
c-4 1 %0 Le) ri 1 cn rý oi ýt 1o oo -t 1o M r--1 rý P-4 Lr) ri CY) (n -t ri r--4 -t 
0 
%D 
CY% 
P-4 
t CY% vi r, L-) fi "4 00 0N tr% rn (: 
rý c; rz lý cý cý uý 
Lý 
-ý cý rý r2 ý9 rý -ý (ý ci r, LM 00 000 v-% N0 
rZ 
rrl M (n 00 r- (n 00 M r. rý %In r-4 %0 0IN ýt -e 0 00 m%0 "14 c"i P-4 rn IT cli "4 CNI ri rli cq m r. 4 N Lr% P-4 (n Lri r-4 
Ul r, 1 ri 0N Lr) r- r- ei cyl Lri cyl 0 U) P-4 0 r_ %D ri -t r-4 1-4 1-4 cl P-4 (n V-4 r-i N P-H ýt r4 N P-4 
N LD u 
1-4 ý-4 
zz 
334 
00 
ON 
1-4 
%-0 
0 
5 
Pw 
0 
P-4 
0) 
$4 
0 
APPENDIX 5.7 
ALLOCATION PROCEDURES 
Applications on prescribed forms in duplicate duly supported with documentary 
evidence as required therein should either be handed over personally at tenant 
purchase office, City Hall or sent through registered mail to the Town Clerk, P. O. 
BOX 30075, Nairobi, so as to reach in either case not later than 8th march, 1976. 
2. Each application should be accompanied with a fee of Kenya Shillings fifty in 
cash, bank draft or crossed cheque 
A cheque or bank draft for the exact amount of down payment as explained at 
page 15 of this brochure or as defined in the letter of offer should be received by 
the Town Clerk P. O. BOX 30075, Nairobi within seven days of the receipt of the 
said letter of offer to successful applicant. 
4. Incomplete applications or those without the fee of Kenya shillings fifty will be 
rejected summarily. 
5. Those applications which are complete in all respects and are accompanied with 
application fee will be scrutinized. 
6. After scrutiny those applications which are found to be eligible will be kept on 
record and processed further. 
7. Applications found eligible in all respects will go through a random selection 
process, using either the computer or simple balloting. 
8. A list of successful applicants will thus be drawn, to whom a letter of offer will 
be sent. This letter of offer will specify date by which an acceptance by the 
allottee and down payment must be received. 
9. Should any successful applicant fail to accept, pay the down payment or take up 
the house for whatever reason, the same will be allocated to the next successful 
applicant from the supplementary list of eligible applicants, drawn using the same 
procedure as outlined above. 
M. M. YUSUF 
PROJECT DIRECTOR 
NOTE: Other than application fee and cost of brochure all figures in the 
brochure are estimated and therefore are subject to adjustment. 
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